Dear Demorep,
in the last days, you have spamed the Election Methods
Mailing List with mails about the Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker.
You have explained the Reverse Bucklin tiebreaker in detail
and calculated many examples. But you haven't written
anything about the expected advantages of this
this result is problematic or unjustifiable
to your opinion.
Markus Schulze
our election methods.]
Markus Schulze
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Dear Craig,
you wrote (19 Oct 1999):
At 21:16 18.10.99 , Markus Schulze wrote:
I want to add that (in so far as most election methods don't
guarantee that a voter cannot be punished for going to the polls
and voting sincerely) the concept of wasted votes cannot really
be used
ur website is out of date. For example: In that website
you still write that SD and SSD were identical and that SD met
monotonicity.
Markus Schulze
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ant to ask you to
explain why this result is problematic or unjustifiable
to your opinion.
Markus Schulze
Thank you for your quick reply. But it doesn't seem to me that
Craig criticizes the currently used STV methods because of their
lack of monotonicity. Could you -please- quote that part
that meets the Condorcet
criterion due to your "universally accepted" theory?
Markus Schulze
, candidate B must be
elected. But the FPP winner is candidate A.
In the example above, I didn't make any presumptions
about whether the voters vote sincerely or strategically.
In the example above, I didn't make any presumptions
about the sincere opinions of the voters. Did I?
Markus
concept and to explain why you think that your own concept
might be better. But unless you have done this, you have to
live with the fact that the concept that election methods
are defined on the reported von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities
of the voters is widely used.
However, I don't have the impression that your statements have
anything to do with majority winner sets or beat path GMC.
Markus Schulze
"Vox populi vox dei!" then I have to disagree
with you.
Markus Schulze
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is the unique best
possible method.
Markus Schulze
when NOTA is
chosen or (6) whether the ballots should be counted by hand or
by computer-- is a part of the electoral law but not of the
election method itself.
However, I don't have the impression that your statements have
anything to do with majority winner sets or beat path GMC.
Markus Schulze
sincerity" look like when the
used election method allows the voter to cast more than just
preferences? Example: When Average Rating or Median Rating or
Cumulative Voting is used, then how has a voter to vote to be
"sincere"?
Markus Schulze
orcet versions" (which are significantly more complicated than
Smith//PC) to get compliance with the Smith criterion?
Markus Schulze
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mechanism.
Markus Schulze
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that you knew, doesn't meet GSFC and doesn't strictly meet
SDSC. I've repeatedly said that I prefer Tideman(wv) SSD because
they comply with GSFC SDSC.
Could you please demonstrate that Smith//PC fails GSFC and SDSC?
Markus Schulze
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Voting.
Markus Schulze
else whom he likes better."
I don't see why offensive strategies are not possible
under Approval Voting. Could you please give an
explanation? Could you please explain e.g. why bullet
voting is not an offensive strategy under Approval
Voting?
Markus Schulze
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,
and insincere-strategic.
Could you please give an example for each of these four types
of votes?
Do you mean that bullet voting is sincere under Approval Voting
or do you mean that bullet voting is sincere under any election
method?
Markus Schulze
never used Matlab. But if you are
interested, then you can send me a sample of the input data
and I will write the matrix creation algorithm in C.
Markus Schulze
(a.k.a. SD) but not in
Tideman.
Markus Schulze
been recalled successfully in the
state of Brandenburg. (The 1,700 mayors in the state of Brandenburg are
elected for a term of eight years.)
Markus Schulze
strategists.
Here is a good paper about strategical behaviour under
proportional representation by the single transferable vote:
http://www.politics.tcd.ie/Staff/Michael.Marsh/LagunaBeach.pdf
Markus Schulze
the unique election method that meets these
criteria. Therefore you can agree with Craig's desire
that an election method should be "axiom based" and
still promote every election method you want to
promote. :-)
Markus Schulze
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e, showing the Schulze method preferred a candidate
even though no voter preferred it to the Tideman winner which
beat it pairwise.
I couldn't find in the archives Mike's example where the Schulze
method chooses a Pareto inferior candidate. Could you please
repost this example?
Markus Schu
then the
ranking of the candidates is changed in the same cyclic manner.
Is there a simple way to see that Saari's rotational symmetry
really is a symmetry criterion?
Markus Schulze
in later steps should be eliminated.
Markus Schulze
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yet
published, 1999. (http://www.econ.vt.edu/tideman/rmt.pdf)
2) The Meek Method is used by the Royal Statistical Society
(ca. 6000 members).
Markus Schulze
P.S.: It is sad to hear that Brian Lawrence Meek died.
candidate, then either
candidate A or candidate B must be elected.
Which of Woodall's properties would you be prepared to see
not satisfied by your preferred system?
Markus Schulze
demonstrate that Smith//MinMax(wv) fails and
Tideman(wv) meets SDSC as Mike suggests?
Markus Schulze
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.
If SD is used then candidate D wins decisively. If SSD
or Schulze is used then candidate C wins decisively.
Markus Schulze
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able election method is better
because it is less manipulable (so that it gives the power to the
electorate and not to the manipulators) and not because it is more
often "correct."
Markus Schulze
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opinion, the example above questions whether
STV with the Hare Quota is really proportional.
Markus Schulze
methods.
Markus Schulze
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s" and "Sur les
Elections" are reprinted in "Condorcet: Sur les
Elections et autres textes" (Paris, 1986) by
Olivier de Bernon.
Markus Schulze
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oter can worsen the result of the elections (due to his
sincere preferences) by showing up and using an offensive strategy
deters this voter from using an offensive strategy."?
Markus Schulze
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equirement, is it necessary that the
statement above is met for each pair of two candidates
simultaneously? Or is it sufficient that the statement
above is met for just one pair of candidates? Or is the
requirement ambiguous?
Markus Schulze
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questions. I will ask him a few simple questions about your
wordings. If he is able to answer these questions properly
without additional help, then I will withdraw my claim that
your wordings are ambiguous.
Markus Schulze
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, that's what it takes to show that any method fails
any criterion. For more detail, I refer you to the definitions of
the criteria.
Why does your 5 Oct 2000 example demonstrate that Smith//PC
fails GSFC and SDSC?
Markus Schulze
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reason
why Michael Dummett rejects the concept of wasted votes.]
Markus Schulze
then this candidate might lose ("burying").
Markus Schulze
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preferences.
Beat path GMC is defined in terms of voted preferences.
Beat path GMC is met e.g. by Schulze(wv):
http://www.fortunecity.com/meltingpot/harrow/124/methods.html
Markus Schulze
Therefore the question is: What are you willing to sacrifice
to get monotonicity?
Markus Schulze
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that SSD is identical to Schulze at least when there are no
pairwise ties is incorrect.
Markus Schulze
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et and participation are
incompatible.
What do you think?: How does a sophisticated voter votes if Approval
Voting is used?
Markus Schulze
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are possible. But the term of the then elected parliament
ends with the next ordinary elections.
The Swedish Method guarantees that the possibility to dissolve
the parliament cannot be misused to "corriger la fortune."
Markus Schulze
is a rank method,
and it isn't at all clear why you believe that. Criteria are written
because someone is saying that they're desirable to comply with. If
a method complies, it complies, regardless of its balloting or other
procedural details.
Markus Schulze
perly what the "elimination" of a pairwise comparison is
nor did he write what a "contradiction" is. Is A B C = A a
"contradiction" or is only A B C A a "contradiction"?
Markus Schulze
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that computes all possible paths? Path voting
seems really hard to code. I hope I'm wrong.
I'll work on it this weekend. If anyone has done this work already,
please e-mail me on this list or at [EMAIL PROTECTED]
What is wrong with that algorithm I have posted yesterday?
Markus Schulze
s
it impossible for any meaningful kind of comparison between
systems."
Markus Schulze
which was pairwise-beaten by the Tideman winner." And you
wrote that "the situation that Steve described exists." I never
claimed that you wrote something different in your 13 May 2000
mail.
Therefore I see absolutely no justification for your claim that
I misquoted you.
Markus Schulze
[EMA
of clones.
But when you slightly modify your example then the Schulze
winner is unique while the Tideman method is indecisive.
Example: AB51,BC51,CA51,AD60,BD60,CD60,DE61,EA52,EB53,EC54.
Now candidate A is the unique Schulze winner while the
Tideman method is indecisive between A, B and C.
Markus
in your opinion?
Markus Schulze
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F G A
it is clear that every additional defeat will lock in a
cycle.
Markus Schulze
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-Morgenstern utility of candidate X. Then:
If p(B,A)*(u(A)-u(B)) p(B,C)*(u(B)-u(C)), it is
advantageous for you to vote A = B C D insincerely
instead of A B C D sincerely.
Markus Schulze
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uld at least explain _why_ you have changed
your opinion about this criterion so abruptly. Otherwise your
argumentation seems to be quite arbitrary and you cannot expect
anybody to follow your argumentation.
Markus Schulze
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le the IBCM method
is indecisive between A, B and C.
Therefore my question is: How do you measure the decisiveness
of a method? Which presumptions do you use to justify your claim
that the IBCM method is more decisive than the Schulze method?
Markus Schulze
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-methods-list/5465).
You should also read my 4 June 2000 mail
(http://www.egroups.com/message/election-methods-list/5475).
Steve wrote in his 3 June 2000 mail
(http://www.egroups.com/message/election-methods-list/5465):
I erred when I wrote that MTM is more decisive.
Markus Schulze
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rsally accepted" concept is questionable, when you cannot
explain why the resulting criteria describe desirable properties.
Markus Schulze
you have to
suppose decisiveness of the voters in at least some very
weak meaning.
Markus Schulze
t withdraw under any circumstances.
Candidate D prefers B to C to E to A.
Candidate E prefers C to B to D to A.
If no candidate withdraws, candidate A is elected.
If only candidate D withdraws, candidate B is elected.
If only candidate E withdraws, candidate C is elected.
If both candidates,
. Candidate A defeats candidate C
via beat-paths.
**
I have demonstrated, that if candidate A defeats candidate B
via beat-paths and candidate B defeats candidate C via
beat-paths, then candidate A defeats candidate C via
beat-paths. Thus: Schulze wins cannot be cyclic.
Markus Schulze
votes are transfered to their
next choice: A.
Second round:
A=80
B=40
C=0
D=60
Thus: The candidates A, B, and D are elected.
Summary: STV violates house-monotonicity
independently on whether you use the Hare Quota
or the Droop Quota.
Markus Schulze
e reversal symmetry criterion, and the clone
criteria.
Markus Schulze
s set in a pairwise comparison. Then the
winning option is chosen from the options of the Smith
set.
Use my definition of Pareto and you will understand my
last e-mail.
[By the way, I didn't say, that Pareto is
unachievable. For example: Smith//Condorcet[EM] without
the subcycle rule meets Pareto.]
Markus Schulze ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
ical to VA.
Markus Schulze
Demorep wrote (28 Jul 1998):
Whether or not some sort of other criteria is violated
is irrelevant.
Why?
Markus
1989.
Its theoretical background has been published in:
T. Nicolaus Tideman, "Independence of Clones as a Criterion
for Voting Rules," Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 4, p. 185-206,
1987.
Markus Schulze
ally casted ballots, then you have every possibility to do so.
You claim that beat-path GMC was too strong compared to your
lesser-of-two-evils criteria. But actually beat-path GMC is
significantly weaker that GMC that you have proposed until
very recently (until Feb 2000?).
Markus Schulze
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iolates SARC- it isn't feasible to conclude that Approval
Voting deters less from showing up than PC. To my opinion,
this demonstrates that SARC doesn't do what it was designed
for."
Therefore it is clear that I didn't claim that PC meets SARC.
Au contraire: I demonstrated that -although Appr
derivation. It is based on (P1). Adding (1,1,1,...) to
(x:A,y:B,z:C,...) makes no difference to winners, etc..
So you think that you can circumvent the limitations of
Saari's model simply by using the term "tetrahedron"
instead of "cube"?
Markus Schulze
[*] A "positio
cult to argue why -in the Tideman
method- the winner should be changed from candidate C to
candidate A when some voters uprank B ahead of D or
downrank D behind B.
Markus Schulze
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Dear Blake,
you wrote (26 Aug 1999):
Markus Schulze wrote:
Dear Blake,
you wrote (22 Aug 1999):
Election dates should be fixed and outside the control of the
legislature. Often it is suggested that the legislature or cabinet
needs to be able to call an early election to resolve
is available to
calculate the SASWs while Tideman can unnecessarily elect a non-SASW.
You wrote (31 Jan 2000):
Markus Schulze wrote (29 Jan 2000):
Blake Cretney wrote (24 Jan 2000):
I have made some attempts to show that Schulze (path voting) is in
some way intuitive. That is, it seems to rely
This message was sent to the original instantrunoff list by jquinn+irv
but he consented to have it forwarded to the freewheelin' list. So,
when he talks about "this list" he means instantrunoff classic.
From jquinn+irv:
So far, this list's "last word" on Condorcet is that it is not a
correct to use the present tense when describing his advocacy?
Lucien Saumur still promotes Smith//RandomCandidate.
Markus Schulze
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n for your claim that I
misquoted you.
By the way: Steve wrote twice (23 Feb 2000; 11 May 2000) that you
claimed that it was possible to create an example "showing the
Schulze method preferred a candidate even though no voter preferred
it to the Tideman winner which beat it pairwise.&quo
has any non-trivial
geometrical meaning that could justify the introduction of your geometrical
interpretation of elections?
Markus Schulze
Dear Blake,
you wrote (30 Mar 2000):
Markus Schulze wrote (29 Mar 2000):
This is an example where it is advantageous to vote
insincerely in a zero information situation:
Suppose that MinMax(margins) is used. Suppose that there
are four candidates. Suppose that your sincere opinion
to comment against the use of invalid
reasoning. I suppose this is irrelvant.
I don't comment on every mail. I have other things to do.
Markus Schulze
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d" the same questions.
You claim that you are "real tired of that repetition." But
you apparently neglect that you have never answered any of my
questions. Although I have invited you several times to explain
why you think that your concept might be better, you have never
answered.
However, I doubt that those who don't promote Approval Voting
will agree to your definition of "sincerity."
However, I don't have the impression that your statements have
anything to do with majority winner sets or beat path GMC.
Markus Schulze
discussion only statement (1) is
interesting.]
Markus Schulze
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violate Beatpath GMC, etc.
Markus Schulze
our choice of election rules for the n+1-n
election and the head-to-head untying elections) is independent
of the removal of irrelevant alternatives wherever an answer
exists- just like Condorcet!
mean in this context?
**
Markus Schulze
rom
clones to be useful.
Markus Schulze
he Schulze method to explain
this method.
Markus Schulze
subscribers), and
so we're editing out some messages that don't seem to be
directly on-point. Messages about Condorcet are not on-point.
Markus Schulze
defeats is already proportional to V*N^2,
the time you need to calculate the paths is neglectable
compared to the time you need to calculate the matrix
of pairwise defeats (whether you use a computer or not).
Markus Schulze
orresponding problem can be circumvented simply by using some
"random mechanisms." It is not clear to me how you interpreted
this as a criticism of SARC.
Markus Schulze
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s a family of election methods than one
single election method.
Markus Schulze
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used in practice." It is surprising that you -now that it has
been proven that Alternative Voting violates this criterion-
say that this criterion was "uninteresting."
**
You wrote (14 Dec 1999):
At 06:33 15.12.99 , Markus Schulze wrote:
I don't remember that ever somebody said &quo
dependence from clones to
be important then why do you promote more methods than just PC?
Markus Schulze
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than the existence of an "indirect"
strategy (e.g. changing the winner from candidate A to candidate
B by ranking candidate C insincerely ahead of candidate D).
Markus Schulze
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quot;first past the post" is used then it is a useful
strategy to vote for only one candidate even if you don't have
a unique favorite candidate.
Markus Schulze
voted for him/her. Vote
totals can be done using any type of simple totalling device (as used on
all sorts of TV game shows).
Markus Schulze
g.
Robert Winters wrote (28 Nov 1998):
I propose that Mike Ossipoff and Donald Davison compete in a nude mud
wrestling tournament. It would be a lot more interesting than the
back-and-forth blather about Approval, Condorcet, what constitutes a
majority, etcetera, ad nauseum.
Markus Schulze
gry that I use Herve
Moulin's participation criterion and not your SARC.
The main reason why I use Herve Moulin's participation
criterion is the fact that his criterion is well known
in literature.
Markus Schulze
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Dear Craig,
you wrote (7 Oct 1999):
At 01:00 07.10.99 , Markus Schulze wrote:
I prefer the following wordings:
[A]
Deterministic Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives:
Suppose, that candidate A would have not been elected
if candidate B hadn't run. Then -if candidate B does
every election method that is
compatible to Condorcet's words must result in a ranking that
includes C B, B D and A D.
Markus Schulze
(this time without any virus)
onsider the Schwartz criterion to be
_very_ important.
Markus Schulze
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