Here is a correction:
At 02\12\18 18:41 +1300 Wednesday, Craig Carey wrote:
...
Markus wrote (4 Feb 2002):
In so far as IRV meets majority for solid coalitions and independence
from clones, IRV can hardly be called erratic compared to primary
with runoff.
...
A better rule is
12/18/02 - Re: Best method in use?
Hi Mike,
Donald here, the best methods in use around the world today are as follows:
Single-Seat elections:
First Best - Alternative Vote aka Irving aka IRV:
Second Best - Top Two Runoff (only valid for three candidates):
Multi-Seat elections:
Dear Craig Carey,
the concept of clones has been proposed by Tideman:
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Independence of Clones as
a Criterion for Voting Rules, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
WELFARE, vol. 4, pp. 185-206, 1987.
Markus Schulze
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe,
At 02\12\18 12:27 +0200 Wednesday, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Craig Carey,
the concept of clones has been proposed by Tideman:
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Independence of Clones as
a Criterion for Voting Rules, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
WELFARE, vol. 4, pp. 185-206, 1987.
Markus Schulze
Well, you
Dear Craig Carey,
you wrote (19 Dec 2002):
Markus wrote (18 Dec 2002):
The concept of clones has been proposed by Tideman:
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Independence of Clones as
a Criterion for Voting Rules, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
WELFARE, vol. 4, pp. 185-206, 1987.
What Mr Tideman wrote
Don Davison wrote:
... why are
you supporting Condorcet and/or Approval Voting? For, this is what these
two method do, they give `crutches to weak candidates'.
Do you mean weak candidates like Centrist, below?
10% FarRightRightCentristLeftFarLeft
10% RightFarRightCentristLeftFarLeft
15%
At 02\12\18 16:12 +0200 Wednesday, Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Craig Carey,
you wrote (19 Dec 2002):
Markus wrote (18 Dec 2002):
The concept of clones has been proposed by Tideman:
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Independence of Clones as
a Criterion for Voting Rules, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
Great style of example and it pointedly reminds that the reformers
that said the Alternative Vote fixed some vote splitting problem
with First Past the Post were lying. E.g. the CVD top leaders
certainly are recalled by us (Chessin, Dan and Rob, and others).
To some extend the complaint about
As I understand it, Kemeny's Rule amounts to minimizing a certain metric
on rankings, and that this minimization is an NP complete problem, making
it intractable for elections with more than four or five voters when there
are as few as twenty candidates.
Forest
On Wed, 18 Dec 2002, barnes99
I took it for granted that favorite would also be among the approved on
Majority Choice ballots, and that favorites would be determined from the
rankings or ratings in the case of CR or ranked ballots.
But I still think that CS as I proposed it suffers from a fault. If the
race is perceived as
Here's the version of Candidate Space (CS) that I like the best now:
The ballots must have some way of determining favorite, so must have at
least the expressivity of Majority Choice ballots.
[The favorite on the expressive side of the ballot must have maximal
positive instrumentality in the
Does anyone know who uses Kemeny's Rule, and if there is any freeware avaible
which will handle that method? I think I can figure out a 3 candidate KR
outcome with a matrix, but not any more than that.
BTW, according a very good book I am now reading:
Condorcet's maximal agreement method is
12 matches
Mail list logo
