: Re: Finding the probable best candidate?
Mr. Barney wrote in part-
The plurality procedure is the only positional method which always elects a
majority candidate when one exists; therefore, one could argue that it is the
positional procedure which maximizes the election of a majority
like Borda elimination
does, nor does it remove any candidate from the process until the bottom
seeded candidate has had its go, so the theorem Saari quoted does not
apply.
The title of this EM thread is finding the probable best candidate.
Best implies optimization of something. Perhaps minimum
Forest:
Here is a quote from one of Saari's papers which seems to imply that inverse
Nanson and the Borda Bubble Sort method must not be monotonic, given that they
are based on an iterative Borda Count applied to subsets of candidates:
To illustrate, the development of Chapter 5 from [_The
Could you post those examples where RP and not SSD produces those
seemingly undesirable results?
I can't find those old messages in my archives, but here's a very simple
example:
49: Bush
24: Gore
27: Nader,Gore
Bush beats Nader 49-27
Nader beats Gore 27-24
Gore beats Bush 51-49
With ranked
for something else.
The problem is that no method can satisfy both IIA and the condition that it
always produces non-cyclic outcomes.
SB
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2002 18:21:35 -0800 (PST)
From: Rob LeGrand [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Finding the probable best candidate?
Steve
Forest:
Most preferred according to the information in the ordinal preference ballots.
SB
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, 18 Feb 2002, Steve Barney wrote:
Yes, of course we have limited information by which to determine the
group's
best
On Tue, 19 Feb 2002, Adam Tarr wrote:
Basically, whoever starts in first place in the cyclic
tie wins, since whoever makes it up to challenge them must be the candidate
that loses to them. So insofar as Borda seeded bubble sort uses Borda
count to decide things, it has the same
On Wed, 20 Feb 2002, Steve Barney wrote:
Most preferred according to the information in the ordinal preference ballots.
I don't think you are saying that we should choose the candidate that
contributes the most (or least) information to the ballot.
Example:
51 ABCD
49 DBAC
B's rank
On Wed, 20 Feb 2002, Adam Tarr wrote:
Forest wrote:
(1) Bubble sort starts from the top and works down: If the Borda order is
A B C , then Bubble compares A and B first, and then advances C as
far up as possible, one comparison at a time. So in circular ties
Bubble can
Forest wrote:
In three way races Black, Ranked Pairs, and SSD all give the same answer
if there are no truncations, so none has any possible advantage over the
others in three way races without truncations.
What about the election
9:ABC
8:BCA
6:CAB
B wins under Black but A wins under
Rob:
First, I really never thought of Buchanan as a clone of Bush, just as I didn't
think of Gore as a clone of Bush (Nader may have, but I didn't). In fact, in
that election it always seemed to me that the fairly strong vote for Nader in
Florida and other states, in spite of the obvious spoiler
On Wed, 20 Feb 2002, Rob LeGrand wrote:
Forest wrote:
In three way races Black, Ranked Pairs, and SSD all give the same answer
if there are no truncations, so none has any possible advantage over the
others in three way races without truncations.
Oops!
What about the election
Steve,
The term clones refers to candidates who are together on every ballot in an
election. In other words, on no ballot does any other candidate separate them.
(Markus has a good formal definition.) The term doesn't imply that the
candidates are actually alike in any way, much less that
Forest wrote:
Unfortunately, at least according to my simulations so far, BSBS is much
worse at SU given sincere votes than BSSE or Black.
I knew that, but that's part of the inevitable tradeoff. The higher the
SU in this class of methods, the less likely that the votes will be
sincere.
I wrote and Markus responded,
Shwartz Sequential Dropping is better. The only
differences as far as I can tell are that
1) You only deal with the Smith Set
2) You consider number of voters in favor of the defeat, not the margin
of the defeat.
I don't understand this paragraph. Do you
Mr. LeGrand wrote in part-
The term clones refers to candidates who are together on every ballot in an
election. In other words, on no ballot does any other candidate separate
them.
(Markus has a good formal definition.) The term doesn't imply that the
candidates are actually alike in any
On Mon, 18 Feb 2002, Steve Barney wrote:
Yes, of course we have limited information by which to determine the group's
best candidate, but what if we focus on nothing but the information which is
contained in an ordinal preference ballot?
Order of preference isn't sufficient to determine
Mr. LeGrand wrote-
Who deserves to win the following election? Who wins using Borda?
11:BrowneBushBuchananGoreNader
2:BuchananBushBrowneNaderGore
8:BushBrowneBuchananGoreNader
16:BushBuchananBrowneGoreNader
12:BushBuchananBrowneNaderGore
17:GoreNaderBrowneBushBuchanan
Demorep wrote:
Head to Head (Condorcet) Table
BR Browne BH Bush BN Buchanan G Gore N Nader
BR BHBN G N
BR xx 6270 5249
BH 38 xx98 4949
BN 30 2xx 4949
G 48 5151 xx52
N 51 5151
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Mr. LeGrand wrote-
Who deserves to win the following election? Who wins using Borda?
11:BrowneBushBuchananGoreNader
2:BuchananBushBrowneNaderGore
8:BushBrowneBuchananGoreNader
16:BushBuchananBrowneGoreNader
12:BushBuchananBrowneNaderGore
Steve Barney wrote:
Yes, of course we have limited information by which to determine the group's
best candidate, but what if we focus on nothing but the information which is
contained in an ordinal preference ballot? In that case, the best candidate
may be defined as the one who is most
On Sat, 16 Feb 2002, Blake Cretney wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
Personal benefits add up to societal benefit if the voters are civic
minded enough to consider community benefits of personal worth. If their
attitude is every man for himself then community values will be short
changed
On Sat, 16 Feb 2002, Blake Cretney wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
In this EM archive thread, what if (for starters) we just stick to a two
way race between two candidates.
Wouldn't we all agree that the best democratic method is to give the win
to the candidate with the majority of
On Sat, 16 Feb 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Forest wrote-
Perhaps using an L_n norm with n somewhere between 2 and infinity (which
corresponds to the max norm that yields regular CR which is strategically
equivalent to Approval) would be a good compromise. The n could be
adjusted to
Rob LeGrand:
Here's the Borda Count outcome for your example.
11:BrowneBushBuchananGoreNader
2:BuchananBushBrowneNaderGore
8:BushBrowneBuchananGoreNader
16:BushBuchananBrowneGoreNader
12:BushBuchananBrowneNaderGore
17:GoreNaderBrowneBushBuchanan
3:NaderBrowneGoreBushBuchanan
Steve,
You have a different way of calculating the Borda winner than I do, so I won't
go to the trouble of finding the errors in your math. I'm so used to compiling
the pairwise matrix for other methods that I use it for Borda too. You can see
the way I do it at
Forest wrote-
Perhaps using an L_n norm with n somewhere between 2 and infinity (which
corresponds to the max norm that yields regular CR which is strategically
equivalent to Approval) would be a good compromise. The n could be
adjusted to take into account the relative importance of
You (Mike) wrote this a while ago, but I think it sums up your position.
There's no one best candidate. There's one that you insist is
the best, and there's one that someone else insists is the best.
You claim that there's a certain candidate who's really the best,
but there isn't.
That doesn't solve the problem. But it does give a starting point for
arguing about what standards are valuable, and what assumptions are
reasonable, and then what procedure is implied from various standards
and assumptions.
---
D - One obvious standard --- getting a desired (plus compromise, if
On Tue, 12 Feb 2002, Richard Moore wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
That still leaves open at least two important questions.
(1) How do we ascertain voter utilities accurately? The uncertainty
principle operates here; the measurement process inevitably introduces
uncertainties. How
On Thu, 14 Feb 2002, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Then maybe there's something to postmodernism. But it's a funny
word. What would they call what comes after postmodernism?
Mike Ossipoff
How about transcendent post modernism?
In this EM archive thread, what if (for starters) we just stick
On Tue, 12 Feb 2002, Blake Cretney wrote:
Forest Simmons wrote:
The utilities don't have to be utilitarian. They include the
altruistic
values held dear by the voters as well as their economic interests.
But if you're hoping to use the method to find the candidate that
Forest wrote-
Wouldn't we all agree that the best democratic method is to give the win
to the candidate with the majority of votes, whether or not the voters
have actually based their votes on fact, fiction, or superstition?
If we cannot resolve the two candidate case, then we have no hope of
Blake said:
So the existence of candidates that are best for specific individuals
proves that there are no absolute best candidates? I claim that toads
don't exist. After all, you admit that frogs do exist. What more proof
do you need?
I reply:
I must admit that I don't understand the
Pragmatically speaking, in a democracy what do we have besides voter
utilities, intuitions, and hunches to measure the goodness of a candidate?
The utilities don't have to be utilitarian. They include the altruistic
values held dear by the voters as well as their economic interests.
The
Forest Simmons wrote:
That still leaves open at least two important questions.
(1) How do we ascertain voter utilities accurately? The uncertainty
principle operates here; the measurement process inevitably introduces
uncertainties. How do we minimize this uncertainty to the extent
Forest Simmons wrote:
Pragmatically speaking, in a democracy what do we have besides voter
utilities, intuitions, and hunches to measure the goodness of a
candidate?
Well, voters may have sound reasons. But you're right that we have only
the voters to go by. But if there is such a thing
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Blake said:
You haven't actually brought out an argument in favour of your position.
The fact that there exist candidates that are best for some people
isn't in dispute and doesn't address the issue.
I reply:
Actually, I claim that it does address the issue, and
Blake said:
You haven't actually brought out an argument in favour of your position.
The fact that there exist candidates that are best for some people
isn't in dispute and doesn't address the issue.
I reply:
Actually, I claim that it does address the issue, and that it
means that there's no
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