Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Bruce Kellett]

On 11/07/2017 2:12 pm, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 10:29:26PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I don't think it is that simple. If we have substrate independence,
the machine (the conscious person) cannot tell what substrate is
supporting the computations, whether arithmetic, a quantum world, or
a classical Newtonian world. That would seem to imply that mere
consideration of conscious observer moments cannot distinguish
between these. Or else you feel the full force of the conundrum
enunciated above: if observer moments imply a quantum reality, then
the machine can indeed determine its substrate, and substrate
independence is lost.


You're still missing the point. The quantum reality is a 1p thing, it
is the observed phenomenal physics. Substrate independence is a 3p
thing, and may be quantum, classical or whatever, just needing to
support universal computation.


Well, in the Everettian picture, the quantum reality is the whole 
structure, multiverse or whatever. The 0p/3p picture of splitting into 
separate worlds according to the unitary evolution of the wave function 
is the quantum reality. The 1p view of this is just a projection from 
the whole according to self-selection. If the universe were classical, 
Turing machines could still exist and support the computations 
underlying consciousness, but there would be no splitting into many 
worlds. So if consciousness implies quantum mechanics, then we are able 
to determine the substrate -- if quantum, the substrate cannot be purely 
Newtonian, and the computations are not supported by a classical Turing 
machine. I don't think the 1p-1pp-3p distinctions are helpful here, they 
obscure what is actually going on.


Bruce





--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 10:29:26PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> I don't think it is that simple. If we have substrate independence,
> the machine (the conscious person) cannot tell what substrate is
> supporting the computations, whether arithmetic, a quantum world, or
> a classical Newtonian world. That would seem to imply that mere
> consideration of conscious observer moments cannot distinguish
> between these. Or else you feel the full force of the conundrum
> enunciated above: if observer moments imply a quantum reality, then
> the machine can indeed determine its substrate, and substrate
> independence is lost.
> 

You're still missing the point. The quantum reality is a 1p thing, it
is the observed phenomenal physics. Substrate independence is a 3p
thing, and may be quantum, classical or whatever, just needing to
support universal computation.

-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Lawrence Krauss Should Have Paid Attention to Vic

[Brent Meeker]

Interesting essay.  When I was helping edit Vic's books I made a similar 
argument too him - that the reason his Point-of-View-Invariance seemed 
so powerful in rederiving physics is that physicist were only interested 
in things that obeyed POVI.


You wrote:

/Let us say we were interested in describing all phenomena in our 
universe. What type of mathematics would we need? How many axioms would 
be needed for mathematical structure to describe all the phenomena? Of 
course, it is hard to predict, but it is even harder not to speculate. 
One possible conclusion would be that if we look at the universe in 
totality and not bracket any subset of phenomena, the mathematics we 
would need would have no axioms at all. That is, the universe in 
totality is devoid of structure and needs no axioms to describe it. 
Total lawlessness! The mathematics are just plain sets without 
structure. This would finally eliminate all metaphysics when dealing 
with the laws of nature and mathematical structure. It is only the way 
we look at the universe that gives us the illusion of structure./


I"m sure you're aware of Max Tegmark's "Mathematical Universe 
Hypothesis" in which all possible mathematical structures obtain in some 
universe; and his later restriction of this idea to the "Computable 
Universe Hypothesis" in which only Turing computable universes exist.   
But you are probably not aware of the ideas of Bruno Marchal, a 
mathematical logician in Brussels.  He has a much more worked out idea 
of reality based on the Universal Dovetailing computer which he combines 
with the assumption that consciousness is certain kind of information 
processing to conclude that the UD computation produces all experience 
and implies physics.  It seems like a crankish idea at first, but Bruno 
is a very nice and serious guy, not at all a crank (though I don't agree 
with all of his theories).   Here's his basic paper: 
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
I know him from his posting on the Everything list; 
everything-list@googlegroups.com


Brent



On 7/10/2017 3:56 PM, Noson Yanofsky wrote:


Thank you!

Vic Stenger’s books are always very interesting!!!

Attached is a paper on finding lawlessness.

And here is a link to another paper that was just published: 
http://nautil.us/issue/49/the-absurd/chaos-makes-the-multiverse-unnecessary


Please pass them on to whoever would be interested in them.

All the best,

Noson

*From:*Brent Meeker [mailto:meeke...@verizon.net]
*Sent:* Monday, July 10, 2017 4:48 PM
*To:* spinozalens via Free Thinkers Physics Discussion Group 
; no...@sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu; Atvoid-2 


*Subject:* Re: Lawrence Krauss Should Have Paid Attention to Vic

It's gratifying to see Vic's contribution to the philosophy of science 
recognized.  I think it's important to recognize though that 
mathematics is not "effective" in weeding out false physics theories.  
Intelligence has evolutionary advantage insofar as it is good at 
prediction; which is implicitly projection of regularities into the 
future.  So humans have a built-in tendency to see patterns - even 
where they are specious.  They can build mathematical theories which 
don't have any reference reality, just as they can invent 
superstitions about physical events.


Anyway, thanks to Prof Yanofsky.

Brent

On 7/10/2017 8:14 AM, spinozalens via Free Thinkers Physics Discussion 
Group wrote:


In Marcus Chown's delightful book " The Never Ending Days of Being
Dead" a whole chapter ( Patterns in the Void)  is devoted to Vic's
ideas " Where The Laws Of Physics Comes From" Chown used good
judgement including this chapter in his book.  I  think that had
Lawrence Krauss been more familiar with Vic's work , he
possibly wouldn't have walked in the minefield he did with his
book. "A Universe From Nothing"  In my opinion Vic had a very good
answer to this question. This answer has not received enough
attention in the physics and philosophy communities. Here
mathematician Noson S Yanofky fleshes out these ideas in more detail.

Bob Zannelli

*Why Mathematics Works So Well*

Noson S. Yanofsky


/(Submitted on 28 Jun 2015)/

A major question in philosophy of science involves the
unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in physics. Why should
mathematics, created or discovered, with nothing empirical in mind
be so perfectly suited to describe the laws of the physical
universe? We review the well-known fact that the symmetries of the
laws of physics are their defining properties. We show that there
are similar symmetries of mathematical facts and that these
symmetries are the defining properties of mathematics. By
examining the symmetries of physics and mathematics, we show that
the effectiveness is actually quite 

Re: What lead to free-will denial?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Jul 10, 2017 at 7:02 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> I am just saying that universal machine can differ fro their beliefs, and
> that it is a better identity criteria,
>

​If you have a better way of identifying the beliefs of others than
observing their behavior I would very much like to hear what it is!​



> ​> ​
> Do you agree that the Clark and ensistenin are different person, despite
> being both (universal) machine?


​Sure I agree, universal machines can have different memories and different
programming. And in the real physical world it takes time to move that tape
(or its equivalent) around, and some machines can do it faster than others.
Also in the real physical world different amounts of blank tape are
available for use by different machines. In the real would there is never a
unlimited amount of tape (or it's equivalent) available for use, there is
always a limit, although some have more tape than others.

So a Turing Machine is a excellent mathematical model of how real computers
and brains work at the fundamental level, but no model can be perfect. ​


>> ​>> ​
>> ​It seem to me that the observance of behavior that is exactly the same
>> is a great way to determine the equivalence of personal
>> identity
>> ​; in fact I can't think of a better one.​
>>  ​
>
>
> ​> ​
> Because it reflects the same beliefs.
>

​That seems like a reasonable hypothesis, but the only thing I know for
certain about other people is what their behavior is, and the same would be
true of a AI.  ​


​>> ​
>> ​So what test can I perform in the lab to determine if machine X is ​
>> ​L​
>> öbian
>> ​ or​ Turing? If you have none then it's not science.
>>
>
> ​> ​
> That is impossible.
>

​Then it's not science just philosophical gas, a idea that can never make
advance and progress and so is a waste of time.​

​

John K Clark​

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: “Could a Quantum Computer Have Subjective Experience?”

[Bruno Marchal]

On 10 Jul 2017, at 03:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 7/07/2017 7:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Jul 2017, at 01:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 7/07/2017 12:50 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Jul 2017, at 14:22, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 6/07/2017 5:55 pm, Russell Standish wrote:
And assuming conscious classic digital machines, quantum  
phenomenology
appears at the observed level - a result in line with Bruno  
Marchal's

FPI result.


Prove it. Bruno has failed to do so -- his person duplication  
thought experiments do not reproduce quantum behaviour.


Which one? Z1*, X1*, or S4Grz1? If you know about a physical  
facts contradicting those theories, I would be pleased to know.  
The person duplication experience just shows that physics is  
given by a "sum" on all computations, seen from internal points  
of view imposed by incompleteness, and until now, as modest as  
the results can be, the three propositional physics are still not  
refuted. I am not sure you have studied them, because you have  
shown not knowing the basic theories needed to apprehend them, so  
it looks you are just inventing something here.


The point that I was trying to make to Russell was the fact that  
purely classical machines can exhibit consciousness means that you  
cannot derive quantum mechanics from consciousness alone.


That depends on your assumptions. If my consciousness, or my 1p  
experience are invariant for a physical digital substitution, in  
virtue of computing, then there is just no choice in the matter.


Let me spell out the argument more clearly. If consciousness implies  
that the world is quantum mechanical (one can derive quantum  
mechanics from the existence of observer moments), then it follows  
that consciousness is not possible in a non-quantum world (modus  
tollens). But a Turing machine is not a quantum device;


OK. It is an arithmetical entity.





it could exist in a non-quantum world


Indeed, at least seen from outside, in the 0p view. OK.




and exhibit consciousness (given the appropriate computations), so  
something has to give -- either the derivation of the quantum from  
the existence of consciousness, or digital substitution of  
consciousness (substrate independence). Take your pick.


The machine "lives", or "exists" in the arithmetical reality, in the  
eyes of god (in the 3p absolute view, or in the 0p view), but from its  
first personal perspective (1p view) it lives provably in a quantum  
reality. Then we can test if the quantum reality of the machine  
violates or not the quantum that we infer from nature.


You must not identify: "the machine is in arithmetic", with the  
machine's point of view access only a quantum reality (the reality of  
all computations going through its current states, below its  
substitution . We need to always make clear which pov we are talking  
about. The UDA showed that the physical is 1p plural statistical. It  
is not a 3p view.


Bruno








Bruce

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: What lead to free-will denial?

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Jul 2017, at 00:13, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jul 8, 2017 at 4:46 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​​>> ​did Einstein believe in anything or did he just write  
symbols on paper that got published as journal articles? If you  
think he did believe it I'd like to know how you determined that,  
and then I want to know what exactly Einstein's brain had that the  
Turing Machine (the one that was doing such a good job emulating  
Einstein) lacked."​


​> ​I do not understand. Are you assuming that Einstein is a p- 
zombie?


​I don't know and don't want to know what a "p-zombie" is, it  
sounds obscene. However I do want to know if you assume​ that ​a  
intelligent computer is a zombie​, and if so why do you think that  
is a reasonable assumption to make about a smart computer but not  
about a smart person like Einstein.



You attribute things I have never said. mechanism implies strong AI.  
That machine can be conscious is what I am working since the beginning.






​> ​I do assume that Einstein brain is Turing emulable,

​Good, so you haven't totally abandoned rationality.

​> ​which means that the only difference is in the belief that  
the "Einstein Turing machine" has.


​The Einstein Turing machine says some brilliant things about our  
physical world and it also says it passionately believes what it's  
saying. There is plenty of evidence that it is telling the truth  
about one of those statements, but what evidence do you have it is  
lying about the other one?  And what evidence do you have that the  
biological Einstein was telling the truth about both?



I am just saying that universal machine can differ fro their beliefs,  
and that it is a better identity criteria, and indeed the one we have  
used (and agree) in all discussion. Do you agree that the Clark and  
ensistenin are different person, despite being both (universal) machine?









​> ​All universal machine do exactly the same thing

​If they didn't then they wouldn't be a ​universal machine​.​

​> ​and so is not a good criteria for person identity.

​How do you figure that? ​


You have use this al lot, for example when saying that the W-guy is  
the H-guy, ...






 ​It seem to me that the observance of behavior that is exactly the  
same is a great way to determine the equivalence of personal  
identity​; in fact I can't think of a better one.​ ​


Because it reflects the same beliefs.






​> ​But they differ in their provability of believability  
extension,


​No idea what " believability extension​"  means or what proof  
you have that it exists. ​


For the correct simple ideal machine, the set of what it can  
rationally justify is recursively enumerable.
In logic we often identify a theory with the set of its theorem, as  
opposed to the finite description of its axioms.








​> ​All Löbian machine are universal machine.​ ​Not all  
universal machine are Löbian machine.


​If it can't emulate something then it's not a ​universal  
machine, but it doesn't matter because you said a Turing Machine can  
emulate a "Löbian machine". So whatever a "Löbian machine" can do a  
Turing Machine can do it too.


Yes, making "universalness" a bad identity criterion. If universalnes  
was the identty criterion, you could say yes to the lazy doctor which  
replace the brain with 16k Radio-Shack computer. It can also emulate  
all machines, if you provide the extended memory when asked.








​> ​Löbian machines are Turing machine with enough belief so

​So what test can I perform in the lab to determine if machine X  
is ​Löbian​ or​ Turing? If you have none then it's not science.


That is impossible. That is alredy impossible for the factorial  
programs, or any programs, by Rice theorem. The set of programs  
computing the factorial function is not recurisiven nor even  
recursively enumarable. It is a general theorem in computer science.  
We can build programs computing function, but we cannot build a  
program capable of testing which function is computed when given some  
programs.










​> ​that the G* theology

Oh no, now we have ​G* theology! If homemade jargon and acronyms  
were science you'd have about 10 Nobel Prizes by now.


​>​Basically, you obtain a Löbian machine from a universal  
Turing machine by adding enough "induction axiom".


​It would be easy to include the induction axiom in a Turing  
machine's program, just tell it that things usually continue. That  
why Evolution managed to come up with brains that could make use of  
inductive reasoning about 500 million years before brains that could  
use deductive reasoning.


I use induction in the sense of Peano. It is part of deduction rule,  
not inductive inference.




There is nothing magical about induction and there is certainly  
nothing about it that is beyond a Turing Machine. ​


RA, seen as a Turing machine does not believe in the inudction axiom,  
and that is the difference with PA. ZF believes in transfinite