Re: How to protect natl. critical infrastructure? (was Re: analyzing traceroute ouput)

2001-06-10 Thread Thomas MacKay
On Sat, 9 Jun 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: This is disturbing. I was more disturbed by the reported saying somethinb to the effect The security issues have been resolved and the system is now totally secure. Why is such a critical system as power grid even PUBLICLY accessible. It's

RE: DDos Defenses

2001-06-10 Thread Zachary Uram
On Sat, 9 Jun 2001, J wrote: Load testing is fine. The unit we have saturates around 300Mbits/sec. Captus Any freeware tools to do load testing? like to see a CSU/DSU connection so I could plant it at MCI or something to prevent DoS traffic from getting to my facilitiy. Huh, why would

Re: Nokia IP330

2001-06-10 Thread opie san
I would definitely check that out again. $74k for an IP330 is ridiculous. The only possible way it could get that high is if they were also adding in a support contract and software licensing. Are you sure you were speaking directly to Nokia or was it a reseller? Do you remember who it was

Re: analyzing traceroute ouput

2001-06-10 Thread Saint James
Is there anyway to make traceroute show any additional devices/nodes, like bridges ? James __ Do You Yahoo!? Get personalized email addresses from Yahoo! Mail - only $35 a year! http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/ - [To unsubscribe, send mail to

Re: analyzing traceroute ouput

2001-06-10 Thread james
Is there anyway to make traceroute show any additional devices/nodes, like bridges ? James _ Do You Yahoo!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com - [To unsubscribe, send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with unsubscribe

PIX mailling list

2001-06-10 Thread Jerome hebert
Hi all, I was wondering if there was a mailling list dedicated to the Cisco PIX firewall ? Regards, Jerome. __ ifrance.com, l'email gratuit le plus complet de l'Internet ! vos emails depuis un navigateur, en POP3,

Re: analyzing traceroute ouput

2001-06-10 Thread Mikael Abrahamsson
On Sun, 10 Jun 2001, Saint James wrote: Is there anyway to make traceroute show any additional devices/nodes, like bridges ? Traceroute is a layer 3 only tool, ie will only show IP routers. -- Mikael Abrahamssonemail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] - [To unsubscribe, send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED]

ATM PVC as security barrier - ARMARP issue

2001-06-10 Thread Abdulkareem Kusai
Does RFC-1483 resolve the ATMARP issue of host impersonation described in RFC 2225? Find the best deals on the web at AltaVista Shopping! http://www.shopping.altavista.com - [To unsubscribe, send mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with unsubscribe firewalls in the body of the message.]

Re: analyzing traceroute ouput

2001-06-10 Thread Rene Wijninga
Hi James, A traceroute is done on the layer 3 level (IP) whereas a bridge is a layer 2 device (MAC layer), unaware of layer 3 information. So a traceroute will only show you layer 3 info, and not layer 2. So the answer is no, only layer 3 devices like routers will show up in a traceroute, not

RE: This is a must read document. It will freak you out

2001-06-10 Thread Paul D. Robertson
On Sun, 10 Jun 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Egress filtering at border points is appropriate for leaf networks. Which is exactly what I'm proposing. Many ISPs, though, also ferry third-party traffic between their peering points; it would be inappropriate for them to accept traffic

Re: This is a must read document. (.edu and ISP perspective)

2001-06-10 Thread Gary Flynn
what about the military? and sensitive federal entities. the way these hardened top secret places seem to get cracked I can't for the life of me figure out what utilities, air traffic control, emergency services, and military systems are doing on a public network. Communications costs and

RE: This is a must read document. It will freak you out

2001-06-10 Thread dgillett
Egress filtering at border points is appropriate for leaf networks. Many ISPs, though, also ferry third-party traffic between their peering points; it would be inappropriate for them to accept traffic that an egress rule elsewhere will prevent them from delivering. This isn't to day that

Re: analyzing traceroute ouput

2001-06-10 Thread dgillett
No. Bridges do not, in the networking sense, route traffic, and need not have addresses (even at layer 2) let alone names. On 10 Jun 2001, at 3:39, james wrote: Is there anyway to make traceroute show any additional devices/nodes, like bridges ? James - [To unsubscribe, send mail to

RE: How to protect natl. critical infrastructure? (was Re: analyzing traceroute ouput)

2001-06-10 Thread dgillett
There are 6 or 8 top-level peering points around the country; two of them are within 10 miles or so of me -- Nasa Ames and MAE West. David Gillett On 9 Jun 2001, at 22:09, Carl E. Mankinen wrote: Goto 55 marietta in Atlanta and you will see a large peering arrangement. Lot's of fiber

RE: This is a must read document. It will freak you out

2001-06-10 Thread Bill Royds
The original point was that a leaf network might find itself sued if it allows packets to leave with a bogus source IP address. Perhaps we should write-up a RFC about leaf networks restricting outgoing packets with egress filtering. It wouldn't completely stop DDoS but it would make the

Re: FW1 is letting the traffic out but not the port starts 'listening'....

2001-06-10 Thread patrick kerry
Is the any any any rule in both directions?? What are you seeing in the logs when you attempt to make these connections?? Please provide more information for a specific fix to your problem. PK --- Patrick James [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi, I have a FW1 version 4.1 SP2 installation on WinNT

Re: analyzing traceroute ouput

2001-06-10 Thread Zachary Uram
what are layer 1 and layer 4 type devices? are there any tools to probe such devices since traceroute only works on layer 3? On Sun, 10 Jun 2001, Rene Wijninga wrote: Hi James, A traceroute is done on the layer 3 level (IP) whereas a bridge is a layer 2 device (MAC layer), unaware of layer

RE: DDos Defenses

2001-06-10 Thread R B
Wow, lots of things to think about I see J's point of putting a DoS stopper at my upstream provider. We're running a pair of T1's right now, with another pair for failover. From one perspective, all it would take to effectively DoS us is 3Mbits/sec of traffic. I generate that when I fart.

Re: This is a must read document. (.edu and ISP perspective)

2001-06-10 Thread T.
On 10 Jun 2001 10:00:41 -0400, Gary Flynn wrote: I can't for the life of me figure out what utilities, air traffic control, emergency services, and military systems are doing on a public network. There are good ways to do this, but they require using only secure OSs that aren't

Re: analyzing traceroute ouput

2001-06-10 Thread Mikael Abrahamsson
On Sun, 10 Jun 2001, Zachary Uram wrote: what are layer 1 and layer 4 type devices? Do a search for OSI model. http://www.lex-con.com/osimodel.htm is probably a good link (just did a quick search myself). This is BASIC knowledge for anyone in networking, very basic. They mention this in the

RE: analysing traceroute ouput

2001-06-10 Thread Alex O'Neill
Hi, When we refer to layer 2 and layer 3 devices we are referring to the OSI 7 layer model, you wont see any devices at layer 1 as this is the physical layer, i.e. the cable electrical signals are passed along or the fibre that light is transmitted across, layer 4 is the transport layer which

Re: This is a must read document. (.edu and ISP perspective)

2001-06-10 Thread Zachary Uram
On 10 Jun 2001, Michael T. Babcock wrote: They're usually on the PSTN too, don't forget. This isn't an entrance for worms, etc, but its how most of them get cracked -- phone calls. Public System Telephone Network? this is known as phreaking yes? [EMAIL PROTECTED] Blessed are those who

Re: Undeliverable Mail

2001-06-10 Thread Zachary Uram
I get a number of 'bounced' messages from people on the firewall list every day. Other lists I am on shield me from such annoying bounces so why can't this list? Does everyone else get these bounced messages? Perhaps switch the list to a genuine LISTSERV with bounce filtering before posts relayed

RE: This is a must read document. It will freak you out

2001-06-10 Thread Crispin Harris
One thing about egress filtering which I noted recently. If the leaf node is using VPN software, you may be in for a surprise! At least one major vendor of VPN client software performs the Virtual functions by re-writing the source address of the packet: Mobile PC: -A- VPN Gateway: -B-

RE: DDos Defenses

2001-06-10 Thread T.
On 10 Jun 2001 11:59:22 -0700, R B wrote: But seriously, while the Captus box may keep that from making the leap from my CSU to network, what good is it if my T1's are saturated? I'm running GigE internally; why do I care about 3 or 4 Mbits of traffic, DoS or not? Yes, we definetely require

RE: analysing traceroute ouput

2001-06-10 Thread T.
On 09 Jun 2001 21:25:21 +0100, Alex O'Neill wrote: FYI TCP/IP is actually 2 protocols each working at a different layer Yes, people forget that TCP/IP is more accurately TCP over IP, not TCP or IP. A good routing book is useful too -- there is a lot of stuff happening in the background that

Re: This is a must read document. (.edu and ISP perspective)

2001-06-10 Thread T.
On 10 Jun 2001 19:08:49 -0400, Zachary Uram wrote: Public System Telephone Network? Yes. this is known as phreaking yes? What you're thinking of is ... but no. There are many secure sites with direct-dial modem lines into their computers for external support or backdoor access. They also

Re: Undeliverable Mail

2001-06-10 Thread T.
On 10 Jun 2001 19:30:08 -0400, Zachary Uram wrote: I get a number of 'bounced' messages from people on the firewall list every day. Other lists I am on shield me from such annoying bounces so why can't this list? Does everyone else get these bounced messages? Perhaps switch the list to a

FW1 is letting the traffic out but not the port starts 'listening'....

2001-06-10 Thread Patrick James
Hi, I have a FW1 version 4.1 SP2 installation on WinNT 4.0 SP6. My network is a simple one where I have couple of servers on the LAN and a Router, the FW1 pretty sits between the LAN Servers and the Router. I configured the proper NAT and security policy settings absolutely no problem with

DDoS prevention

2001-06-10 Thread Dug Song
On Sun, Jun 10, 2001, at 09:59:16 -0400, Paul D. Robertson wrote: Once again, I'm stressing that end-user network filtering be the major point of egress filtering, not ISP networks. [ ObDisclaimer: i work for a company offering a DDoS product. ] simple egress filters at the edge, unicast