candidate, only even with their
next choice. So their vote does not constitute a betrayal or even a
strategic vote. It's a sincere vote, given the constraints of Approval Voting.
-Adam Tarr
atarr at purdue dot edu
Adam Tarr, Ph.D. Student
Purdue University
School of Electrical and Computer
in 2000, it didn't blatantly disenfranchise an
entire region like the 1860 vote did.
- Adam Tarr
(If this idea has been suggested before, then I apologize for unintentionally
copying and throw my support fully behind the original proponent. If you don't
care to read my long-winded build-up, just skip to the sixth paragraph, not
including this one.)
Proportional Representation (PR) has
Proportional Representation (PR) is not an election method in itself, it is
a category of methods that give better proportionality than
Plurality-at-Large.
What you are talking about above is called `Closed Party List'.
Thanks for the clarification.
You also wrote: In order for a party to be
At 06:39 PM 1/30/02 -0800, Blake Cretney wrote:
Your definition may well be clear and easy to apply. I don't remember
your definition.
I'm pretty sure this is Mike's Definition:
http://electionmethods.org/evaluation.html#CC
It seems like a reasonable one to me. This does not mean that we
The way I would look at the IRV vs. ITTR (top two runoff) debate:
IRV advocates tout many advantages of IRV, but in reality it only has one clear
advantage over basic plurality: as long as two parties (candidates) stay
dominant, it prevents a spoiler vote. ITTR shares this advantage, while
elections, like
Condorcet would provide.
If you choose to respond, please do address the example and explain why IRV
will succeed where the other voting methods fail.
-Adam
Adam Tarr, Ph.D. Student
Purdue University
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
(765)743-7287
At 06:17 AM 2/3/02 -0500, Donald Davison wrote:
One: Its high proportionality is only for party.
How else do you define proportionality? You can't define it on a
per-candidate basis; candidates are either 100% elected or 100% un-elected..
Two: The voter is not allowed to cross party lines.
I wrote and Forest responded:
It seems to me that rather than talking about satisfaction points it
makes more sense to decay the value of the ballots that voted for a
winner. The effect is the same, it just makes more sense by my way of
thinking. For example, if we wanted to use
Forest Wrote:
n A and C
n B and C
51-n A only
49-n B only
As long as 2*n is greater than 51, the winning
combination is {A,C} in sequential PAV.
But when 2*n is not too much greater than 51 [up until 65],
the winning combination is still {A,B} in regular PAV.
So I was wrong... good
Using d'Hondt's rule, this sort of offensive strategic manipulation
by clever vote-splitting appears to be impossible... it seems obvious
from playing with examples, although I'm having trouble coming up
with a clean way to explain it. So, it looks like d'Hondt might be
the better choice for
Forest wrote:
Suppose that we have a closed list method
and we want to know which order to fill the list's (eventual) quota. The
party could have a sequential PAV primary. Better yet use an open list
instead of a primary, and let sequential PAV decide the order of filling
the quota.
This is an
Demorep wrote:
Head to Head (Condorcet) Table
BR Browne BH Bush BN Buchanan G Gore N Nader
BR BHBN G N
BR xx 6270 5249
BH 38 xx98 4949
BN 30 2xx 4949
G 48 5151 xx52
N 51 5151
I wrote and Markus responded,
Shwartz Sequential Dropping is better. The only
differences as far as I can tell are that
1) You only deal with the Smith Set
2) You consider number of voters in favor of the defeat, not the margin
of the defeat.
I don't understand this paragraph. Do you
Blake wrote:
So, is the point of your example that the Bush voter's are dishonest
then?
Dishonest? Is all strategic voting tantamount to dishonesty? If so,
then I agree that the Bush voters are dishonest. If not, I see no
reason to slander the (imaginary) Bush voters like that. Their
Forest wrote:
[...] if we interpret truncations as NO and ranked as YES.
This time Bush wins, having greater approval than Gore.
I suggest that this is a reasonable interpretation, and that the resulting
version of Approval Completed Condorcet is not too shabby.
The problem with handling
Are you claiming that it is always, or generally, a bad idea to give a
complete ranking in RP. I believe that to be false. If you don't have
any particular strategic knowledge, you should give a full ranking.
I agree, it is unlikely that this is always the case. In my example,
however, I
Partial rankings are penalized.
I don't think it would be a strong exaggeration to characterize this as the
crux of your argument. You basically say, Ranked Pairs ignores partial
rankings, while SSD does not. Since partial rankings are penalized, this
allows those who are unaware of this
26 AB
25 BA
49 CX
Not sure what this example attempts to drive at, but I'll take a stab at it
and you can perhaps fill us in
There are 51 voters in the A,B camp, so one of them should win,
regardless of the composition of X (C is a Condorcet loser) If X is
truncation, an even split, or
Joe Weinstein wrote and Alex responded:
usual PR presumes that voters want to be proportionally
represented ONLY according to political party, not other criteria,
including geographic proximity.
Good point about geographical concerns. In a bicameral state legislature
it would be reasonable to
If the
election is done using open party list, then voting is very simple no
matter how many candidates there are.
My concern is not the method. My concern is that electoral districts be a
reasonable size so that campaign costs aren't unmanageable. Also, I worry
that if each party's slate is
I wrote and Alex responded:
if you have small districts you don't get real proportionality. In my
opinion, you have to have at least 5 or 6 seats in a district to get
acceptably proportional results. The more fractionalized the electorate
is, the more seats per district you need.
I'm not
I'm trying to figure out if Approval-Completed Condorcet does better than
Beatpath or Ranked Pairs or the other popular Condorcet implementations around
here. So I decided to look at it against Mike's criteria. Well, it fails
Favorite Betrayal, like everything this side of Approval does.
Michael wrote:
Draw a line between the population centroid and the
voting centroid (or population median and voting median), and continue until
you have the number of districts you want. That way, roughly equal voters
and residents would be in each district.
As you implied before, this could
Josh wrote:
I think the map should be non-geographic, and, instead, road-based.
Dense networks of roads should not be separated into separate districts.
An urban area on two sides of a bridge could easily be divided.
Very slick idea Josh. The question becomes, how do you come up with a
Steve wrote:
. . . All that kept [Hitler's party] alive was its chance to obtain
some measure of success in every election in which it participated. Otherwise
it would probably have disbanded, and Hitler might have resumed the peaceful
profession of painting houses.
--Hermens, F. A.,
Alex wrote:
19% Bill George Ross
18% Bill Ross George
19% Ross George Bill
12% Ross Bill George
16% George Bill Ross
16% George Ross Bill
Runoff is still Bill vs. George, and George wins. If 2% from the
BillGeorgeRoss camp list their preference as RossBillGeorge, the runoff
is Bill
Rob wrote:
To violate monotonicity, an example must cause a winner to lose by having
some voters uprank him or cause a loser to win by having some voters
downrank him. Alex's first Bill/George/Ross example and Adam's
Al/George/Ralph example have the same problem.
My example again was
44%
Rob wrote:
9:ABC
8:BCA
6:CAB
A wins by all four methods. Now four of the BCA voters switch to CAB,
which is upranking A by Adam's definition:
9:ABC
4:BCA
10:CAB
Now C
The rest of my message (not sure why it didn't make the list; it's in my
out box) appears below. I apologize for the junk message.
Rob wrote:
9:ABC
8:BCA
6:CAB
A wins by all four methods. Now four of the BCA voters switch to
CAB, which is upranking A by Adam's definition:
9:ABC
Rob LeGrand recently experimented with simulations of repeated Approval
balloting. He did both cumulative and non-cumulative versions. He found
that when there is a CW, the non-cumulative version homes in on it quicker
than the cumulative version, but they both eventually reach it. When
there
Dave wrote:
I have nothing nice to say about Approval, noting that no one seems able
to give me useful guidelines as to how well I should have to like a
candidate to say approve.
Rob LeGrand came up with a decent strategy that makes a lot of
sense. Approve every candidate you like more than
Despite the fact that this debate has been on the list since long before I
showed up, I really think we're making progress.
I wrote and Blake responded
A beats B, 70% winning votes (25% losing)
B beats C, 52% winning votes (45% losing)
C beats A, 50% winning votes (40% losing)
By virtue of a
Don Davidson wrote:
Adam, you are confused. It is not a weakness of IRV that it does not
interfer with the voters and with an election when it does not break the
system out of a two-party duopoly. Instead, it is the strength of IRV that
it allows the public to break the system out of a
Don Davidson wrote:
Rob LeGrand, you wrote:
49:ReaganAndersonCarter
33:CarterAndersonReagan
18:AndersonCarterReagan
Donald: If this example above is an Approval election then it would be nice
if at least one voter only approved one candidate. As it is, your election
is a three way tie.
I
It seems clear that only the Condorcet winner (if one exists) will produce
a Nash equilibrium.
Are you suggesting that if there is no Condorcet winner there is no Nash
equilibrium, or that if there is a Condorcet winner all of the Nash
equilibria will elect the Condorcet winner, or both?
The
Alex wrote:
So not every election of the Condorcet candidate is a Nash equilibrium,
but every Nash equilibrium elects the Condorcet candidate.
This looks right, assuming of course that a Condorcet winner exists.
Is every Nash equilibrium sincere? Have to think about that. Seems like
every
Winning this election is only our second objective. Worst may win
this election, but that is only a short term gain for them. We are going
for the long term gain. We are going for Number One, but first we need to
be Number Two.
That's basically a load of bull. What you are saying is that IRV
Would you have a web reference for a precise description
of the BeatpathWinner method...
Is it like Ranked Pairs ?
http://www.onr.com/user/honky98/rbvote/desc.html
Beatpath is described under Schulze.
-Adam
We thus have the following ordering:
(C,V) S
V S C
S (V, C)
We thus have the following ordering:
(C,V) S
V S C
S (V, C)
Vanilla is the Condorcet winner. Chocolate is the Condorcet loser. No
need to assume preferences among the voted indifferences. Perhaps an
example that truly produces a
Jurij wrote:
this system becomes similar to AV if the number of candidates to be
elected is large and the number of all candidates is small. For example 3
members to be elected and four candidates altogether. Or evenmore: 7
candidates to be elected and 8 candidates overall. But what if there
http://www.electionmethods.org
At 09:55 AM 4/12/02 -0400, you wrote:
Please explicite:
FBC, SFC, GSFC, WDSC, SDSC.
( Criteria)
If Mr. Ossipoff could provide a reference on a website with a definition
for each criteria
and if possible a counter-example for each of these
criteria that
Hello everyone. I was just playing around with my/Forest's/Demorep's
Approval-Completed Condorcet idea again. Once again, the idea is to use a
graded ballot (ABCDEF, for example). If there was not a Condorcet winner,
then the candidate with the most approval votes (A's, B's, and C's in the
Mike wrote:
If there are fewer than 5 candidates, or fewer than 5 voters, or
if someone offers to count the rankings by computer, then I vote
for all of the methods that I've nominated except Bucklin.
Otherwise, I vote for Approval and Bucklin.
I'm not sure what we are voting on here. Are we
Mike wrote:
That hadn't occurred to me--that there's another non-reversed
defensive strategy that always thwarts offensive order-reversal
in the wv methods: equal-top-ranking of the CW.
Of course the Nader voters might insist that the Gore voters
announce publicly that they're going to
49: BushGoreNader
12: GoreBushNader
12: GoreNaderBush
27: NaderGoreBush
---
D- Who, if anybody, with all the strategy / insincere machinations has a
YES majority ???
Demorep, read the original message of the thread, [EM] Approval-Competed
Condorcet... more strategy-free? from early morning
Here are some links that I have been looking into to try and find details
on Eastern European Approval-Style elections. So far, no luck, but maybe
someone else can do better.
http://www.aceeeo.org/
http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/
http://www.ifes.org
http://www.idea.int/
Demorep wrote:
I again suggest that new EM folks (aka newbies) be given info and directed
to look at certain web pages so that the same old election math 101
questions do NOT have to be answered again and again by EM senior citizens.
Dave wrote:
I claim that approval is both weak enough for many of these to notice, and
more difficult than its backers are willing to admit:
Weak because, if I approve of two candidates, I CANNOT indicate my
preference between them.
True, but it can hardly be considered a step back
Sorry for the huge quote block at the top of this message, but I tried to
snip out that which was no longer relevant...
A beats B, 70% winning votes (25% losing)
B beats C, 52% winning votes (45% losing)
C beats A, 50% winning votes (40% losing)
By virtue of a slight perturbation (the
Rob L wrote:
Let's assume a simple left-right spectrum, with candidates A, B, C, and D
(far left to far right). Let's also say that candidates B wins in a world
where there's accurate data, and everyone votes according to expected
strategy (where B and C are the only candidates who get or come
D- I mention the obvious.
A legislative body can elect/ appoint (by a majority vote) any officer who
fails to get 50 percent plus 1 of the votes for the office from the voters.
Demorep, you advocate this sort of thing a lot, but frankly I don't think
it's a good idea to throw things to the
Alex wrote:
I read that Riker proved that when voters have complete information about
eachother's preferences, and act to optimize their immediate outcome, the
sincere CW will win, no matter what (nonprobabilistic?) voting system is
used.
If this is true then perhaps it is possible to come
At 05:23 PM 5/3/02 -0700, you wrote:
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite result doesn't rule out Alex's SVM (Small Voting
Machine) when you take into account that the voting machine is supposed to
apply the OPTIMAL strategy, which is sometimes a probabilistic mixture of
pure strategies requiring coin
Rob LeGrand wrote:
Strategy A: Approve all candidates I prefer to the current CRAB
first-placer; also approve the first-placer if I prefer him to the
second-placer.
strategy A always homes in on the Condorcet winner when one exists and all
voters use the same strategy.
This is really an
Rob LeGrand wrote
The problem is that the approval voters in CRAB don't know when the
balloting
will stop, so insincere strategy almost always backfires in the end, even if
it's effective at first. I've tried some tricky strategies in my simulations,
but they never help the voters using them
Joe Weinstein wrote:
Our process could readily have been formalized as an MCA election among
candidates A-E. Under usual Approval, B would have won; but in effect we
followed MCA, making A the clear winner.
I wouldn't be so sure that B would win in approval. If everyone took the
name
Bart Ingles wrote:
Adam Tarr wrote:
There's no sense in talking about uncertainty and ties; it only
confuses the issue.
Sorry to spoil your clarity. Having never seen an election where the
exact vote count is known in advance (except possibly in a couple of
counties in Florida), I would
Bart, you've got it wrong. You're jumping to bad conclusions here,
because you're not looking at all four cases. Look back at my
original analysis, or at least look at this, the final decision matrix
for winning votes (ABC voters' choices on top, CBA voters' choices on
left):
xxx| T | NT |
Bart Ingles wrote:
The reason I am comparing only the
diagonal (T/T vs. NT/NT) is that the
A and C sides can't know which they are in advance of the election
(in
other words, which is the majority faction). So whatever
strategy
applies to one applies to both; in fact there is no way for the two
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My conjecture is: If you
give multiple unranked candidates 1/2 vote each then both wv and margins
have the no strategic truncation incentive (NSTI) property.
Sorry matt, it's not true. If you give equally ranked candidates
half a vote against one another (which, I think,
Looks like you goofed. Not so fullproof... maybe you were juggling a lot
of different numbers and you sent out the wrong ones? Your pairwise counts
do not jive with the voted totals at all.
Stephane Rouillon wrote:
2: A B C
4: A C B
2: B A C
3: B C A
2: C A B
0: C B A
8A 5B
8A 5C
7B 6C
I think you got it this time. I'm glad I made my (ultimately false) claim,
because now I have a better sense of when it is not the case. It would be
nice to understand it even better, though.
Stephane Rouillon wrote:
2: A
2: A B C
2: B A C
1: B C A
4: C
With winning votes A (6) C (5),
Forest, I finally got around to reading this series of posts. It's very
interesting stuff and you've obviously made a lot of progress on this. A
few comments:
- I'd imagine you're aware of this, but this approach passes the sanity
check of reducing to a regular pairwise matrix when the size
2 more questions about Condorcet-PR:
- is there any sequential version of this? I can't figure one, since the
placement of the cutoffs depends on the total number of candidates being
elected.
- I will admit this is the first election method I've dealt with where I
have trouble manipulating
Alex wrote,
IRV is like a post-season tournament,
where teams and players qualify by doing well during the regular season
and procede through a series of eliminations.
Actually, this is still not very IRV-ish, since each team competes in a
series of pairwise tests in the elimination series.
Steve Barnes wrote:
Alex Small seems to beg the question, how much more manipulatable is the
Borda
Countthan, say, the IRV? It seems to me that we should quantify the DEGREE
to which
it suffers this problem.
Is there a way to quantify this? Probably not a way that everyone could
agree on.
1 ABC
1 ACB
1 CAB
1 CBA
1 BCA
1 BAC
Is the BC is more manipulable than IRV or plurality vote, in this case? If
so,
precisely how much more (in numbers)?
Borda and plurality are exactly equal in the eyes of this example. No
voter can break the tie in favor of their favorite; any voter can
Recently, there have been a few people on the list making the erroneous
claim that approval voting violates the principle of one person, one
vote. I just wanted to share what I consider the simplest argument to
refute this:
*** You can only vote at most once for the winning candidate. ***
James Gilmour wrote:
I don't want to play semantics, but surely if (as you said) approval ballots
contain information not present in ranked ballots, the ranked ballots must
contain less information than the approval ballots? Or do you mean that they
contain similar amounts of information, but
Stephane Rouillon wrote:
You maximize the power of your vote by voting for half of the candidates.
This would be the optimal strategy if you had no knowledge from
pre-election polls.
No; if you have no knowledge of the polls, you should vote for every
candidate above your MEAN candidate, not
Steph, I think I read you wrong, but I'm not sure what you WERE trying to
say...
However, the optimal strategy with information obtained from polls, is to
vote for your
favourite and any other candidate you like that the poll says it would
beat your
favourite.
No again. If your favorite
Stephane Rouillon wrote:
1) I would cut all candidates into two equal groups the ones I like, the
ones I do not.
Without poll information, I believe it is the vote that would optimize
my voting power...
I agree, provided the ones I like means the ones I consider better than
average.
2) If I
Stephane Rouillon wrote:
*** You can only vote at most once for the winning candidate. ***
A good thing and this is why I prefer ranking methods to grading methods.
You can use graded ballots in ranking methods, too. Forest advocates this
on the grounds that people are familiar with it and
Don Davison wrote:
... why are
you supporting Condorcet and/or Approval Voting? For, this is what these
two method do, they give `crutches to weak candidates'.
Do you mean weak candidates like Centrist, below?
10% FarRightRightCentristLeftFarLeft
10% RightFarRightCentristLeftFarLeft
15%
What's that you say?: this minimization is an NP complete problem. No
capisci.
Some problems can be done in polynomial time. This means that if the
size of the problem (number of voters, or candidates, in our case) is N,
then the amount of steps you need to solve the problem is some
I must admit I'm not the least bit surprised that Donald Davison has not
responded to my message from 12/18. This is standard debating style for
Donald -- post an inflammatory criticism of Condorcet or Approval, ignore
the reasoned responses, rinse, repeat. Would it be too much to ask him to
Markus Schulze wrote:
The aim of proportional representation is to minimize the number of wasted
votes. However, proportionality is not the only criterion for a good multi-
winner method. I prefer PR-STV to PR-PL because STV makes it possible for
independent candidates to get elected. I consider
Mike wrote and Donald responded:
Mikeo: One advantage that Runoff has over IRV is that, with Runoff, at
least a CW can't lose if s/he comes in 1st or 2nd in the 1st balloting,
whereas in IRV a CW can lose even if s/he's the favorite of by far the most
people. The scenario in which that happens
Markus, very good points. You've convinced me that party list in any form
has significant weaknesses. What do you think of my last comment, about
the advantages of PAV over STV? I'd say the main advantages are twofold:
- voting in PAV is unquestionably easier than STV. For this reason, one
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
60: ABCDE
70: BACDE
100: B
83: DECBA
75: EDCBA
A E get eliminated, and their transfers leave C with the fewest votes.
C gets eliminated though C is CW and though C is the voted favorite
of more people than is any other candidate.
The middle faction should be C's
Markus wrote:
Example: Suppose that there are 3 parties with 5 candidates each.
Suppose that a given voter votes as follows.
Party A (5)
Candidate A1 ()
Candidate A2 (7)
Candidate A3 ()
Candidate A4 (4)
Candidate A5 ()
Party B (7)
Candidate B1 (8)
Candidate B2 (2)
Candidate B3 (1)
Steph wrote:
Suppose two sets, S1 the set of voters and S2 the set of candidates.
Suppose an electoral method that produces scores for each candidate.
If you can split S1 in |S2| subsets each of a cardinality equal to the score
obtained
by the corresponding candidate, you can link these two sets
Hi folks,
A small request for help. I belong to a sports league that has several
sectional tournaments, with a certain number of teams from each section
advancing to the regional tournament. The sections have varying numbers of
teams, and the number of bids each section gets to the regional
Nope, not close enough, but it gives me some new ideas on scenarios to look
for. Thanks.
-Adam
At 12:55 PM 2/1/2003 +0200, you wrote:
I hve this example on my page (in Finnish) at the end of the chapter on
Hare-Niemeyer. Probably not close enough for you.
19 seats
550, 470, 250, 160
7, 6, 4,
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
I suggest that Eric not add margins-counting to his website, because
, for one thing, having it would create some doubt for the user about
which to use, requiring the website to add discussion about the relative
merits of the 2 defeat-measures. The user would have to study
matt matt wrote:
You seem to be incorrectly assuming that the margins method has non-voted
options ranked last like your preferred winning votes method. The margins
method could place the non-voted options at the approval cutoff.
This would require the voted ballots having an explicit
matt matt wrote:
My perspective is that the ranked pairs and beatpath methods describe an
algorithm for determining contest outcomes independently from the details
regarding how equal ranking is counted or ballots are completed or ties
are broken or defeats are measured and the like.
how
I plan on going with a more standard behavior of respecting
the sender's reply-to. The case for the latter behavior is made here:
http://www.unicom.com/pw/reply-to-harmful.html
Rob,
While I agree with the principles noted here, it's worth noting that there
is one disadvantage to standard
, would be if C had won the election. Take the extreme
example: say there was a fourth candidate, Adam Tarr, who received zero
votes. Does electing A, B, or C constitute erasing a majority, because
the other two candidates' defeats of mr. Tarr are not counted? Of course
not. Such a standard
Something I've been wondering about... has anyone suggested extending the
gradation in MCA beyond preferred, approved, and diapproved? For example,
why not use MCA with a A,B,C,D,F ballot? If no candidate has a majority of
A's, then check for a majority of A's and B's, then check for a
I need a proof that Borda and Condorcet can lead to
different winners.
91: AB=C=D=E=F=G=H=I=J=K=L
9: BCDEFGHIJKLA
Condorcet: A defeats B 91 to 9.
Borda: B defeats A 99 to 91.
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
Josh Narins wrote:
BUSH IS A SHIT EATING MONKEY
This is merely the worst example from a thread that has long since strayed
off topic. I understand that we're here to talk about elections, but the
issue of the 2000 Florida recount is only tangentially related to the
issues of election method
Mike Ossipoff wrote:
Either you should speak of a majority _voting_ the candidates in S
over all the other candidates, or else, when saying only that they
prefer the candidates in S to all the others, you should add the
stipulation that they vote sincerely.
The latter wording is better, since
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