Adam was quoted:
Adam was more helpful, with a rule I could follow: Approve whichever
candidate I prefer among the expected front runners, and approve all the
candidates I like better than that one.
That's an easily-applied strategy, since one thing oftenr relatively
obvious is who the 2
Hi all,
I've been somewhat following the various approval strategy threads, and
I'm still a little skeptical. In addition to the three-way problem that
Richard Moore points out, I think a more troubling problem will be in
getting good polling data.
When asked in some
I recently read something about elections in Venice. I think it was in this
PDF
file, which I found when I wasd looking for information on Ramón Llull (or
Lull)
who invented Condorcet voting in the 13th century.
Voting in Medieval Universities and Religious Orders
What a great link, thanks.
98% re-election?
North Korea would be proud?
BLAH!
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2002 11:56 AM
Subject: [EM] Gerrymander story- Economist
The Economist, a U.K. politics magazine, has a story
Rob L wrote:
Let's assume a simple left-right spectrum, with candidates A, B, C, and D
(far left to far right). Let's also say that candidates B wins in a world
where there's accurate data, and everyone votes according to expected
strategy (where B and C are the only candidates who get or come
Mr. Hager wrote in part-
With the Venetian system, set it up so that a failure of any candidate to get
at least 66% means that all candidates are rejected and a new election with
new candidates must be held.
---
D- Democracy = 50 % plus 1
ANTI- Democracy = less than 50 % plus 1
I wonder when they'll be able to say Alex is in apartment 22 and
registered with this party, and the guy in apt. 21 is a different party, so
let's draw the line between those units.
Even better This husband and wife are opposite parties. Since he sleeps
on the left side of the bed and has his
Demorep-
I agree that MN should have used a different election method, so that
whoever their governor might be he can claim more than 37%% support.
However, calling Ventura's election a subversion of democracy seems to
imply that he shouldn't have taken office. If somebody fails to get a
http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/campaignfinance/
has th various 2002 U.S.A. campaign finance law cases.
How many pounds (tons ???) of paper in all cases ???
I continue to note the indirect minority rule math of the ANTI-Democracy
gerrymander/ plurality regime in the U.S.A. Congress that
Rob Lanphier wrote:
Let's assume a simple left-right spectrum, with candidates A, B, C, and D
(far left to far right). Let's also say that candidates B wins in a world
where there's accurate data, and everyone votes according to expected
strategy (where B and C are the only candidates who
I agree with Mike's main point (that we should go after the public, and
not worry too much about converting IRV proponents) as well as his
secondary important point that rank balloting is not the right thing to
take to the public at this point.
By keeping things simple we can use simplicity as
Alex wrote in part --
I wonder when they'll be able to say Alex is in apartment 22 and
registered with this party, and the guy in apt. 21 is a different party, so
let's draw the line between those units.
---
D- Welcome to the cynical world of minority rule gerrymanders.
At least the
On Sat, 27 Apr 2002, Richard Moore wrote:
snip
I think in non-zero-info cases, if the inference is based on each
candidate's probable vote totals and margin of error from a reliable
Approval-style poll, then the inference is supported by statistical
evidence,
[etc.]
This brings up the
Forest Simmons wrote:
What if the polls could tell us (for each i and j) what percentage of the
voters approve both candidates i and j. If that percentage is not close
to the product of the percentages of approval for i and approval for j, it
would tell us that that approval for i and j are
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