Although it is generally good strategy to allocate points equally among
all choices under cumulative voting, there seem to be exceptions.
For example, in an election to fill several seats with a number of
different factions, you have two similar factions of equal size, who are
just barely
At 17:29 99/09/17, David Cratchpole wrote:
Oh! It solves the thing on a case by case basis (like finding
all examples of inversion and using the rule to exclude answers)!
Alteration rules (rules that constrain the effects caused by
altering preferences on one or more types of papers) hold even
Dear David,
I am not sure whether I have understood you correctly.
That's why I want to ask you to explain your thoughts
using the following two examples?
**
Example 1:
There are 120 voters and 4 candidates for 2 seats.
8 voters vote A C B D.
8 voters vote A C D B.
8 voters vote B
The "principle 1" is incorrectly defined.
New definition:
Principle 1 (P1), Sat 18 Sept 1999
For all c (c is a candidate), all V, all V' (where
V and V' are election systems), then if
V' in AltAtAfter(V,c) and c loses V, then c
also loses V'.
AltAtAfter(V,c) is defined to be the set of
