Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2009 11:05:22 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Jesse Mazer skrev:
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2009 18:40:14 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2009 18:40:14 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Jesse Mazer skrev:
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 09:18:10 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2009 09:31:46 +0200
On 11 Jun 2009, at 21:43, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Countably infinite does not mean recursively countably infinite. This is
something which I
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 09:18:10 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Jesse Mazer skrev:
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 18:38:23 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 18:03:26 +0200
On 10 Jun 2009, at 01:50, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Isn't this based on the idea that there should be an objective truth about
every well-formed
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 18:38:23 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Jesse Mazer skrev:
Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2009 21:17:03 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 12:54:16 -0700
From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
You don't justify definitions. How would you justify Peano's axioms as being
the right ones? You are just confirming my
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 15:22:10 -0700
From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 12:54:16 -0700
From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 17:20:39 -0700
From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2009 15:22:10 -0700
From: meeke...@dslextreme.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2009 16:48:21 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Jesse Mazer skrev:
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2009 08:33:47 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re
Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2009 21:17:03 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Jesse Mazer skrev:
Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2009 16:48:21 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re
If it helps, here's a screenshot of how the symbols are supposed to look:
http://img34.imageshack.us/img34/3345/picture2uzk.png
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries 2
Date: Sat, 6 Jun 2009 22:36:01 +0200
Marty,
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2009 08:33:47 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Brian Tenneson skrev:
On Thu, Jun 4, 2009 at 8:27 AM, Torgny Tholerus tor...@dsv.su.se
mailto:tor...@dsv.su.se wrote:
Date: Thu, 4 Jun 2009 15:23:04 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Quentin Anciaux skrev:
If you are ultrafinitist then by definition the set N does not
exist... (nor any infinite set countably or
Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2009 13:14:16 +0200
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
From: allco...@gmail.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2009/6/3 Torgny Tholerus tor...@dsv.su.se:
Bruno Marchal skrev:
On 02 Jun 2009, at 19:43, Torgny Tholerus wrote:
Bruno Marchal
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2009 19:43:59 +0200
From: tor...@dsv.su.se
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: The seven step-Mathematical preliminaries
Bruno Marchal skrev:
4) The set of all natural numbers. This set is hard to define, yet I
hope you agree we can describe it by the
Hi Bruno, I meant to reply to this earlier:
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Date: Sat, 2 May 2009 14:45:13 +0200
On 30 Apr 2009, at 18:29, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2009, at 23:30, Jesse Mazer
Date: Wed, 6 May 2009 11:33:52 -0700
Subject: Re: Temporary Reality
From: daddycay...@msn.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
On May 4, 6:13 am, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote:
2009/5/4 daddycay...@msn.com:
I agree that religion, and a lot of other stuff,
I found a paper on the Mandelbrot set and computability, I understand very
little but maybe Bruno would be able to follow it:
http://arxiv.org/abs/cs.CC/0604003
The same author has a shorter outline or slides for a presentation on this
subject at
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Apr 2009, at 23:30, Jesse Mazer wrote:
But I'm not convinced that the basic Olympia machine he describes doesn't
already have a complex causal structure--the causal structure would be in the
way different troughs influence each other via the pipe system he describes
From: stath...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 23:24:35 +1000
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
2009/4/29 Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com:
Kelly wrote:
Not if information exists platonically. So the question is, what does
it mean
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Consciousness is information?
Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2009 22:19:56 +0200
Maudlin's point is that the causal structure has no physical role
But I'm not convinced that the basic Olympia machine he describes doesn't
already
Kelly wrote:
Not if information exists platonically. So the question is, what does
it mean for a physical system to represent a certain piece of
information? With the correct one-time pad, any desired information
can be extracted from any random block of data obtained by making any
Brent Meeker wrote:
I think meaning ultimately must be grounded in action. That's why
it's hard to see where the meaning lies in a computation, something that
is just the manipulation of strings. People tend to say the meaning is
in the interpretation, noting that the same string of 1s
Brent Meeker wrote:
Indeed there seems to be a conflict between MWI of QM and the feeling of
consciousness. QM evolves unitarily to preserve total probability, which
implies that the splitting into different quasi-classical subspaces reduces
the
measure of each subspace. But there's no
2009/2/11 Quentin Anciaux
Because the point is to know from a 1st person perspective that it exists a
next subjective moment... if there is, QI holds. Even if in the majority of
universes I'm dead... from 1st perspective I cannot be dead hence the
only moments that count is where I
Russell Standish wrote: According to Wikipedia, Born's rule is that the
probability of an observed result \lambda_i is given by \psi|P_i|\psi, where
P_i is the projection onto the eigenspace corresponding to \lambda_i of the
observable. This formula is only correct if \psi is normalised.
Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2009 11:47:02 +1100
From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [kevintr...@hotmail.com: Jacques Mallah]
Jesse, you need to fix up your email client to follow the usual
quoting conventions, wrap lines etc.
I'm using hotmail, any
From: laserma...@hotmail.com To:
everything-l...@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: [kevintr...@hotmail.com: Jacques
Mallah] Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2009 20:33:52 -0500 I don't understand, why is this
implied by what Jacques or I said? My comment was that the Born
Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2009 13:02:31 +1100
From: li...@hpcoders.com.au
To: everything-l...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [kevintr...@hotmail.com: Jacques Mallah]
All I have ever said was that effective probability given by the
squared norm of the projected eigenvector does not follow from
It seems to me that discussions of quantum immortality often founder on the
fact that people don't make their assumptions about philosophy of mind
explicit, or don't have a well-thought-out position on metaphysical issues
relating to mind in the first place. For example, Jaques, are you
Ah, never mind, rereading your post I think I see where I misunderstood
you--you weren't saying nothing in QM says anything about the amplitude of an
eigenvector that you square to get the probability of measuring that
eigenvector's eigenvalue, you were saying nothing in QM says anything about
His discussion of the Born rule is incorrect. The probability given by
the Born rule is not the square of the state vector, but rather the square
modulus of the inner product of some eigenvector with the original
state, appropriately normalised to make it a probability. After
observation,
Right. It's generally thought that the direction of increasing entropy is
defined by the expansion of the universe since the expansion increases
the available states for matter. But it's hard to show that this must
also determine the radiation arrow of time.On the contrary, no
Jesse Maser wrote:
The copenhagen interpretation is just one of several ways of thinking about
QM, though. Other interpretations, like the many-worlds interpretation or the
Bohm interpretation, do try to come up with a model of an underlying reality
that gives rise to the events we
As I said in the first post: aspect 1 is descriptions of an underlying
reality. aspect 2 is also a set of descriptions, but merely of
generalisations/abstractions of the appearances in an observer made of . Both
aspects are equally empirically supported. You can't give either aspect
And now, in Henry Stapp’s book I find the taboo laid out in plain view for
all to see. It’s dressed up as the ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ and it’s been
adopted as a cult, which I will now outline by quotation: (see page 11).
“Let there be no doubt about this point. The original form of
I came across a very interesting and novel interpretation of
relativity in which the author claims to resolve the mathematical
incompatibilities with merging QM and relativity.
I didn't look at the article too closely, but it seems to be talking about
special relativity rather than
Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2007 09:00:17 +0100
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
Jesse Mazer skrev:
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2007 19:55:20 +0100
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2007 18:25:54 +0100
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
Quentin Anciaux skrev:
Le Thursday 29 November 2007 17:22:59 Torgny Tholerus, vous avez écrit :
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2007 19:55:20 +0100
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Theory of Everything based on E8 by Garrett Lisi
Jesse Mazer skrev:
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
As soon as you talk about the set N
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 19:01:38 +0100
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Bijections (was OM = SIGMA1)
Bruno Marchal skrev:
But infinite ordinals can be different, and still have the same
cardinality. I have given
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
On 11/18/07, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 18/11/2007, Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
How is this different to arguing that a person who wins the lottery
should not ask how come something so improbable has happened to him
Pete Carlton wrote:
Since barring global disaster there will be massively more observers
in the future, why did you find yourself born so early? Surely your
probability of being born in the future (where there are far more
observers) was much much higher than your chances of being born so
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 01/10/2007, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I guess if you believe there is no real
temporal relation between OMs, that any sense of an observer who is
successively experiencing a series of different OMs is an illusion and
that
the only real
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
Not single mind is half-zombified, but single brain. Half of the brain
implements half of the mind, and another half of the brain is zombie.
Another half of the mind (corresponding to zombie part of the brain)
exists as information content and can be implemented in
marc geddes wrote:
On Sep 27, 2:15 pm, Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Yes. So my point is, even though the subjective probability computed by
ASSA
is intuitively appealing, we end up ignoring it, so why bother? We can
always make the right choices by thinking directly about measures
LauLuna wrote:
On 29 jun, 19:10, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
LauLuna wrote:
On 29 jun, 02:13, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
LauLuna wrote:
For any Turing machine there is an equivalent axiomatic system;
whether we could construct
LauLuna wrote:
On 29 jun, 02:13, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
LauLuna wrote:
For any Turing machine there is an equivalent axiomatic system;
whether we could construct it or not, is of no significance here.
But for a simulation of a mathematician's brain, the axioms
LauLuna wrote:
This is not fair to Penrose. He has convincingly argued in 'Shadows of
the Mind' that human mathematical intelligence cannot be a knowably
sound algorithm.
Assume X is an algorithm representing the human mathematical
intelligence. The point is not that man cannot recognize X
LauLuna wrote:
For any Turing machine there is an equivalent axiomatic system;
whether we could construct it or not, is of no significance here.
But for a simulation of a mathematician's brain, the axioms wouldn't be
statements about arithmetic which we could inspect and judge whether they
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh wrote:
Hi everybody,
I need to clarify. When we build this new combined system, we would be
immune to Godelian statements for one of them not for the whole system,
whatever it might be. So Jesse's argument does not hold, and of course the
new system does not contradict the
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Jesse,
Hasn't Stephen Wolfram proven that it is impossible to shortcut
predictions for arbitrary behaviours of sufficienty complex systems?
http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/
Stephen
The paper itself doesn't
Mohsen Ravanbakhsh
*Jesse,
I definitely don't think the two systems could be complete, since
(handwavey
argument follows) if you have two theorem-proving algorithms A and B, it's
trivial to just create a new algorithm that prints out the theorems that
either A or B could print out, and
I definitely don't think the two systems could be complete, since (handwavey
argument follows) if you have two theorem-proving algorithms A and B, it's
trivial to just create a new algorithm that prints out the theorems that
either A or B could print out, and incompleteness should apply to
Russell Standish:
You are right when it comes to the combination of two independent
systems A and B. What the original poster's idea was a
self-simulating, or self-aware system. In this case, consider the liar
type paradox:
I cannot prove this statement
Whilst I cannot prove this
Torgny Tholerus wrote:
When it concerns mathematics, I have developped a set of integers that I
myself call unnatural numbers. An unnatural number U is an integer
that is bigger than every natural number N. And the inverse of an
unnatural number (1/U) is more close to zero than any real
John M:
Cher Quentin,
let me paraphrase (big):
so someone had an assumption: BH. OK, everybody has the right to fantasize.
Especially if it sounds helpful.
Well, the basic assumption was more broad than that: it was that general
relativity is a trustworthy theory of gravity. There's plenty
Russell Standish wrote:
Well there is a reason we don't observe them, due to observational
selection effects tied to Occam's razor. This is written up in my Why
Occams Razor paper. Nobody has shot down the argument yet, in spite
of it being around on this list since 1999, and in spite of it
chris peck wrote:
I have a question for people here who know the issues better than me:
I was having an argument about alleged Quantum Immortality/Quantum suicide
with some people who argue that because the 2nd law of thermodynamics
continues regardless in each universe a 'me' continues
Mark Peaty wrote:
This is yet another delayed response; the story of my life really ...
Jason: By physically reversible I don't mean we as humans can undo
anything
that happens, rather physical interactions are time-invertible. If you
were shown a recording of any physical interaction on a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 2/21/07, Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It is a complicated issue. Patients with psychotic illnesses can
sometimes
reflect on a past episode and see that they were unwell then even
though
they insisted they were
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
It is a complicated issue. Patients with psychotic illnesses can sometimes
reflect on a past episode and see that they were unwell then even though
they insisted they were not at the time. They then might say something
like,
I don't know I'm unwell when I'm unwell,
I would bet on functionalism as the correct theory of mind for various
reasons, but I don't see that there is anything illogical the possibility
that consciousness is substrate-dependent. Let's say that when you rub two
carbon atoms together they have a scratchy experience, whereas when you rub
Tom Caylor wrote:
I'm talking about ultimate meaning, meaning which is ultimately based
on truth. Purpose would go along with that. I think that this
situation is similar (metaphysically isomorphic? :) to the primary
matter situation. I think you maintain that experience is enough. I
, then
an observer falling in will see each successive buoy flying past him at
closer to C, with the measured speed of the buoy approaching C in the limit
as the buoy's distance from the horizon approaches 0.
Jesse Mazer
From: James N Rose [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: everything-list
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
What you seem to be suggesting is that not all computations are equivalent:
some give rise to mind, while others, apparently similar, do not. Isn't
this similar to the reasoning of people who say that a computer could
never be conscious because even if it exactly
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 19-juil.-06, à 17:30, Jesse Mazer a écrit :
Stathis Papaioannou:
Bruno Marchal writes:
I think I have more basic difficulties also, like the Maudlin
argument re the handling of counterfactuals for consciousness to
occur:
It is a bit harder
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Those specifications have to make physical processes NOT turing
emulable, for Chalmers' idea being coherent. The price here would be an
explicit NON-COMP assumption, and then we are lead outside my working
hypothesis. In this way his dualism is typically
1Z wrote:
Even with the consciousness-is-computation computationalism, it depends
on
what your definition of is is...if you understand it to mean that a
conscious experience is nothing more than an alternate way of describing
a
certain computation, I suppose Chalmers would not be a
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
But natural laws are usually taken to be contingent, we can imagine
possible worlds where they are different--can you have supervenience
under
logical laws, or any other laws which must be the same in all possible
worlds?
natural laws ae the same in all
Stathis Papaioannou:
Bruno Marchal writes:
I think I have more basic difficulties also, like the Maudlin
argument re the handling of counterfactuals for consciousness to
occur:
It is a bit harder, no doubt. And, according to some personal basic
everything philosophy, the
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi, thank you for your answer.
But then I have another question, N is usually said to contains positive
integer number from 0 to +infinity... but then it seems it should contains
infinite length integer number... but then you enter the problem I've
shown,
so N shouldn't
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
But it is a straw man to say everything-theories makes the
prediction
that
Harry Potter universes should be just as likely as lawlike ones,
because in
fact they do *not* make that definite prediction. If you had just
said
1Z wrote:
The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.
It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe to
the view that every possible world or observer-moment
IZ wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
1Z wrote:
The clue is our failure ot observe HP universes,
as predicted by Platonic theories.
It a theory predicts somethig which is not observed,
it is falsified.
But this is a bit of a strawman, because most on this list who subscribe
1Z wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
IZ wrote:
And mathematical MWI *would* be in the same happy position *if*
it could find a justification for MWI or classical measure.
However, in the absence of a satifactory theory
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
You misunderstand population models. It's not a question of what
members of a species think or
vote for; it's a matter of whether their logic will lead to their
survival in the evolutionary
Brent Meeker:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
You misunderstand population models. It's not a question of what
members of a species think or
vote for; it's a matter of whether
Lennart Nilsson wrote:
No, you have the burden of showing what possible worlds could possibly mean
outside a real biological setting.
Cooper shows that logical laws are dependent on which population model they
refer to. Of course that goes for the notion of possibility also...
That sounds
Lennart Nilsson wrote:
We use mathematics as a meta-language, just like you kan describe what is
said in latin by using italian. That does not make italian
logically/evolutionary prior to latin of course.
But in this case we are using mathematics to describe actual events in the
real world,
Brent Meeker wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Lennart Nilsson wrote:
We use mathematics as a meta-language, just like you kan describe what
is
said in latin by using italian. That does not make italian
logically/evolutionary prior to latin of course.
But in this case we are using
Brent Meeker wrote:
1Z wrote:
Brent Meeker wrote:
You misunderstand population models. It's not a question of what
members of a species think or
vote for; it's a matter of whether their logic will lead to their
survival in the evolutionary
biological sense. So the majority can be
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Jun 08, 2006 at 04:24:51AM +0200, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Le Jeudi 8 Juin 2006 02:56, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Wed, Jun 07, 2006 at 03:56:32PM +0200, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
Hi Bruno,
what I undestand about the UD is that it generates all
Russell Standish wrote:
Indeed obtaining the tape with Omega on it would be equivalent to solving
the Halting problem, but obtaining an arbitrary random noncomputable
sequence
tape is as simple as hooking up a random source to your TM.
In what way is the random source not a program?
True,
in an
interrupted chain that circumnavigates the pole. (Sorry I may not be
explaining the concept of ring species too well - look up Wikipedia).
In such a case, perhaps ring identities such as Jesse Mazer -
Bruno Marchal do exist - but I'd like to be surer of the analogy. Also
ring species are the exception
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
The dovetailer is only supposed to generate all *computable* functions
though, correct? And the diagonalization of the (countable) set of all
computable functions would not itself be computable.
The dovetailer I know does not seem relevant
Russell Standish wrote:
On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 07:53:35PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Anyway, I agree with your basic point--although practical possibility is
not
important to philosophical thought-experiments, *logical* possibility
certainly is, and if there were no smooth path
George Levy wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Meanwhile, I
would like to ask George and the others if they have a good
understanding of the present thread, that is on the fact that growing
functions has been well defined, that each sequence of such functions
are well defined, and each
Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through
non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all,
there is a continuous sequence of intermediates
Tom Caylor wrote:
Actually, in reviewing the definition of Turing machine (it's been over
2 decades since I studied it) I agree with you. The Turing machine
leaves behind a memory of its past through its writes to the tape.
Maybe I don't understand what Wei Dai was saying with his setting of
From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: why can't we erase information?
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 16:11:28 -0700
Jesse Mazer wrote:
As for the question of why we live in a universe that apparently has
Russell Standish wrote:
Also note that exact measurements of microstates is *in principle*
incompatible with the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
Well, that's why I defined microstates as detailed descriptions of the
positions and momenta of all the particles, within the limits of the
From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Reply-To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: why can't we erase information?
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 2006 18:34:42 +1000
On Mon, Apr 10, 2006 at 12:03:47AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
Russell Standish
Tom Caylor wrote:
The reason why you don't buy lottery tickets could just as easily be
explained in a single universe.
I short-changed my argument. I should've said, The reason why you don't
buy lottery tickets can only be explained in a single universe.
Tom Caylor
If you don't
George Levy:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are conscious only because we belong to a continuum of infinite never
ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's guardian angel G* says about that:
true and strictly unbelievable.
Bruno
Since you agree that the number of histories is on a
George Levy wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
George Levy:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
we are conscious only because we belong to a continuum of infinite
never ending stories ...
...that's what the lobian machine's guardian angel G* says about
that: true and strictly unbelievable.
Bruno
Since you
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I was thinking of people who accept some ensemble theory such as MWI, but
don't believe in QTI. I must admit, I find it difficult to understand how
even a dualist might justify (a) as being correct. Would anyone care to
help?
What do you think of my argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
George Levy writes:
Along the line of Jorge Luis Borges a blackboard covered in chalk contains
the library of Babel (everything) but no information. Similarly a white
board covered with ink also contains no information.
Interestingly, information is minimized or
From: Stephen Paul King [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Goldilocks world
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 19:29:39 -0500
Dear Jesse, Stathis, Bruno et al,
- Original Message - From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com
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