--- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could
be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is unknown. The
conclusion is that if the artificial neurons lack consciousness, then
--- On Tue, 3/2/10, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote:
computationalist theory of mind would amount to the claim that consciousness
supervenes only on realisations capable of instantiating this complete range
of underlying physical activity (i.e. factual + counterfactual) in virtue of
--- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com wrote:
For partial replacement scenarios, where part of a brain has
counterfactuals and the rest doesn't, see my partial brain paper:
http://cogprints.org/6321/
I've finally come around
Bruno, I hope you feel better. My quarrel with you is nothing personal.
--- Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
Bruno, you don't have to assume any 'prescience'; you just have to assume
that counterfactuals count. No one but you considers that 'prescience' or
any
...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
What is false is your statement that The only way to escape the conclusion
would be to attribute consciousness to a movie of a computation. So your
argument is not valid.
OK. I was talking in a context which is missing. You can also conclude
Last post didn't show up in email. Seems random.
--- On Tue, 2/23/10, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote:
-even if there was a one-to-one relationship between distinct computations
and distinct observer-moments with distinct qualia, very similar computations
could produce very similar
My last post worked (I got it in my email). I'll repost one later and then
post on the measure thread - though it's still a very busy time for me so maybe
not today.
--- On Mon, 2/22/10, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
OK, so you're suggesting there may not be a one-to-one
Jesse, how do you access the everything list? I ask because I have not
recieved my own posts in my inbox, nor have others such as Bruno replied. I
use yahoo email. I may need to use a different method to prevent my posts from
getting lost. They do seem to show up on Google groups though.
think I got a copy in my email so I am putting a copy of what I posted here:
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
MGA is more general (and older).
The only way to escape the conclusion would
--- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Jack Mallah wrote:
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
MGA is more general (and older).
The only way to escape the conclusion would be to attribute consciousness
to a movie of a computation
That's not true
--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
A little thin brain would produce a zombie?
Even if size affects measure, a zombie is not a brain with low measure; it's a
brain with zero measure. So the answer is obviously no - it would not be a
zombie. Stop abusing the language.
It's been a very busy week. I will reply to the measure thread (which is
actually more important) but that could be in a few days.
--- On Thu, 1/28/10, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote:
What about if half of your neurons were 1/2 their normal size, and the other
half were twice their
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Jack is talking about copies in the common sense of initially physically
identical beings who however occupy different places in the same spacetime
and hence have different viewpoints and experiences.
No, that's incorrect. I
I'm replying to this bit seperately since Bruno touched on a different issue
than the others have. My reply to the main measure again '10 thread will
follow under the original title.
--- On Wed, 1/27/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
I would also not say yes to a computationalist
-- On Mon, 1/25/10, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net wrote:
Does not the mutual interfearence between the copies hace something to do
with a QM systems ability to compute exponensially more than a classical
system? If so, then reducing the number or density of copies would lead to an
--- On Tue, 1/26/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:16, Jack Mallah wrote:
Killing one man is not OK just because he has a brother.
In our context, the 'brother' has the same consciousness.
The brother most certainly does not have the same consciousness. If he
--- On Tue, 3/10/09, Saibal Mitra smi...@zeelandnet.nl wrote:
http://arxiv.org/abs/0902.3825
I've written up a small article about the idea that you could end up in a
different sector of the multiverse by selective memory erasure. I had written
about that possibility a long time ago on
--- On Fri, 3/6/09, Wei Dai wei...@weidai.com wrote:
No. First, I don't agree that the real question is what the utility
function is or should be. The real question is whether the measure, M, is
conserved or whether it decreases. It's just that a lot of people don't
understand what
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Well, this seems to be the real point of disagreement between you and the
pro-QI people. If I am one of the extra versions and die overnight, but the
original survives, then I have survived. This is why there can be a many to
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Two copies don't increase the measure of a computation and reducing it's
vector in Hilbert space doesn't diminish it.
If that is so then how do you explain the Born rule?
The Born rule assumes you start with a
Hi Johnathan. I see that there are some new people like yourself here. I like
to see new people and younger people take an interest in the philosophical
issues, though at the same time it saddens me to see so many continue to fall
victim to the the QS fallacy.
I have made an important
--- On Thu, 2/12/09, George Levy gl...@quantics.net wrote:
I have also been overwhelmed by the volume on this list.
The idea is not to take more than you can chew.
Indeed.
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, George Levy
If that were the case, the Born Rule would fail.
Perhaps the probability rule
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't get it. Why should the measure suddenly decrease at 80 (or 100)
years old ? Why not 30 ? Why not 4 ?
Heart disease. Cancer. Stroke. Degradation of various organs leading to
death. Such ailments are known to strike
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1 (e.g. discarding
any errors that A2 might have made) then one could say that A1 is the
same person as B, while A2 is not. This is causal differentiation.
Yes, but
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
I don't think it makes a difference if life is continuous or discrete: it is
still possible to assert that future versions of myself are different people
who merely experience the illusion of being me.
However, this just
Hello again, Saibal!
It is good to see that I am not alone here in taking a stand against QS/QI.
What do you think of my paper? Is it unclear, convincing, unconvincing?
Are there others like us who still post here?
Regards,
Jack
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com
And if your measure were to drop off dramatically overnight, it is
equivalent to saying that many _more people_ woke up in your bed today as
compared to the number of people who
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in the argument. The important
is what it feels like for the experimenter.
You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on, what
for practical purposes, is
Hi George. The everything list feels just like old times, no? Which is nice
in a way but has a big drawback - I can only take so much of arguing the same
old things, and being outnumbered. And that limit is approaching fast again.
At least I think your point here is new to the list.
---
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of me
wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra
versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I
--- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in
the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter.
You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect on,
what for practical purposes,
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
It seems that the disagreement may be one about personal identity. It is not
clear to me from your paper whether you accept what Derek Parfit calls the
reductionist theory of personal identity. Consider the following
--- On Mon, 2/9/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not 4, there
are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you use for 1000 years
old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ?
Quentin, why would the measure of 4
--- On Tue, 2/10/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/2/11 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com:
2) If the data saved to the disk is only based on A1
(e.g. discarding any errors that A2 might have made) then
one could say that A1 is the same person as B, while A2
--- On Mon, 2/9/09, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
good idea to resume UDA again
Bruno, I will post on the subject - but not yet. I do not want to get
sidetracked from improving my paper.
I see you have make some progress on the subject (but not yet on
diplomacy, unless your
--- On Sat, 2/7/09, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/2/7 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com
1. Initially, before evolution occurred, a typical Boltzmann brain (BB) had
about the same measure as a brain which was like what we consider a normal
person's (an atypical BB).
2
So far the responses here have not been as hostile as I feared :)
--- On Sat, 2/7/09, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com wrote:
are you open to the idea
that there might be truths about subjectivity (such as
truths about what philosophers call 'qualia') which
cannot be reduced to purely
--- On Sun, 2/8/09, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
He must have some model in mind which tells us how
the amplitude of the branches relates to the amplitude of the
original state.
The Schrodinger equation is linear and unitary. As long as it applies (in
other words, assuming
--- On Sun, 2/8/09, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
Suppose you differentiate into N states, then on
average each has 1/N of your original measure. I guess
that's why you think the measure decreases. But the sum
of the measures is N/N of the original.
I still find this
--- On Fri, 2/6/09, russell standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
So sorry Jacques - you need to do better. I'm sure you can!
Russell, I expected there might be some discussion of my latest eprint on this
list. That's why I'm here now - to see if there are any clarifications I
should make in
41 matches
Mail list logo
