Re: Does the plants quantum computations?

2010-02-21 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Stephen, On 20 Feb 2010, at 19:52, Stephen P. King wrote: Nature has repeatedly proven herself to be vastly more clever than we can imagine. Quantum coherence is used in photosynthesis by plants to increase the efficiency of photon energy capture by the use of structures

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread David Nyman
On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously computable, not even partially). Yes, I do understand that. What I'm particularly

Re: Does the plants quantum computations?

2010-02-21 Thread John Mikes
Bruno, interesting exchange with Stephen. I have a sideline-question: why do you 'refer-to' and repeatedly invoke into your ways of your advanced thinking the NAME (I did not say: concept) of GOD, a noumenon so many times and many occasions mistreated and misused over the millennia - throughout

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread Rex Allen
On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we possess it (or seem to, according to some). We can't compute the existence of any 1-p experiential

Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-21 Thread Jason Resch
On the many-worlds FAQ: http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html It states that many-worlds implies that worlds split rather than multiple, identical, pre-existing worlds differentiate: Q19 Do worlds differentiate or split? - Can we regard the

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread David Nyman
On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in the weaker subordinate position of needing to be explained in terms of 3-p, while 3-p is

RE: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-21 Thread rmiller
To me, the Many-Minds interpretation requires significant changes in frames of reference. Suppose you view a particular world out of many as a 2-dimensional surface. Layers of surfaces comprise the local environment of a particular section of Many Worlds. Now think of a behavior pattern as a

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we possess it (or seem to, according to some). We can't compute the existence of any

Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-21 Thread Jason Resch
On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:07 PM, rmiller rmil...@legis.com wrote: To me, the Many-Minds interpretation requires significant changes in frames of reference. Suppose you view a particular world out of many as a 2-dimensional surface. Layers of surfaces comprise the local environment of a

RE: Epiphenomena?

2010-02-21 Thread Stephen P. King
Hi Bruno, Well! Perhaps we are closer than I thought but that has implications of its own… From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal Sent: Sunday, February 21, 2010 11:25 AM To:

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Feb 2010, at 17:31, David Nyman wrote: On 17 February 2010 18:08, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You may already understand (by uda) that the first person notions are related to infinite sum of computations (and this is not obviously computable, not even partially). Yes, I do