Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-31 Thread Bill Davidsen

ksh shrm wrote:

Is there anything we all care about.
We are normal users who don't have any server at home.

Just a PC with internet connection to surf.

Then you are safe as long as you don't shop, bank, use a search engine, 
or ever provide any information of any nature you don't want to be 
public. And that includes the names of the sites you visit...


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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-31 Thread Bill Davidsen

James Kosin wrote:

Everyone,

The DNS attacks are starting!!!
Below is a snippet of a logwatch from last night.  Be sure all DNS 
servers are updated if at all possible.  The spooks are out in full on 
this security vulnerability in force.


THIS IS YOUR LAST WARNING...!!!
Patch or Upgrade NOW!

Then test your connection, because some providers like Verizon NAT your 
packets to all use the same port, even with the patch in place. I did 
check, thankfully, and now have a bunch of entries for critical stuff in 
my internal files.


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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-28 Thread Andrew Kelly

On Fri, 2008-07-25 at 13:32 -0500, Les Mikesell wrote:
 Björn Persson wrote:
  
  If you are really paranoid (or about to do large transactions on what
  you hope is your banking site), you could do a 'whois' lookup for the
  target domain to find their own name servers and send a query directly
  there for the target site.
  
  Check that the domain name in the address bar is right, that you're using 
  HTTPS, and that the bank's certificate has been verified correctly. Then 
  you're safe, unless the attacker has *also* managed to trick one of the 
  certification authorities into issuing a false certificate, or somehow 
  sneaked a false CA certificate into your browser.
 
 You aren't paranoid enough.  What if the spoofer is also a system 
 administrator at the bank with access to a copy of the real certificate 
 that he installs on the machine he's tricked your dns into reaching - 
 with the expected name that you'll still see.

Exactly.

I've made the decision to surf the Internet using only a sketch pad and
sticks of medium charcoal for the next several months, until this is all
resolved.
Last time something like this happened my cousin caught a trojan that
got into is toaster. It later grew and arm and stabbed him in the eye.

It was a big joke for a while (http://xkcd.com/293/) and eventually
attained urban myth status. But all myths have their basis in reality
and I was there for this one.

Remember, just because you're paranoid, doesn't mean your not in dire
need if immediate assistance from a mental health professional.

[sheesh]

Andy

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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-28 Thread Tim
On Mon, 2008-07-28 at 10:58 +0200, Andrew Kelly wrote:
 I've made the decision to surf the Internet using only a sketch pad
 and sticks of medium charcoal for the next several months, until this
 is all resolved. Last time something like this happened my cousin
 caught a trojan that got into is toaster. It later grew and arm and
 stabbed him in the eye.

Hahaha...  I wonder what the internet fridge could get up to?

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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-26 Thread Björn Persson
Les Mikesell wrote:
 You aren't paranoid enough.  What if the spoofer is also a system
 administrator at the bank with access to a copy of the real certificate
 that he installs on the machine he's tricked your dns into reaching -
 with the expected name that you'll still see.

Then the bank has failed to protect its secret key. I expect banks to have 
rigorous security routines to control who can access sensitive systems, and 
to be able to check afterwards who did what.

Could you elaborate on how whois guards against malicious system 
administrators? Do you think security could be improved by having browsers 
and other programs make whois queries automatically?

Björn Persson

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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-26 Thread Mikkel L. Ellertson

Björn Persson wrote:

Les Mikesell wrote:

You aren't paranoid enough.  What if the spoofer is also a system
administrator at the bank with access to a copy of the real certificate
that he installs on the machine he's tricked your dns into reaching -
with the expected name that you'll still see.


Then the bank has failed to protect its secret key. I expect banks to have 
rigorous security routines to control who can access sensitive systems, and 
to be able to check afterwards who did what.


Could you elaborate on how whois guards against malicious system 
administrators? Do you think security could be improved by having browsers 
and other programs make whois queries automatically?


Björn Persson

Also, if it is the a system administrator at the bank, what is to 
prevent him from just changing the real name servers? Or putting in 
a program on the bank's web server to capture the username and 
password when you enter them? Lets face it, if a bank employee wants 
to embezzle money from the bank, there is not much we as costumers 
can do about it.


Mikkel
--

  Do not meddle in the affairs of dragons,
for thou art crunchy and taste good with Ketchup!



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RE: DNS Attacks

2008-07-26 Thread bruce
but if a bank employee is involved in the taking of funds, then there is
somewhat of a trail. if the employee where to change the root dns servers,
there would be some trail of this with the service that the bank uses for
this setup.. this would be pretty easy to resolve, and the customer would
have protection (although suffer a hassle) as the bank would back up the
funds that were stolen...

the issue of dns poisoning would also be resolved in a matter of time, but
unfortunately, there might be multiple customers who are impacted...

after thinking on this for awhile, the only thing that i can really think of
to make a site safe is for you the customer to get your behind into a
physical setup/location/building when you initially setup the online
account!!! and then you should only use sites that incorporate multi-pass
(two factor) security processes. (although this has it's own set of
issues!!)

for my own $0.02 worth, i find myself going to different parts of a site to
see if i get links that return me back to where i should be prior to
inserting my login information... but this implies that you know what a
site's structure should be!





-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Mikkel L. Ellertson
Sent: Saturday, July 26, 2008 6:01 AM
To: For users of Fedora
Subject: Re: DNS Attacks


Björn Persson wrote:
 Les Mikesell wrote:
 You aren't paranoid enough.  What if the spoofer is also a system
 administrator at the bank with access to a copy of the real certificate
 that he installs on the machine he's tricked your dns into reaching -
 with the expected name that you'll still see.

 Then the bank has failed to protect its secret key. I expect banks to have
 rigorous security routines to control who can access sensitive systems,
and
 to be able to check afterwards who did what.

 Could you elaborate on how whois guards against malicious system
 administrators? Do you think security could be improved by having browsers
 and other programs make whois queries automatically?

 Björn Persson

Also, if it is the a system administrator at the bank, what is to
prevent him from just changing the real name servers? Or putting in
a program on the bank's web server to capture the username and
password when you enter them? Lets face it, if a bank employee wants
to embezzle money from the bank, there is not much we as costumers
can do about it.

Mikkel
--

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for thou art crunchy and taste good with Ketchup!


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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-26 Thread Les Mikesell

Mikkel L. Ellertson wrote:



You aren't paranoid enough.  What if the spoofer is also a system
administrator at the bank with access to a copy of the real certificate
that he installs on the machine he's tricked your dns into reaching -
with the expected name that you'll still see.


Then the bank has failed to protect its secret key. I expect banks to 
have rigorous security routines to control who can access sensitive 
systems, and to be able to check afterwards who did what.


Yes, but controlling 'who does what' only works as long as the selected 
person does what you expect.  Are you following the case of the San 
Francisco network admin that refused to give the password to anyone 
else?  This may not even be malicious (he may just think everyone else 
would screw it up), but it isn't what anyone expected.


Could you elaborate on how whois guards against malicious system 
administrators?


It spreads the number of things that have to be compromised to fool you. 
The person who had access to copy the security certificate may not be 
the same one that registers the public DNS servers. Maybe it's a backup 
operator who knows how to restore a copy elsewhere


 Do you think security could be improved by having

browsers and other programs make whois queries automatically?


Slightly, but the DNS infrastructure probably would not handle having 
every query send to an authoritative source, which is why we have the 
caches that can be compromised in the first place.


Also, if it is the a system administrator at the bank, what is to 



prevent him from just changing the real name servers?


That's visible and would leave traces in obvious places.

 Or putting in a
program on the bank's web server to capture the username and password 
when you enter them?


Likewise.

Lets face it, if a bank employee wants to embezzle 
money from the bank, there is not much we as costumers can do about it.


But you need to trust the combination of DNS and the target certificate. 
  If DNS can be compromised someone then only needs to have a copy of 
the certificate in a place that will be hard to find after the DNS cache 
expires.


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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-26 Thread Björn Persson
Les Mikesell wrote:
 Yes, but controlling 'who does what' only works as long as the selected
 person does what you expect.  Are you following the case of the San
 Francisco network admin that refused to give the password to anyone
 else?  This may not even be malicious (he may just think everyone else
 would screw it up), but it isn't what anyone expected.

I think I saw something about it. Relying entirely on one administrator is 
foolish even if he's guaranteed to never do anything malicious. There should 
always be some way for someone else to access the system in case the 
administrator suddenly dies for example.

  Could you elaborate on how whois guards against malicious system
  administrators?

 It spreads the number of things that have to be compromised to fool you.
 The person who had access to copy the security certificate may not be
 the same one that registers the public DNS servers.

OK, a slight improvement, but it still depends on the bank's security 
routines, just like the secrecy of the secret key does.

 Maybe it's a backup 
 operator who knows how to restore a copy elsewhere

Well, a backup copy of a secret key is just as secret as the live copy and 
must be protected by just as rigorous routines.

   Do you think security could be improved by having
  browsers and other programs make whois queries automatically?

 Slightly, but the DNS infrastructure probably would not handle having
 every query send to an authoritative source, which is why we have the
 caches that can be compromised in the first place.

So doing that manually works for you only because most people don't do it?

  Also, if it is the a system administrator at the bank, what is to
  prevent him from just changing the real name servers?

 That's visible and would leave traces in obvious places.

As I already wrote, a bank should have things set up so that copying a secret 
key would also leave traces.

Björn Persson

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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-26 Thread Nifty Fedora Mitch
On Fri, Jul 25, 2008 at 01:32:58PM -0500, Les Mikesell wrote:
 Björn Persson wrote:

 If you are really paranoid (or about to do large transactions on what
 you hope is your banking site), you could do a 'whois' lookup for the
 target domain to find their own name servers and send a query directly
 there for the target site.

 Check that the domain name in the address bar is right, that you're 
 using HTTPS, and that the bank's certificate has been verified 
 correctly. Then you're safe, unless the attacker has *also* managed to 
 trick one of the certification authorities into issuing a false 
 certificate, or somehow sneaked a false CA certificate into your 
 browser.

 You aren't paranoid enough.  What if the spoofer is also a system  
 administrator at the bank with access to a copy of the real certificate  
 that he installs on the machine he's tricked your dns into reaching -  
 with the expected name that you'll still see.


What does it take to collect 'correct' answers now and
then watch for poisioning and get it fixed promptly.

Banks and other key sites like google, yahoo, miscrosoft and many of
the big social network sites should be actively watching for abuse.
ISPs also need to watch their DNS servers and should be working with
the likes of Cert, the FBI etc. to nip this stuff in the bud should some
bad guys attempt to do bad stuff.   In the early days Universities were
central in keeping sanity on the early Internet perhaps they can also
pick up one of the balls in this game.

I have a very limited set of 'valuable' sites I connect with  and have
already started caching key host IP addresses and DNS servers that I
believe I can rely on even when WiFI connected from the local coffee shop.

 

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DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread James Kosin

Everyone,

The DNS attacks are starting!!!
Below is a snippet of a logwatch from last night.  Be sure all DNS 
servers are updated if at all possible.  The spooks are out in full on 
this security vulnerability in force.


THIS IS YOUR LAST WARNING...!!!
Patch or Upgrade NOW!

James Kosin
A long time Fedora / Redhat / Linux user



   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'com/ANY/IN' denied: 30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'gmail.com/ANY/IN' denied: 32 
Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'hotmail.com/ANY/IN' denied: 31 
Time(s)

   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'net/ANY/IN' denied: 30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'nosuch.domain/ANY/IN' denied: 
30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'search.live.com/ANY/IN' denied: 
30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.ebay.com/ANY/IN' denied: 31 
Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.facebook.com/ANY/IN' 
denied: 30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.gmail.com/ANY/IN' denied: 
30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.google.com/ANY/IN' denied: 
30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.live.com/ANY/IN' denied: 30 
Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.microsoft.com/ANY/IN' 
denied: 30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.msn.com/ANY/IN' denied: 30 
Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.myspace.com/ANY/IN' denied: 
30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.wachovia.com/ANY/IN' 
denied: 30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.wamu.com/ANY/IN' denied: 30 
Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.yahoo.com/ANY/IN' denied: 
30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'yahoo.com/ANY/IN' denied: 30 
Time(s)




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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Jim van Wel
Zhe zombies are coming But we are all aware of this fact after release
of the patch ;)

Greetings,
Jim.

 Everyone,

 The DNS attacks are starting!!!
 Below is a snippet of a logwatch from last night.  Be sure all DNS
 servers are updated if at all possible.  The spooks are out in full on
 this security vulnerability in force.

 THIS IS YOUR LAST WARNING...!!!
 Patch or Upgrade NOW!

 James Kosin
 A long time Fedora / Redhat / Linux user

 

 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'com/ANY/IN' denied: 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'gmail.com/ANY/IN' denied: 32
 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'hotmail.com/ANY/IN' denied: 31
 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'net/ANY/IN' denied: 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'nosuch.domain/ANY/IN' denied:
 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'search.live.com/ANY/IN' denied:
 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.ebay.com/ANY/IN' denied: 31
 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.facebook.com/ANY/IN'
 denied: 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.gmail.com/ANY/IN' denied:
 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.google.com/ANY/IN' denied:
 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.live.com/ANY/IN' denied: 30
 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.microsoft.com/ANY/IN'
 denied: 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.msn.com/ANY/IN' denied: 30
 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.myspace.com/ANY/IN' denied:
 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.wachovia.com/ANY/IN'
 denied: 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.wamu.com/ANY/IN' denied: 30
 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'www.yahoo.com/ANY/IN' denied:
 30 Time(s)
 client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'yahoo.com/ANY/IN' denied: 30
 Time(s)

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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread James Kosin

Jim van Wel wrote:

Zhe zombies are coming But we are all aware of this fact after release
of the patch ;)

Greetings,
Jim.



I know; but there is always somebody who always says, It won't happen 
to me.  And sadly they usually never learn their lesson even if 
repeated multiple times.
I attached a snippet of a log to show how serious it really is.  The 
pishing people can use this as a back door to all web-sites.


All they have to do is find one site to push invalid DNS entries on 
others and the pollution begins.


James



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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread ksh shrm
Is there anything we all care about.
We are normal users who don't have any server at home.

Just a PC with internet connection to surf.

adios

KSH SHRM

People don't care how much you know, until they know how much you care...

2008/7/25 James Kosin [EMAIL PROTECTED]:

 Jim van Wel wrote:

 Zhe zombies are coming But we are all aware of this fact after release
 of the patch ;)

 Greetings,
 Jim.


 I know; but there is always somebody who always says, It won't happen to
 me.  And sadly they usually never learn their lesson even if repeated
 multiple times.
 I attached a snippet of a log to show how serious it really is.  The
 pishing people can use this as a back door to all web-sites.

 All they have to do is find one site to push invalid DNS entries on others
 and the pollution begins.

 James


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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Wolfgang S. Rupprecht

James Kosin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'com/ANY/IN' denied: 30 Time(s)
client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'gmail.com/ANY/IN' denied: 32
 Time(s)
client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'hotmail.com/ANY/IN' denied: 31

Thanks for posting.  Maybe this will light a fire under the folks that
haven't upgraded yet.

Did you have to turn any extra logging on to get these message?

-wolfgang
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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Mikkel L. Ellertson

ksh shrm wrote:

Is there anything we all care about.
We are normal users who don't have any server at home.

Just a PC with internet connection to surf.

adios

KSH SHRM

I guess there era a lot of abnormal users on this list them. And it 
is a concern even if you do not run a name server, because you could 
find yourself going to a web site other then the one you wanted.


Mikkel
--

A:  Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q:  Why is top-posting a bad thing?




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RE: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread bruce
As I understand the issue. The issue is one of being able to poison the DNS
app on the DNS server. There's not really much the casual user can do, aside
from switching to another DNS/IP address that's safe. But the rub is, do you
really know if the DNS/IP you're switching to is safe!

The best approach, would probably be a system to allow you to poll a few DNS
servers, and to take the returned ip address that comes back from the most
of them as the correct ip address!! but this isn't implemented anywhere as
far as i know

peace..


-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Mikkel L. Ellertson
Sent: Friday, July 25, 2008 9:56 AM
To: For users of Fedora
Subject: Re: DNS Attacks


ksh shrm wrote:
 Is there anything we all care about.
 We are normal users who don't have any server at home.

 Just a PC with internet connection to surf.

 adios

 KSH SHRM

I guess there era a lot of abnormal users on this list them. And it
is a concern even if you do not run a name server, because you could
find yourself going to a web site other then the one you wanted.

Mikkel
--

A:  Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q:  Why is top-posting a bad thing?



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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Les Mikesell

bruce wrote:

As I understand the issue. The issue is one of being able to poison the DNS
app on the DNS server. There's not really much the casual user can do, aside
from switching to another DNS/IP address that's safe. But the rub is, do you
really know if the DNS/IP you're switching to is safe!


If you are really paranoid (or about to do large transactions on what 
you hope is your banking site), you could do a 'whois' lookup for the 
target domain to find their own name servers and send a query directly 
there for the target site.



The best approach, would probably be a system to allow you to poll a few DNS
servers, and to take the returned ip address that comes back from the most
of them as the correct ip address!! but this isn't implemented anywhere as
far as i know


dig @dns_server target_name
will send a query to a specified DNS resolver.  Most public-facing 
servers will only resolve the names of their own zones, especially now. 
 I think the current vulnerability only involves cached addresses for 
which the server is not primary or secondary.


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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread James Kosin

Wolfgang S. Rupprecht wrote:

James Kosin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'com/ANY/IN' denied: 30 Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'gmail.com/ANY/IN' denied: 32
Time(s)
   client 143.215.143.11 query (cache) 'hotmail.com/ANY/IN' denied: 31


Thanks for posting.  Maybe this will light a fire under the folks that
haven't upgraded yet.

Did you have to turn any extra logging on to get these message?

-wolfgang
No, these are sent every day by logwatch.  I'm running a server 24/7; so 
logwatch runs as a cronjob.


But, the patches out don't fix the issue totally.  That would require a 
complete re-write of the DNS and how DNS works.  This is something 
already in the works.
The patch just makes it more difficult to trigger the issue.  I'm using 
the patched version of 9.4.2-P1.


Just look at your root email, if you check it or leave the computer ON 24/7.

James



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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Wolfgang S. Rupprecht

James Kosin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 But, the patches out don't fix the issue totally.  That would require
 a complete re-write of the DNS and how DNS works.  This is something
 already in the works.
 The patch just makes it more difficult to trigger the issue.  I'm
 using the patched version of 9.4.2-P1.

Thanks.  I'm running 9.5.0-P1 and haven't seen anything in my named or
system logs yet.  I guess I'm lucky. ;-) 

I have been looking since I just configured dnssec and was watching
for error messages.  (Using dnssec along with dlv.isc.org to find the
keys, seems to be as good a solution as today's DNS allows for.)

-wolfgang
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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Björn Persson
Mikkel L. Ellertson wrote:
 ksh shrm wrote:
  Is there anything we all care about.
  We are normal users who don't have any server at home.

 I guess there era a lot of abnormal users on this list them.

Yeah, I'm abnormal. And my DNS server is upgraded.

Björn Persson

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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Björn Persson
Les Mikesell wrote:
 If you are really paranoid (or about to do large transactions on what
 you hope is your banking site), you could do a 'whois' lookup for the
 target domain to find their own name servers and send a query directly
 there for the target site.

Check that the domain name in the address bar is right, that you're using 
HTTPS, and that the bank's certificate has been verified correctly. Then 
you're safe, unless the attacker has *also* managed to trick one of the 
certification authorities into issuing a false certificate, or somehow 
sneaked a false CA certificate into your browser.

Similarly for other protocols: Use TLS if the server's identity matters. This 
is what TLS is for. (Well, one of its two purposes.)

Björn Persson

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RE: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread bruce
bjorn...

while what you say makes sense... the vast majority of people pop up their
favorite browser, and go to a site.. there's no way these guys (my mother
included) are going to get into the esoteric details of what goes on behind
the scenes for the browser/dns/certificates/etc...

it's up to the architects/developers to build a bullet proof (100%)
solution... it's ok to send me to a screwed up/fake flicker.com, not cool
for etrade.com...

peace


-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Behalf Of Björn Persson
Sent: Friday, July 25, 2008 11:13 AM
To: For users of Fedora
Subject: Re: DNS Attacks


Les Mikesell wrote:
 If you are really paranoid (or about to do large transactions on what
 you hope is your banking site), you could do a 'whois' lookup for the
 target domain to find their own name servers and send a query directly
 there for the target site.

Check that the domain name in the address bar is right, that you're using
HTTPS, and that the bank's certificate has been verified correctly. Then
you're safe, unless the attacker has *also* managed to trick one of the
certification authorities into issuing a false certificate, or somehow
sneaked a false CA certificate into your browser.

Similarly for other protocols: Use TLS if the server's identity matters.
This
is what TLS is for. (Well, one of its two purposes.)

Björn Persson

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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Wolfgang S. Rupprecht

Les Mikesell [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
 James They'd have to spoof several things at once to keep it from being
 obvious but you are right, the whois result will give names that you
 have to look up somehow.

Go for the gusto.  Spoof the nameservers.  Why screw around?

-wolfgang
-- 
Wolfgang S. Rupprecht   http://www.wsrcc.com/wolfgang/

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Re: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Bruno Wolff III
On Fri, Jul 25, 2008 at 10:02:57 -0700,
  bruce [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 As I understand the issue. The issue is one of being able to poison the DNS
 app on the DNS server. There's not really much the casual user can do, aside
 from switching to another DNS/IP address that's safe. But the rub is, do you
 really know if the DNS/IP you're switching to is safe!
 
 The best approach, would probably be a system to allow you to poll a few DNS
 servers, and to take the returned ip address that comes back from the most
 of them as the correct ip address!! but this isn't implemented anywhere as
 far as i know

You are better off running your own caching resolver than trying the above.

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RE: DNS Attacks

2008-07-25 Thread Björn Persson
bruce wrote:
 while what you say makes sense... the vast majority of people pop up their
 favorite browser, and go to a site.. there's no way these guys (my mother
 included) are going to get into the esoteric details of what goes on behind
 the scenes for the browser/dns/certificates/etc...

They aren't going to follow Les' advice and do whois lookups either. For those 
who do care about whose server they give their secrets to, TLS is a better 
solution than whois.

Oh, and please don't top-post.

Björn Persson

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