My original (Fri 9 Aug) post stated, Our process could readily have been
formalized as an MCA election among candidates A-E. Under usual Approval, B
would have won; but in effect we followed MCA, making A the clear winner.
In response, Adam Tarr wrote (Sun 11 Aug):
I wouldn't be so sure
Adam argued that in Approval elections the best strategy may not be to
simply vote for all candidates whom you approve on a gut level. In
public elections this is certainly true.
On a small committee, however, there may be more incentive to vote for all
candidates whom you approve on a gut
Joe Weinstein wrote:
Our process could readily have been formalized as an MCA election among
candidates A-E. Under usual Approval, B would have won; but in effect we
followed MCA, making A the clear winner.
I wouldn't be so sure that B would win in approval. If everyone took the
name
Recall that in MCA (Majority Choice Approval), the voter rates each
candidate as preferred (or ‘highly desired’: two checks), accepted (one
check), or unacceptable (no checks, blank). If at least one candidate is
rated by a majority (50% or more) of the voters as preferred, then the
winner
At 02\08\09 16:20 -0700 Friday, Joe Weinstein wrote:
Recall that in MCA (Majority Choice Approval), the voter rates each
candidate as preferred (or 'highly desired': two checks), accepted (one
check), or unacceptable (no checks, blank). If at least one candidate is
rated by a majority (50%
