Bruno Marchal wrote:
You made a relevant decomposition of the problem,
and you are on the right track. Actually I'm not sure the ja da
McCarthy's amelioration adds anything deep to the problem.
It will be enough to take into account that a double negation
gives an affirmation.
I've thought about
Nice work, Eric! Your solution looks right to me. I now realize my mistake,
I was thinking that if the gods are in a particular order (say, TRF) and Ja
has a particular meaning (say, Ja=yes) and you get a particular series of
answers (say, JJJ) then if you reverse the meaning of Ja and ask the
Bruno Marchal wrote:
As a Price, I give you the (known?) Smullyan McCarthy
puzzle. You are in front of three Gods: the God of Knights, the
God of Knaves, and the God of Knives. The God of Knight always
tells the truth. The God of Knaves always lies, and the God of Knives
always answers by yes or
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
I don't think that's a good counterargument, because the whole concept of
probability is based on ignorance...
No, I don't agree! Probability is based in a sense on ignorance, but you
must make full use of such information as you do have.
Of course
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Sorry Jesse, I can see in retrospect that I was insulting your intelligence
as a rhetorical ploy, and we shouldn't stoop to that level of debate on
this list.
No problem, I wasn't insulted...
You say that you must incorporate whatever information you have, but no
more
Brent Meeker wrote:
-Original Message-
From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2004 6:33 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: Observation selection effects
Brent Meeker wrote:
On reviewing my analysis (I hadn't looked at for about four
-Original Message-
From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 2004 8:45 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: Observation selection effects
If the range of the smaller amount is infinite,
as in my P(x)=1/e^x
example, then it would no longer
Norman Samish:
The Flip-Flop game described by Stathis Papaioannou strikes me as a
version of the old Two-Envelope Paradox.
Assume an eccentric millionaire offers you your choice of either of two
sealed envelopes, A or B, both containing money. One envelope contains
twice as much as the other.
a path i do you really mean the probability
amplitude?
Jesse Mazer
will observe
it inside the solenoid? If the latter, this isn't really analogous to
Afshar's experiment or Unruh's variation on it.
Jesse Mazer
Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Aug 12, 2004 at 01:08:36AM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Also notice that in the analysis of Afshar's experiment by W. Unruh at
http://axion.physics.ubc.ca/rebel.html which scerir linked to, Unruh does
not dispute Afshar's claim that all the photons from the each
assumption that you saw a nonzero number of
cases where the photon was detected at one of the wires at these minima.
Thus, the only outcome consistent with complementarity is to have zero cases
where the photons hit one of these wires, just as Afshar found.
Jesse Mazer
Saibal Mitra wrote:
Now in the article, Afshar claims to have measured which slit the
photon passed through and verified the existence of an interference
pattern. However, this is not the case - without the wires in
place to detect the presence of the interference pattern, photons
arriving at
Actually, looking at the diagram and explanation of the experiment posted at
http://www.kathryncramer.com/wblog/archives/000674.html I think Saibal Mitra
and the sci.physics.research poster I quoted may have misunderstood what
happened in this experiment. I may have misunderstood, but it
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Let us suppose the native is knave. Then what he said was false. But he
said if I am a knight then Santa Claus exists. That proposition can only
be false in the case he is a knight and Santa Claus does not exists.
This only works if you assume his if-then statement was
Kory Heath wrote:
Thanks for the clarification. In this short discussion I've seen at least
three conflicting ways that people use the term Platonism:
1. Platonism == Mathematical Realism.
2. Platonism == The belief in Ideal Horses, which real horses only
approximate.
3. Platonism ==
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Lets go over this again. There is a 100% chance that some copy of Kory
Heath will find himself in the non-bizarre world, even though there will be
one billion copies which find themselves in the bizarre worlds. If that
single, lucky copy is not *you*, then who is he?
Hal Finney wrote:
The MWI is just the quantum formalism minus
wave function collapse and is therefore perfectly compatible with this
experiment, since the experiment is itself compatible with the quantum
formalism.
Would this experimental result actually be predicted by the quantum
formalism,
I wrote:
Would this experimental result actually be predicted by the quantum
formalism, though? It sounds like they had a setup similar to the
double-slit experiment and found a small amount of interference even when
they measured which hole the particle traveled through, but I thought the
Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't find any reference to Afshar or his experiment on the
Harvard web site or on arXiv.org?
Maybe it hasn't been written up yet, or it just wasn't submitted to
arXiv.org. But the Kathryn Cramer blog entry on this had a link to a
schedule of talks at a Texas AM physics
Saibal Mitra wrote:
This is the ''white rabbit'' problem which was discussed on
this list a few
years ago. This can be solved by assuming that there exists
a measure over
the set of al universes, favoring simpler ones.
Also, note that there is no such thing as ''next possible''
states. Once you
Jesse Mazer wrote:
Saibal Mitra wrote:
This means that the relative measure is completely fixed by the
absolute
measure. Also the relative measure is no longer defined when
probabilities
are not conserved (e.g. when the observer may not survive an experiment
as
in quantum suicide). I don't
Bruno Marchal wrote:
At 20:17 03/02/04 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Personally, I would prefer to assign a deeper significance to the notion
of absolute probability, since for me the fact that I find myself to be a
human rather than one of the vastly more numerous but less intelligent
other
By the way, after writing my message the other day about the question of
what it means for the RSSA and ASSA to be compatible or incompatible, I
thought of another condition that should be met if you want to have both an
absolute probability distribution on observer-moments and a conditional
Saibal Mitra wrote:
This means that the relative measure is completely fixed by the absolute
measure. Also the relative measure is no longer defined when probabilities
are not conserved (e.g. when the observer may not survive an experiment as
in quantum suicide). I don't see why you need a theory
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Thank you Jesse for your clear answer. Your comparison
of your use of both ASSA and RSSA with Google ranking system
has been quite useful.
This does not mean I am totally convince because ASSA raises the
problem of the basic frame: I don't think there is any sense to compare
possible way to resolve it?
Jesse Mazer
_
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From: Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Subjective measure? How does that work?
Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2004 03:09:08 -0500
On Sat, Jan 24, 2004 at 11:49:09PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
But measures aren't just about making decisions about
the known laws of physics (like why we always see dropped balls fall towards
the earth).
Jesse Mazer
_
Rethink your business approach for the new year with the helpful tips here.
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on measure theory that may be helpful:
http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Measure_theory
http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sigma_algebra
http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_axioms
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Measure.html
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/ProbabilityMeasure.html
Jesse Mazer
, with no
more evidence (and considerably less parsimony, IMO) to justify it than the
Platonic view?
Jesse Mazer
_
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Jesse Mazer
_
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Eric Hawthorne wrote:
So the answer to *why* it is true that our universe conforms to simple
regularities and produces complex yet ordered systems governed
(at some levels) by simple rules, it's because that's the only kind of
universe that an emerged observer could have emerged
in, so that's
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
Hal Finney wrote:
However, I prefer a model in which what we consider equally likely is
not patterns of matter, but the laws of physics and initial conditions
which generate a given universe. In this model, universes with simple
laws are far more likely
Bruno Marchal wrote:
I don't think the word universe is a basic term. It is a sort
or deity for atheist. All my work can be seen as an attempt to mak
it more palatable in the comp frame.
Tegmark, imo, goes in the right direction, but seems unaware
of the difficulties mathematicians discovered
Chris Collins wrote:
This paradox has its origin in perception rather than fundamental
physics:
If I fill a huge jar with sugar and proteins and minerals and shake it,
there is no reason why I can't produce a talking rabbit, or even a unicorn
with two tails. Yet out out of the vast menagerie of
of
molecules in a rock are contributing to its measure, since both can be seen
as isomorphic to the events of that universe with the right mapping.
Jesse Mazer
_
Get reliable dial-up Internet access now with our limited-time introductory
whether a given
physical object is implementing a particular computation in his paper Does
a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?, available here:
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/rock.html
--Jesse Mazer
_
Working
David Barrett-Lennard wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote,
Isn't there a fundamental problem deciding what it means for a given
simulated object to implement some other computation?
Yes, but does this problem need to be solved? I have no problem with
the idea that some physical object (in one
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Jesse,
Would it be sufficient to have some kind of finite or approximate
measure even if it can not be taken to infinite limits (is degenerative?)
in
order to disallow for white rabbits? A very simple and very weak version
of the anthropic principle works for
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Why is there something rather than nothing?
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2003 12:57:55 +0100
At 18:30 19/11/03 -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Does anyone know, are there versions of philosophy-of-mathematics that
would allow no distinctions
cardinalities, which as I said in my last post I feel a bit iffy
on.
Jesse Mazer
_
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infinities than traditional
mathematics, but it's way *too* restrictive for my tastes, I wouldn't want
to throw out the law of the excluded middle.
Jesse Mazer
_
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of mathematical objects
with a finite description in the general sense I describe above is a lot
larger than the universe of mathematical objects which an intuitionist would
accept, although I'm not sure about that.
Jesse Mazer
_
Say
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
In your definition of the ASSA, why do you define it in terms of your
next
observer moment?
The ASSA and the RSSA were historically defined as competing views.
I am not 100% sure that I have the ASSA right, in that it doesn't seem
too different from
Wei Dai wrote:
On Wed, Nov 12, 2003 at 10:11:04PM -0500, Jesse Mazer wrote:
Of course not, no more than I would treat the copy who materialized in a
room with the portrait of the candidate who went on to lose the election
as
a zombie. From the point of view of myself about to be duplicated
Hal Finney wrote:
Jesse Mazer writes:
OK, so now go back to the scenario where you're supposed to
be recreated in both Washington and Moscow, except assume that at the
last
moment there's a power failure in Moscow and the recreator machine fails
to
activate. Surely this is no different from
Hal Finney wrote:
One correction, in the descriptions below I should have said multiverse
for all of them instead of universe. The distinction between the SSA
and the SSSA is not multiverse vs universe, it is observers vs observer-
moments. I'll send out an updated copy when I get some more
By the way, for anyone who wants to learn more about the whole issue of the
self-sampling assumption in general, I recommend this website:
http://www.anthropic-principle.com/
The author of the site, Nick Bostrom, (who I think is a member of this list,
or used to be) also wrote a whole book on
But one might also have to take into account the absolute measure on
all-observer moments that I suggest above, so that if there is a very low
absolute probability of a brain that can suggest a future observer-moment
which is very similar to my current one
Sorry, meant to say a very low
Joao Leao wrote:
CMR wrote:
Gödel's incompleteness theorems have and justly should be
judged/interpreted
purely on the merits of the arguments themselves, not the author's
subjective(prejudiced?) interpretation, no?
He was as much a victim(beneficiary?) of his discoveries as was
anyone...
From: Hal Finney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Fw: Something for Platonists]
Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 10:46:56 -0700
Jesse Mazer writes:
Yes, a Platonist can feel as certain of the statement the axioms of
Peano
arithmetic will never lead
Joao Leao wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote:
As I think Bruno Marchal mentioned in a recent post, mathematicians use
the
word model differently than physicists or other scientists. But again,
I'm
not sure if model theory even makes sense if you drop all Platonic
assumptions about math.
You
with the
notion of seeing the entire infinite history of the universe by travelling
into a black hole?
Jesse Mazer
_
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of
controversy about what people even mean by worlds in the MWI. With a
hidden variables interpretation of QM you can talk about the universe's
present state, but the exact details of the present state would always be
unknowable.
--Jesse Mazer
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Jesse,
Please read the below referenced paper. It shows that QM comp *CAN*
solve an undecidable problem
(relative to a classical computer).
Where does it say that?
I do not see how I misread Feynman's
claim
Again, the paper says:
Is there any hope for
Stephen Paul King wrote:
Dear Jesse,
Please read the below referenced paper. It shows that QM comp *CAN*
solve an undecidable problem
(relative to a classical computer).
Where does it say that?
[SPK]
In the abstract of http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~cristian/coinsQIP.pdf
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Jesse Stephen:
About quantum computing getting around the limitations of Turing machines:
you don't have to cite Feynman, this matter was settled fairly clearly in
David Deutsch's classic work on quantum computation. He showed that the
only quantum-computable functions
Hal Finney wrote:
One correction, there are no known problems which take exponential time
but which can be checked in polynomial time. If such a problem could be
found it would prove that P != NP, one of the greatest unsolved problems
in computability theory.
Whoops, I've heard of the P=NP
George Levy wrote:
Without our quantum laws, for example, if we lived in a mechanistic
universe, electrons, unfettered by their quantum levels would fall into
their nucleii resulting in the almost immediate annihilation of all matter
in the universe and a huge increase in entropy. Even though
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Jesse Mazer wrote
Ok, I think I see where my mistake was. I was thinking that decoherence
just referred to interactions between a system and the external
environment, but what you seem to be saying is that it can also refer to
an internal effect where interactions
Brent Meeker wrote:
On 04-Sep-02, Tim May wrote:
By the way, issues of observers and measurements are
obviously fraught with Chinese boxes types of problems.
In the Schrodinger's Cat pedantic example, if the cat
alive or cat dead measurement is made at the end of one
hour by opening
scerir wrote:
Wigner later (1983) changed opinion and wrote
that decoherence forbids superposition of states like
c1 |s 1 |friend 1 + c2 |s 2 |friend 2
After that in QM the conscious being - i.e. the friend
who tells that he already knows whether the outcome is
|s 1 or |s 2 - plays no
Brent Meeker wrote:
OK, consider a single excited hydrogen atom in a perfectly
reflecting box. Has it emitted a photon or not? QM will
predict a superposition of photon+H and H-excited in which
the amplitude for H-excited decays exponentially with time.
But the exponential decay is only
Tim May wrote:
Time for a digression. The classic urn experiment, with Price's objections.
And let me throw in something several members of this list will likely
appreciate: a bet on the outcomes (a la Bayesian reasoning, a la market
processes, a la Robin Hanson's idea futures, a la
From: Charles Goodwin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: FIN insanity
Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 12:26:24 +1200
On the other hand I can't see how FIN is supposed to work, either. I
*think* the argument runs something like this...
Even if you have just had, say, an atom bomb
From: Jacques Mallah [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: FIN Again (was: Re: James Higgo)
Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2001 17:51:46 -0400
From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
I don't understand your objection. It seems to me that it is perfectly
coherent to imagine a TOE which includes
From: Joel Dobrzelewski
Hmm... I think I see the problem now. But I don't understand your proposed
solution.
Do you want to 1) make predictions about the future based on past
observations, or 2) make predictions about the future based on all possible
histories, or 3) something else entirely.
For the computationalist that simple explanation is not available.
For an explanation that preparing coffee augment the degree of
plausibility (probability, credibility) of the experience of
drinking coffee, the only way is to isolate, from pure arithmetics,
a measure on the consistent
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
[re: rock is a good implementation of any computation]
It depends what you mean by good implementation. The context of my
comment above was, *if* you believe there is a single true set of
psychophysical laws, are the laws likely
about the anthropic
principle count as a thought about the anthropic principle? If not, on
what basis do you rule it out?
Jesse Mazer
_
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an objective way to settle
which patterns/computations can be experienced and which can't.
Jesse Mazer
_
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* of consciousness--there could just be a lot of
separate observer-moments that don't become anything different from what
they already are (so there'd be no point in asking which copy I'd become in
a replication experiment).
Jesse Mazer
both ways was
just to avoid giving the wrong impression.
Jesse Mazer
_
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brain
probably gives rise to many different kinds of subjective experiences...if
your ideas are right it may even give rise to all possible experiences.
What this shows is that I am not identical to my brain, a conclusion that
anyone with a computational view of mind would agree with.
Jesse
believe)...it says that
there's nothing to test, because attributing consciousness to a system is a
purely aesthetic decision. Even an omniscient God could not tell you the
truth of the matter, if #1 is correct.
Jesse Mazer
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