David Catchpole wrote:
...this implies non-zero information. Can I just say that our discussions
of "black-box" strategy are really freaking me out? This is some weird
philosophical going down.
It seems we must always have some kind of information or assumptions about
the "black-box"
Dear Blake,
you wrote (30 Mar 2000):
Markus Schulze wrote (29 Mar 2000):
This is an example where it is advantageous to vote
insincerely in a zero information situation:
Suppose that MinMax(margins) is used. Suppose that there
are four candidates. Suppose that your sincere opinion
The important point, which distinguishes margins, is that a vote of AB
is just as likely to decrease the largest loss of A as it is to increase
the
largest loss of B, unless we know which is already winning.
You're talking about changing the outcome by changing, in a
circular tie, which
Dear Markus,
Dear Blake,
this is an example where it is advantageous to vote
insincerely in a zero information situation:
Suppose that MinMax(margins) is used. Suppose that there
are four candidates. Suppose that your sincere opinion
is A B C D.
Where is the problem? The problem
On Wed, 29 Mar 2000, Markus Schulze wrote:
Suppose that p(B,A) is the calculated probability that
you change the winner from candidate B to candidate A
when you vote A B C D sincerely. Suppose that
p(B,C) is the calculated probability that you change
the winner from candidate B to
Dear Blake,
this is an example where it is advantageous to vote
insincerely in a zero information situation:
Suppose that MinMax(margins) is used. Suppose that there
are four candidates. Suppose that your sincere opinion
is A B C D.
Where is the problem? The problem is: It is possible that
David Catchpole said:
On Wed, 29 Mar 2000, Markus Schulze wrote:
Suppose that p(B,A) is the calculated probability that
you change the winner from candidate B to candidate A
when you vote A B C D sincerely. Suppose that
p(B,C) is the calculated probability that you change
the
On Mon, 20 Mar 2000, "MIKE OSSIPOFF" wrote:
You're trying to maximize a candidate's chance of losing
(or the chance of all the sub-mean candidates of losing),
in case they don't have a majority pairwise defeat, in case
a majority isn't trying to get that defeat. Fine. I don't have
a problem
Blake spoke of how, if the goal is to make sure one or more
candidates don't win, then, with Margins, there's no incentive
to do other than sincerely rank the candidates whom one likes
more. But said that, with Condorcet, one would have incentive
to rank a number of candidates in 1st place.
