Craig-
Since you didn't request that I keep your message private, and since you
seem to enjoy reading the list and issuing patronizing comments concerning
posts, I might as well make public this discussion of my posts. If you
wish for me to keep your message private, please say so in the future
Here's why I believe that no voting method based on ranked ballots can
satisfy both the Favorite Betrayal Criterion and the Majority Criterion:
Suppose that sincere preferences are given by
x:ABC
y:BCA
z:CAB
and that none of the three factions has a majority.
Suppose (by way of contradiction)
Please explain CRAB
Forest Simmons a écrit :
Random ballot does satisfy strong FBC.
I suspect that no majoritarian method absolutely satisfies strong FBC,
though some methods like the instant version of CRAB (Cumulative Repeated
Approval Balloting) satisfy it for all practical purposes.
Here's the instant version of CRAB:
Voters submit ranked preference ballots.
Suppose that there are N voters and K candidates.
Initialize a one by K array C by letting the j_th entry be the number of
first place votes of candidate j.
Then ...
While the maximum entry in C is less than N*K+1
Some Condorcet devotees disparage the Consistency Criterion only because
no Condorcet method can satisfy it. Others do not disparage it, but
reluctantly let go of it for the same reason.
But Condorcet (unlike IRV) methods are very close to the boundary of the
set of methods that do satisfy the
I'd said:
Consistency, like a number of other criteria, is relevant to how
well a voting system reflects the electorate's wishes. Say a candidate
wins in each district. If he wins in each district, there's a
meaningful sense in which he can be called the people's choice in
each district. One
Forest, I finally got around to reading this series of posts. It's very
interesting stuff and you've obviously made a lot of progress on this. A
few comments:
- I'd imagine you're aware of this, but this approach passes the sanity
check of reducing to a regular pairwise matrix when the size
