On 23-Apr-02, Wei Dai wrote:
I think it's pretty obvious that you can't predict someone's
decisions if you show him the prediction before he makes his
final choice. So let's consider a different flavor of
prediction. Suppose every time you make a choice, I can predict
the decision, write it
On Wed, Apr 24, 2002 at 04:51:18PM +0200, Marcus Hutter wrote:
In A Theory of Universal Artificial Intelligence based on
Algorithmic Complexity http://www.idsia.ch/~marcus/ai/pkcunai.htm
I developed a rational decision maker which makes optimal
decisions in any environment. The only
H J Ruhl wrote:
In any event in my view your argument makes many assumptions - i.e.
requires substantial information, isolates sub systems, and seems to allow
many sub states between states of interest all of which are counter to my
approach.
Imo the assumption of a limited information
Dear Everyboy on the Everything list,
After having followed the discussions in this list for a
while I would like to make my first contribution:
The paradox between computability and free will vanishes through
careful reasoning:
That a part of the universe is computable is defined
as follows:
Dear Marcus:
I have some basic issues with your post.
The idea I use is that the basis of what we like to think of as our
universe and all other universes is There is no information.
This is not really an assumption in the sense that you can not extract
anything from nothing as one usually
Welcome to the list, Marcus. I think your analysis is very good.
For some predictions there might be a fixed point; for example,
I can predict that I will not commit suicide in the next 5 minutes.
Even knowing that prediction I will not try to contradict it. For other
things there might not be
I think it's pretty obvious that you can't predict someone's decisions if
you show him the prediction before he makes his final choice. So let's
consider a different flavor of prediction. Suppose every time you make a
choice, I can predict the decision, write it down before you do it, and
Explorations of the definitional basis of a universe and its effect on the
idea of decisions:
First examine a deterministic universe j such that [using notation from a
post by Matthieu Walraet]:
TjTj Tj
Sj(0)
On 18 Apr 2002, at 20:03, H J Ruhl wrote:
5) I do not see universes as splitting by going to more than one next
state. This is not necessary to explain anything as far as I can see.
6) Universes that are in receipt of true noise as part of a state to state
transition are in effect
Dear Matthieu:
At 4/19/02, you wrote:
On 18 Apr 2002, at 20:03, H J Ruhl wrote:
5) I do not see universes as splitting by going to more than one next
state. This is not necessary to explain anything as far as I can see.
6) Universes that are in receipt of true noise as part of a
Your approaches seem incoherent to me. If the universe is defined by a
complete computable description then that description includes you and
whatever decision process your brain implements. To treat the universe as
computable and your choices as determined by some utility function and
decision
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 11:57:28AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
Your approaches seem incoherent to me. If the universe is defined by a
complete computable description then that description includes you and
whatever decision process your brain implements. To treat the universe as
computable and
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 12:26:21PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
Perhaps contradictory is too strong a word - I should have stuck with
incoherent. But it seems you contemplate having different wishes about
the future evolution of the world and you want to find some decision
theory that tells you
On Thu, 18 Apr 2002, Wei Dai wrote:
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 12:26:21PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
Perhaps contradictory is too strong a word - I should have stuck with
incoherent. But it seems you contemplate having different wishes about
the future evolution of the world and you want to
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 01:39:59PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
Exactly. So what does the assumption about the complete mathematical
description add?
It's so that your preferences are well defined.
As a positive theory, decision theory is going to be wrong sometimes (e.g.
not predict what
On Thu, 18 Apr 2002, Wei Dai wrote:
On Wed, Apr 17, 2002 at 08:36:29PM -0700, H J Ruhl wrote:
I am interested because currently I find it impossible to support the
concept of a decision.
I was also having the problem of figuring out how to make sense of the
concept of a decision. My
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 02:08:56PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
Why are you in principle unable to compute your own choices? Do you refer
to unable to predict or unable to enumerate or both?
I mean there is no algorithm which your brain can implement, such that
given the mathematical
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 04:15:48PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't see this. You seem to be making a proof by contradiction - but I
don't see that it works. There is no contradiction is assuming that there
is an algorithm that correctly predicts your decision and then you make
that
On Thu, 18 Apr 2002, Wei Dai wrote:
On Thu, Apr 18, 2002 at 04:15:48PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
I don't see this. You seem to be making a proof by contradiction - but I
don't see that it works. There is no contradiction is assuming that there
is an algorithm that correctly predicts
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