In this installment I would like to summarize (by example) the how to of
the current Condorcet Flavored Proportional Representation (CFPR) method
that takes into account the constructive criticism of Adam Tarr:
Here's information from one typical ballot:
A few more thoughts on this subject:
(1) If we interpret the set difference AB-CD as being just A because A is
the only member of AB that is not equivalent to a member of CD, then we
naturally assume that CD-AB would be have to be empty, since each member
of CD is equivalent to some member of
2 more questions about Condorcet-PR:
- is there any sequential version of this? I can't figure one, since the
placement of the cutoffs depends on the total number of candidates being
elected.
- I will admit this is the first election method I've dealt with where I
have trouble manipulating
Adam, thanks for your interest and comments. I'll try to answer your
questions below.
On Thu, 7 Nov 2002, Adam Tarr wrote:
Forest, I finally got around to reading this series of posts. It's very
interesting stuff and you've obviously made a lot of progress on this. A
few comments:
- I'd
Now I'll try to tackle the second question:
On Thu, 7 Nov 2002, Adam Tarr wrote in part:
- I will admit this is the first election method I've dealt with where I
have trouble manipulating small examples. Here's a very small example that
was giving me trouble: say we are electing two
Forest, I finally got around to reading this series of posts. It's very
interesting stuff and you've obviously made a lot of progress on this. A
few comments:
- I'd imagine you're aware of this, but this approach passes the sanity
check of reducing to a regular pairwise matrix when the size
On Mon, 30 Sep 2002 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 28 Sep 2002 at 16:17, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Forest,
you wrote (27 Sep 2002):
A Condorcet Flavored PR Method is an M-winner election method that
(1) compares candidate subsets of cardinality M head-to-head, and
(2) does the
On 28 Sep 2002 at 16:17, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Forest,
you wrote (27 Sep 2002):
A Condorcet Flavored PR Method is an M-winner election method that
(1) compares candidate subsets of cardinality M head-to-head, and
(2) does the comparison in such a way that the winning combination
Dear Forest,
you wrote (27 Sep 2002):
A Condorcet Flavored PR Method is an M-winner election method that
(1) compares candidate subsets of cardinality M head-to-head, and
(2) does the comparison in such a way that the winning combination
of any head-to-head comparison provides better PR
