----- Original Message ----- From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Sunday, August 13, 2000 4:06 PM Subject: United States - Presidential Campaign > Stratfor.com's Weekly Global Intelligence Update - 14 August 2000 > _________________________________________ > > Know your world. > > The Waning Power of Indonesia's President > http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0008112200.htm > > Kuwait Threatens Troop Mobilization > http://www.stratfor.com/MEAF/commentary/0008112217.htm > _________________________________________ > > The Next President > The Unspoken Issue: The Impact of Globalization > > Summary > > Last week, The Weekly Analysis probed the underlying foreign policy > challenges of the American presidential election. This week, the > second part of this series examines the most potentially divisive - > and unspoken - issue of all: globalization. As the Democratic Party > meets in Los Angeles, this issue is at the root of the next > president's choices on foreign policy. And this is the one thing > neither major candidate will dare discuss. > > Analysis > > With the economy booming and foreign dangers distant, the American > presidential campaign is unlikely to attempt to move many voters > with issues of foreign policy. This reflects an elite consensus on > U.S. foreign policy: The international system is driven by > economics, which is increasingly global, integrated and > interdependent, and this is all for the good. This has been the > American elite consensus for a decade. > > But there is a powerful undercurrent running both through American > politics and politics abroad, one that angrily and profoundly > rejects this narrow economic prism for viewing the world. The speed > and power of the flow of capital in the last decade has raised > economies - and destroyed them. In the United States itself, a > small, noisy but potentially powerful movement is rising, rejecting > the cliche that a rising tide lifts all boats. Some, the leaky > ones, get sunk. > > The effects of globalization are among the most important legacies > of the last decade. And yet they are the ones that are either > accepted as undeniable fact by proponents, in multi-national > corporations and government, or swept under the rug. > > This is the case in the American presidential campaign: Both major > candidates running for office offer the same foreign policy. Only > one man will be president, and he will have to wrestle with the > effects of globalization, both at home and abroad. And yet neither > will talk about it. It is unlikely that at any time this week in > Los Angeles, Vice President Al Gore will stop to publicly dwell on > how badly the Thai economy has been ravaged, or how dislocated U.S. > workers will find their place in the information economy. > ________________________________________________________________ > Would you like to see full text? > http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/081400.ASP > ___________________________________________________________________ > > The primary mission of Washington's foreign policy has been to > prevent side issues - like political-military ones - from > interfering in the expansion of the world trading system. As a > result, questions over Taiwan or human rights have been essentially > shut out of the dialogue with China. Exceptions can be found in the > rogue nations, led by governments impervious to economic pain and > subject to sanctions and military action at the hands of the > international community. > > The result of this strategy is a remarkably contiguous U.S. foreign > policy since the end of the Cold War, whether steered by the Bush > or Clinton administrations. Both did everything possible to prevent > the disruption of relations with China. Both have done everything > possible to use institutions - like the International Monetary Fund > - to diffuse power from individual nations. Under Republican and > Democratic presidents alike, Washington led coalitions to war > against rogue countries like Iraq or Yugoslavia, or to control > dysfunctional economies, like Indonesia's. > > In the 2000 campaign, both George W. Bush and Al Gore are > completely committed to the pursuit of this same foreign policy. > This is the ideology not only of the American elite, but the > ideology of the global elite, as well. Indeed, it is not only an > elite perspective. In advanced industrial countries, this ideology > has mass appeal. > > But it does not have universal appeal. Throughout the world, there > are groups, though marginal, that are deeply opposed to this > ideology. Moreover, the application of this ideology is > increasingly difficult for major international leaders. Russian > President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Prime Minister Jiang Zemin are > examples of leaders torn by a globalist ideology they genuinely > accept - but find increasingly painful to pursue at home. > > Two forces are in play against globalization. First and most > immediate, are the national interests abroad. It is possible to > quickly construct a patchwork map of places essentially wiped out > or left behind by globalization. This includes much of Northeast > Asia in 1997, all of Southeast Asia even today, the whole of South > Asia, with the possible exception New Delhi, nearly the entire > African continent and at one time or another huge swaths of Latin > America, including Mexico and Brazil. All in all, nearly 1 billion > of the earth's 2 billion people have been hit head-on by the wave > of creative destruction. > > Second, are the social movements within nations that represent > classes harmed by globalization and objecting to it on their own > ideological grounds. This opposition is far from dominant but it is > there, it is real and it can be heard. > > In fact, it promises to be loudly present outside the Democratic > National Convention in Los Angeles this week, where tens of > thousands of protestors will provide flashbacks of the World Trade > Organization protests in Seattle - only to be dismissed as a > meaningless movement of malcontents. Malcontents they may be. > Meaningless? In this election, almost certainly. But meaningless in > the long run? No. > > The central thesis of globalization is this: Removing barriers to > trade will increase the collective wealth of humanity. > Underpinning this are three prior assumptions: > > 1. Economic well-being is by far the most important consideration > in social life. The ideology of globalization assumes that national > impulses are primitive, tribalist hangovers and that the desire of > say, Indians to have an economy not dominated by German > corporations is a disease to be cured. > > 2. Economic growth is desirable regardless of social disruption. > The United States came into existence as a social disruption and > has institutionalized it. While it works in the United States it is > not clear that disruption will work equally well elsewhere. > > 3. The distribution of economic benefits is less important than the > aggregate benefits of free trade. Unsophisticated advocates ignore > harm and look at total growth rates. More sophisticated advocates > acknowledge harm and emphasize the need for all to benefit - but > they ignore relative growth inside and between countries. > > In short, globalists are simply and willfully ignoring the > realities of politics. > > To them, nationalism is a bothersome annoyance. And yet, the most > important lesson of the 20th century is that the proletariat does > have a country and that national loyalty is more important than > class loyalty. Both world wars and the national uprisings against > the Soviet empire are proof enough. Ironically, it was the greatest > classical economist, Karl Marx, who memorialized a phrase now > essentially etched on Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue alike: > "Capital has no country." > > In reality, though, Marx and enthusiasts for globalization aside, > nations do matter. And within nations, the sense that leaders have > betrayed the national interest in favor of an internationalist > ideology also matters. This does not matter nearly as much during > times of wild prosperity - as the United States is experiencing > today - as it does during periods of economic pain. > > But even in a period of tremendous prosperity, witness the two > marginal candidates in the presidential election: Pat Buchanan and > Ralph Nader, two men with diametrically opposed personal and > political histories, who have arrived at very similar positions on > globalism and nationalism. The rhetoric differs; Buchanan sounds a > nationalist note where Nader sounds a class tune. But both strike > out at the consensus on globalization represented by Bush and Gore. > > These movements are certainly marginal today. That does not mean > they will remain so, however. The global economy is increasingly > out of synch, de-synchronized. The enthusiasm for globalization in > the United States is not reflected in Asia. In the heart of Europe, > in Austria, a major nationalist and definitely anti-globalist > movement has achieved striking electoral success in the midst of a > barrage of criticism from the rest of Europe. In Latin America, > indigenous movements, students and others have sounded their > suspicions. > > The kind of growth rates being experienced in the United States > today will not - cannot - last forever. What goes up must > eventually come down. Certainly, the core prosperity will continue > for several years, but given coming demographic shifts - the > impending retirement of the Baby Boomers in the United States - it > is reasonable to expect major secular shifts in the American > economy over the coming decade. > > And the withdrawal of vast amounts of money from the capital > markets will create a different political dynamic in the United > States - both at home and abroad. The great American geopolitical > choices in the coming decade are withdrawal, collective security > and balance of power. When things cool, choices will have to be > made - not merely about economics, but about security and politics. > > At that point, later in this decade, the advocates of globalization > and those suspicious of it will clash, both abroad and in the > United States. The next American president - unlike his two most > immediate predecessors - will have to wrestle with this powerful > conflict. For the first time the elite will find that their > approach to foreign policy is not universally supported; those > masses that have bought into it will begin to second guess > themselves - and their leaders. > > The two major parties will at that time be caught in the cross > currents. Republicans who helped foster a global economy will be > forced to defend it. But the Democratic Party will stand to lose > the most. After all, it has hammered an unwieldy coalition out of > the financial elite in New York and labor unions in Michigan. That > coalition will be stressed severely, when the dynamics of > globalization begin to change. > > Regardless of the party in power, the president - whether the > occupant of the White House in 2001 or his successor - will be > forced to readdress the foreign policy that has so easily > underpinned successive administrations. Coalitions will be harder > to forge, multinational institutions will be even more unwieldy. > Close allies will become fierce economic competitors. > > Already, these currents are building like eddies in the backwaters > of a great river, in places as disparate as Jakarta and Vienna. And > in Los Angeles, too. Whether you agree or disagree with the > demonstrators in Los Angeles is irrelevant. Listen carefully to > them. They will be vying for power in the United States in the > coming generation, and holding power elsewhere. The debate over > foreign policy will no longer be between left and right, but > between globalists and their critics. > > > (c) 2000 Stratfor, Inc. > _______________________________________________ > SUBSCRIBE to the free, daily Global Intelligence Update. Click on > http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp > UNSUBSCRIBE by clicking on > http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp > _______________________________________________ > Stratfor.com > 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 > Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 > Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ > Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
