2012/10/22 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
--
Onward!
Stephen
No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is
2012/10/22 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 10:03:48PM +0200, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
This does not implies a reality created by an UD algorithm. It may be a
mathematical universe, that is a superset of the computable universes.
The
measure problem in the
Hi Bruno et al,
3p equivalence -- the condition of success
(Mind Reading or Mind emulation by a computer)
I think we can now say something about the
condition obtained when a human mental event
is emulated by a computer.
1) The only possible comparisons between a human
and a computer will
Hi Craig Weinberg
Good. But I think either you have to be more specific
about your definitions or else specify more broadly,
like in terms of categories.
Also, your definition of thought is a good step, but
I myself want to know how thinking is done.
What is thinking ?
Roger Clough,
Hi Craig Weinberg
OK, you can program anything to emulate a particular human act.
And perhaps allow multiple options. But how would your computerized
zombie know which option to take in any given situation ?
I don't think options would be sophisticated enough to fool
anybody. But perhaps I am
SNIP
Hi Bruno and Roger,
What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie
from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything
other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact?
--
Onward!
Stephen
Hi Stephan,
That sounds like autism to me.
Hi Karl,
You have a good sense of humor. Perhaps
this might be virtual science fiction, or
perhaps a zombie novel or biography.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/22/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From:
Hi Stathis Papaioannou
IMHO a zombie ought to be defined in
such a way that you could be fooled.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/22/2012
Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen
- Receiving the following content -
From: Stathis Papaioannou
2012/10/22 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new type of
indeterminacy never seen before because
Hi Bruno,
This may not be the final answer, but the I Ching
demonstrates that comp is possible. That Yi is a complete,
homogeneous (and all of that good stuff) semantic field,
the set of all possible human experiences to 64 bit
resolution (the hexagrams) in numerical (binary) form.
When I say
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 10/21/2012 7:14 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:55 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
wrote:
If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we
would expect some scientific evidence of
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 1:48 AM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
If there is a top-down effect of the mind on the atoms then there we
would expect some scientific evidence of this.
These words are a scientific evidence of this. The atoms of my brain are
being manipulated from
On 21 Oct 2012, at 12:52, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle
...the uncertainty principle is inherent in the properties of all
wave-like systems
Formally yes, but the meaning of the uncertainty principle is very
different
On 21 Oct 2012, at 14:25, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
You say
No, a zombie will stop at the red light. By definition it behaves
like
a human, or like a conscious entity.
My problem is that the definition is an absurdity to begin with.
If he has no mind, he could not know what a
On 21 Oct 2012, at 14:45, Roger Clough wrote:
On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:35, Roger Clough wrote:
(previously) Hi Bruno Marchal
Comp cannot give subjective content,
BRUNO: This is equivalent to saying that comp is false.
By definition of comp, our consciousness remains intact when we get
the
On Monday, October 22, 2012 3:08:14 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
OK, you can program anything to emulate a particular human act.
And perhaps allow multiple options. But how would your computerized
zombie know which option to take in any given situation ?
If you
On Monday, October 22, 2012 3:00:29 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
Good. But I think either you have to be more specific
about your definitions or else specify more broadly,
like in terms of categories.
http://multisenserealism.com
Also, your definition of thought
Hi Bruno,
My own subjectivity is 1p. I don't believe a computer can
have consciousness, but suppose we let the computer have
consciousness as well.
Let a descriptor be 3p. Let my consciousness = 1p
But the computer's consciousness would be different, say 1p'
-- because, let's say, it's less
On 21 Oct 2012, at 18:42, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 8:56 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Hi John,
On 20 Oct 2012, at 23:16, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno,
especially in my identification as responding to relations.
Now the Self? IT certainly refers to a more
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 6:25 PM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote
I think you are missing something. It is a problem that I noticed after
watching the movie The Prestige
In my opinion The Prestige is the best movie made in the last 10 years,
and this is one of those rare instances
On 21 Oct 2012, at 19:46, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I stopped reading after your proof of the existence of a new
type of indeterminacy never seen before because the proof was in
error, so there was no point in reading about things
On 10/22/2012 12:51 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/10/22 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 12:46 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:37, Roger Clough wrote:
On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:55, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
I think if you converse with a real person, he has to
have a body or at least vocal chords or the ability to write.
BRUNO: Not necessarily. Its brain can be in vat, and then I
On Monday, October 22, 2012 12:28:41 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But that's what the brain does, simulate experience from the point of
view of the owner or liver of the experience. According to some
theory. You can't talk like if you knew that this is false.
This is the
On 21 Oct 2012, at 21:51, Roger Clough wrote:
On 20 Oct 2012, at 14:04, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
This is also where I run into trouble with the p-zombie
definition of what a zombie is. It has no mind
but it can still behave just as a real person would.
But that assumes, as
On 21 Oct 2012, at 22:03, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
This does not implies a reality created by an UD algorithm. It may
be a mathematical universe, that is a superset of the computable
universes.
The computable universe is a subset of the mathematical universe.
Just compare: the computable
On 21 Oct 2012, at 22:04, Roger Clough wrote:
SNIP
Dear Bruno,
WHOEVER: Tell us more about how White Rabbits can appear if there
is any
restriction of mutual logical consistency between 1p and in any
arbitrary recursion of 1p content?
BRUNO: We assume comp. If a digital computer
Hi Roger,
You just describe the non-comp conviction. You don't give any
argument. With comp, you are the owner of an infinity of machine, it
does not matter if it is in silicon or carbon, as long as the
components do the right relative things in the most probable history.
You are just
On 21 Oct 2012, at 23:46, John Mikes wrote:
Bruno: my apologies for this late late reply, I am slow to decipher
the listpost from the daily inundation of Roger-stuff so I miss some
more relevant list-post sometimes.
You wrote about the U-M:
...an entity capable of computing all partial
On 10/22/2012 2:32 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
--
Onward!
Stephen
No. The concept doesn't enter consideration. What he considers is that
the Great
On 22 Oct 2012, at 04:32, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/21/2012 6:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
And their very specific correlation with the physical brain states
of sleep.
Of course. But this is taken into account in the theoretical
reasoning where we suppose the brain state are obtained by
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
SNIP
Hi Bruno and Roger,
What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie
from a person that does not see the world external to it as anything
other than an internal panorama with which it cannot interact?
--
Onward!
Stephen
Hi
On 10/22/2012 6:05 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
I don't understand why you're focusing on NP-hard problems... NP-hard
problems are solvable algorithmically... but not efficiently. When I
read you (I'm surely misinterpreting), it seems like you're saying you
can't solve NP-hard problems... it's
On Monday, October 22, 2012 1:39:32 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 20, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote:
The reasons of my neurons are not my personal reasons.
True. And it's also true that the letter e is not Shakespeare's play
Hamlet, but its part of
C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not?
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 10/22/2012 3:12 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
SNIP
Hi Bruno and Roger,
What would distinguish, for an external observer, a p-zombie
from a person that does not see the world external
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
On 10/22/2012 2:38 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
2012/10/22 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of
On 10/22/2012 3:13 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not?
Hi Alberto,
C3PO did refer to itself (in the Star Wars movies) , so no, it
would not be.
2012/10/22 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net
mailto:stephe...@charter.net
On
On 10/22/2012 4:12 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/22/2012 3:13 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
C3PO would be a phylosophical zombie. It would not?
Hi Alberto,
C3PO did refer to itself (in the Star Wars movies) , so no, it
would not be.
Hi Alberto,
After reading my own post
On Mon, Oct 22, 2012 at 01:45:11PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/22/2012 2:32 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 11:38:46PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Rusell,
How does Schmidhuber consider the physicality of resources?
--
Onward!
Stephen
No. The
On 10/22/2012 5:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
Schmidhuber does not consider ontology at all. He merely asks the
question What if we're living inside a universal dovetailer?.
Hi Russell,
That is an ontological question in my thinking, but I will not
quibble this point.
He doesn't ask
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