The following is a list of items from the OBERGEFELL v. HODGES decision - 576 U. S. ____ (2015) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Nos. 14–556, 14-562, 14-571 and 14–574.
My questions follow at the end. ==== Item: Held: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriagebetween two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State. Item: (b) The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex. Item: (1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. Item: Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord themits respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. Item: (3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived fromthe Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. Item: III Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The fundamental liberties protected by this Clause includemost of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 147–149 (1968). In addition these liberties extend to certain personal choicescentral to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484–486 (1965). The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to interpret theConstitution. That responsibility, however, “has not been reduced to any formula.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Rather, it requirescourts to exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State mustaccord them its respect. See ibid. Item: The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as welearn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. Item: That principle applies here. If rights were defined bywho exercised them in the past, then received practicescould serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied. Item: The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history and tradition, but rights come not from ancient sources alone. They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era. Item: The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment isderived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of theequal protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profoundway, though they set forth independent principles. Rightsimplicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protectionmay rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet in some instances each may be instructiveas to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way,even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right. See M. L. B., 519 U. S., at 120– 121; id., at 128–129 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660, 665 (1983). This interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become. =================================================== There is more; I stopped there because this would be one giant email if I kept pulling out possible RKBA support comments. I am sure a sharper eye than mine and a keener Con Law attorney than I'll ever be can find some far, deeper concepts that can be used to support a host of Second Amendment arguments, especially national reciprocity. I'm just curious if anyone else looks at this case that way or am I Mr. Pollyanna in this respect? ***Greg Jacobs*** _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Firearmsregprof@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/firearmsregprof Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. 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