There's been a lot of argument on the list over how to resolve the lack of
a Condorcet winner. With 3 members in the Smith set I see some easy
resolutions that aren't feasible for 3 members.
With 4 members, 2 of them will have 2 victories apiece and 2 of them will
have 1 victory apiece (only
On Tue, 26 Feb 2002, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Alex,
methods that always choose one of the candidates with
the largest number of pairwise victories are called
Copeland methods. The main problem of Copeland methods
is that they are manipulable by clones in a very
straight forward
The goal of maximizing voting power while minimizing manipulability seems
to be an elusive will 'O wisp.
However, in committees and other small groups one option is repeated
balloting. For example, approval ballots can be repeated N times or until
the ballots stabilize, whichever comes first.
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Blake said:
Some countries use plurality with successive elimination for things like
leadership conventions. I think Americans use it for speaker of the
house. Since the strategy is very similar, I think that awareness of
strategy in one would be good evidence of
D- Another *hammer* order from the courts -- like Bush v. Gore, ___ U.S. ___
(2000).
-
Los Angeles Times
State Ordered to Replace Old Vote Machines
By Henry Weinstein
February 14, 2002
A federal judge in Los Angeles on Wednesday ruled that California has to
replace outmoded punch-card
First, a quick point: There are (at least) two separate issues discussed on
this list. One is methods themselves, like Ranked Pairs vs. SSD vs. IRV vs.
Borda; this issue generates most of the interesting posts and debates. The
other is the procedures of compiling the pairwise matrix for
Partial rankings are penalized.
I don't think it would be a strong exaggeration to characterize this as the
crux of your argument. You basically say, Ranked Pairs ignores partial
rankings, while SSD does not. Since partial rankings are penalized, this
allows those who are unaware of this
