George Levy wrote:
Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only
relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different
probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then
our perceptions will be different.
I understand this way of
Le 07-août-06, à 18:24, 1Z a écrit :
Because you don't believe in empriricism, but that is all rather
circular.
Who said I am not an empiricist?
OK. I am saying that fundamental truth (including the origin of the
universe) is in our head (like mystics). But then I make this
precise with
Le 08-août-06, à 15:54, W. C. a écrit :
From: Bruno Marchal
...
I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I
find it
somehow ambiguous.
Let me comment anyway.
Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will
not be
possible in our life time
Le 08-août-06, à 17:00, David Nyman a écrit :
Bruno Marchal wrote:
FP2: I do periphrases to talk about it. It is a confusing notion (cf
Chalmers delusion). Mathematically it needs bimodal logics (or just
G
handled with care);
Bruno
Thanks for the summary, I'll look out for the
Le 09-août-06, à 01:49, Colin Hales a écrit :
Why is everyone talking about abstract computation? Of _course_ 1st
person
is prime = Has primacy in description of the universe. Being a portion
of
any structure (ME) trying to model the structure (the UNIVERSE) from
within
it (ME as
Colin Hales wrote:
David Nyman:
snip
An _abstract_ computation/model X implemented symbolically on a of a
portion
of the structure (a COMPUTER) inside the structure (the UNIVERSE) will
see
the universe as NOT COMPUTER, not some function of the machinations of
X,
the model.
WC writes:
Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum level,
but rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I think,
that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately obvious how
good the copy of a person would have to be (what Bruno
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
(PS could you write *less* next time ? I find tha the more you write,
the less
I understand!)
I sympathise!
However, I'm not sure how much further we're destined to get with this
particular dialogue. Each time we have another go I think I see where
Brent Meeker writes:
David Nyman wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Perhaps it says something about the nature of the simulation's creators,
but I don't see that it says anything about the probability that we are
living in one.
Do you mean that if we are living in one, then
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
They're not just simulating us, are they? They might have just slapped
together a virtual universe in an idle moment to see how it turns out. Maybe
they're more interested in star formation, or bacteria or something. Is an E.
coli
in your gut justified in
Nick (and List):
just a short remark to the very first words of your post below (mostly
erased):
If we are living in a simulation .
I think this is the usual pretension (not only on this list).
I think we simulate what we are living in according to the little we know.
Such 'simulation' -
Misc responses to 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Colin Hales wrote:
David Nyman:
snip
An _abstract_ computation/model X implemented symbolically on a of
a
portion
of the structure (a COMPUTER) inside the structure (the UNIVERSE)
will
see
the universe as NOT COMPUTER, not some function of
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think we simulate what we are living in according to the little we know.
Such 'simulation' - 'simplification' - 'modeling' - 'metaphorizing' - or
weven
'harrypotterizing' things we think does not change the unknown/unknowable
we live in. We just think and
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Of course I have a problem with the word universe and especially with
the expression being inside a universe. The reason is that I think
comp forces us to accept we are supported by an infinity of
computations and that the 1-(plural and singular) appearance of the
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
I'm hoping this also addresses some of David Nyman's queries.
Thanks, yes it does. However, for the sake of clarity:
Why not? What *does* implementation consist of ?
Being the stuff, the substrate. It's the only thing actually instantiated.
So, given your
In a discussion about philosophy, Nick Prince said, "If we are living in a
simulation. . ."
To which John Mikes replied, "I think this is the usual pretension. .
. I think 'we simulate what we are living in' according to the
little we know. Such 'simulation' - 'simplification' - 'modeling'
David Nyman wrote:
Third person perception comes about when several observers share the
same perception because they share the same environmental contingencies
on their existence. In effect these observers share the same "frame of
reference." I see many similarities with relativity
George
Yes, it is getting quite prolix!
The relevant posts are 9, 11 and 14
David
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A while back Peter Jones and Brent Meeker independently pointed out the
illogicality of my non-acceptance of both MWI AND "wave-collapse" as
explanations of "quantum weirdness."They seemed to say that the
explanation had to be one or the other. Now I've read whatColin
Hales has to say. I
Norman Samish:
A while back Peter Jones and Brent Meeker independently pointed out
the illogicality of my non-acceptance of both MWI AND wave-collapse
as explanations of quantum weirdness.
# Since the word 'weirdness' is in the subject line, may I ask the
following?
Has the 'axiom of choice' (I
David Nyman wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Not at all. A bidirectional contingency is superfluous. The only
relevent contingency is: If the observed event will result in different
probabilities of survival for myself and for others observing me, then
our perceptions will be
Prolixing on regardless! David Nyman:
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
I'm hoping this also addresses some of David Nyman's queries.
Thanks, yes it does. However, for the sake of clarity:
Why not? What *does* implementation consist of ?
Being the stuff, the substrate. It's the only
Norman Samish wrote:
A while back Peter Jones and Brent Meeker independently pointed out the
illogicality of my non-acceptance of both MWI AND wave-collapse as
explanations of quantum weirdness. They seemed to say that the
explanation had to be one or the other. Now I've read what Colin
scerir wrote:
Norman Samish:
A while back Peter Jones and Brent Meeker independently pointed out
the illogicality of my non-acceptance of both MWI AND wave-collapse
as explanations of quantum weirdness.
# Since the word 'weirdness' is in the subject line, may I ask the
following?
Has the
George Levy wrote:
Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not
deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that it is
secondary and an illusion brought about by having several observers
share the same frame of reference. This frame of reference
David Nyman:
Sent: Thursday, August 10, 2006 11:20 AM
To: Everything List
Subject: Re: Are First Person prime?
George Levy wrote:
Colin Hales remarks seem to agree with what I say. However, I do not
deny the existence of a third person perspective. I only say that it is
secondary
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