From: W. C.
From: Bruno Marchal
...
Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like observing
your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an
electron.
...
Any microscope (optical or electron type)? What's the min. magnification
resolution to see it?
I
David Nyman wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Perhaps it says something about the nature of the simulation's creators,
but I don't see that it says anything about the probability that we are
living in one.
Do you mean that if we are living in one, then the moral standards of
its
David Nyman writes:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Perhaps it says something about the nature of the simulation's creators,
but I don't see that it says anything about the probability that we are
living in one.
Do you mean that if we are living in one, then the moral standards of
its
Bruno Marchal writes:
Le 07-août-06, à 15:52, W. C. a écrit :
From: Bruno Marchal
...
Comp says that there is a level of description of yourself such that
you
survive through an emulation done at that level. But the UD will
simulate
not only that level but all level belows.
Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
Can you tell me why?
Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell you.
If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go
continue polluting the mailing list.
Quentin
Le 08-août-06, à 10:10, Quentin Anciaux a écrit :
Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
Can you tell me why?
Because you are bad faith and don't read correctly what others tell
you.
If you have some more stupid questions like this, don't hesitate and go
continue polluting the
Le 08-août-06, à 05:49, W. C. a écrit :
From: Stathis Papaioannou
...
Classical teleportation cannot copy something exact to the quantum
level,
but rather involves making a close enough copy. It is obvious, I
think,
that this is theoretically possible, but it is not immediately
Le 08-août-06, à 08:00, W. C. a écrit :
But I still can't see that matter is the result of a sum on an
infinity
of interfering computations.
Can you tell me why?
My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have
empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that physical
Le 07-août-06, à 20:59, 1Z a écrit :
George Levy wrote:
1Z wrote:
George Levy wrote:
A conscious entity is also information.
I am assuming here that a conscious entity is essentially software.
You can assume it of you like. It isn't computationalism, which
is the claim that
Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
...a controlled
experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
everything else
the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in
perfect
lockstep.
I think that the
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 01:11:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical
computers (that is, what
we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be)
has almost twice
the measure as it would have
Brent Meeker wrote:
But the hypothesis that the creators are like us is part of the
justification for supposing they would run simulations of intelligent
beings. If you then argue that their motivations and ethics might be alien
to us, you've discarded any reason for supposing they would
Russell Standish writes:
Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical
computers (that is, what
we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be)
has almost twice
the measure as it would have if it were running on one computer?
From: Bruno Marchal
...
I just said you were deadly wrong here, but rereading your post I find it
somehow ambiguous.
Let me comment anyway.
Human classical teleportation, although possible in principle, will not be
possible in our life time (except for those who will succeed in some lucky
Le 07-août-06, à 22:12, David Nyman a écrit :
1) FP1g - primitive 'global' first person entity or context
2) FP1i - individual person delimited by primitive differentiation
(which is agnostic to comp, physics, or anything else at this logical
level)
3) FP2 - narrative references to first
Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like
observing
your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an
electron.
Could you say more about this? If you examine an object more and more
closely you
Bruno Marchal wrote:
FP2: I do periphrases to talk about it. It is a confusing notion (cf
Chalmers delusion). Mathematically it needs bimodal logics (or just G
handled with care);
Bruno
Thanks for the summary, I'll look out for the roadmap. I'd just like
to clarify the role of FP2 above:
W. C. wrote:
Thanks for the info. although I still don't think substitution level exists.
If teleportation of human beings is real (I hope I can see it in my life),
I think all biggest questions (such as consciousness, soul? Creator? the
origin of the universe, meaning of life ... etc.)
of
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 08-août-06, à 08:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Not at all. I mean it in the operational physical sense. Like
observing
your hand with a microscope, or looking closely to the path of an
electron.
Could you say more about this? If you examine an object
Bruno Marchal wrote:
My opinion here is that you should (re)read the FOR book. We do have
empirical reasons (quantum mechanics) that physical reality is the
result of interfering computable waves.
Quantum weirdness is entirely compatible with
materialism-contingency-empiricism.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
...a controlled
experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
everything else
the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in
perfect
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
difference, or only a
small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
You can't make a difference in Platonia. There is no time there,
no change, and no causality.
Stathis, you put me on the spot (as Brent did, to whom I still owe a reply).
I have NO theory. I started to speculate about things I never had the time
to read a bout, keep pace with novelties, or even contemplate while I was
busy as the nonexistent hell in my
day-to day D and consulting
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
I'll try to nail this here. I take 'ontology' to refer to issues of
existence or being, where 'epistemology' refers to knowledge, or 'what
and how we know'. When I say that our 'ontology' is manifest, I'm
claiming (perhaps a little more cautiously
1Z wrote:
I don't even know what you mean by first person.
Peter
It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what
I mean by first person'! However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned
to distinguish two basic meanings, which failing to specify IMO causes
a lot of
1Z wrote:
I don't even know what you mean by "first person".
David Nyman wrote:
Peter
It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what
I mean by first person'! However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned
to distinguish two basic meanings, which
David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
I don't even know what you mean by first person.
Peter
It's a bit late in the day perhaps to tell me you 'don't even know what
I mean by first person'!
Haven't I been saying that all along.
However, I'll have another go. I'm concerned
to distinguish
If we are living in a simulation (and I believe the matrix hypothesis is a
real possibility) and if we are all just software constructs then the
architect has some options available to it. If it is benevolent, then it
could copy (and save) the state of the simulation at various times. It
could
George Levy wrote:
Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own
existence is contingent on our observation.
Hi George
I think I agree with this. It could correspond with what I'm trying to
model in terms of FP1 etc. Perhaps it might be expressed as:
First person
Hi David,
Le Mardi 8 Août 2006 15:47, David Nyman a écrit :
I'm not sure that Nick Bostrom et al actually take this view. Rather
the notion seems to be based on the assumptions that if this is a
feasible thing to do, and unless you could rule out that *some* future
civilisation would
1Z wrote:
(PS could you write *less* next time ? I find tha the more you write,
the less
I understand!)
I sympathise!
However, I'm not sure how much further we're destined to get with this
particular dialogue. Each time we have another go I think I see where
we're going past each other,
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
- Why accepting the simulation argument is simpler than accepting
the multitude sentient life forms hypothesis ? ;)
Hi Quentin
I think the argument here is based on the presumed lack of practical
constraints on the sheer magnitude of 'simulable observers', which can
be
Why is everyone talking about abstract computation? Of _course_ 1st person
is prime = Has primacy in description of the universe. Being a portion of
any structure (ME) trying to model the structure (the UNIVERSE) from within
it (ME as scientist inside/part of the universe) is intrinsically and
1Z wrote:
It is only directly manifest inasmuch as it how the brain
seems to itself. That does not make it ontologically fundamental.
What is epistemologically basic -- subjective expereince -- is
ontologically very complex and very far from basic. A lot
of philosophy goes into the weeds
Colin Hales wrote:
Of _course_ 1st person
is prime = Has primacy in description of the universe. Being a portion of
any structure (ME) trying to model the structure (the UNIVERSE) from within
it (ME as scientist inside/part of the universe) is intrinsically and
innately presented with that
David Nyman:
snip
An _abstract_ computation/model X implemented symbolically on a of a
portion
of the structure (a COMPUTER) inside the structure (the UNIVERSE) will
see
the universe as NOT COMPUTER, not some function of the machinations of
X,
the model. Eg The first person
Colin Hales wrote:
Sort of...but I think the word 'hardware' is loaded with assumption. I'd say
that universe literally is a relational construct and that it's appearance
as 'physical' is what it is like when you are in it. .ie. There's no such
'thing' as a 'thing'. :-) It doesn't mean that
Precisely my point!
On Tue, Aug 08, 2006 at 08:42:04AM -0700, 1Z wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
By increasing the measure locally in our universe, are you making no
difference, or only a
small amount of difference to the measure overall in Platonia?
You can't make a
David Nyman wrote:
George Levy wrote:
Thus first person perception of the world comes about when our own
existence is contingent on our observation.
Hi George
I think I agree with this. It could correspond with what I'm trying to
model in terms of FP1 etc. Perhaps it
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