Michael Walzer's NYR essay brings together many of the
points made here on FW, both for and against military
intervention, and concludes that there still exists an
alternative to war, but it will require the mobilization of
a multilateral system which until now has shown little
interest in being so mobilized. 

Walzer gives pretty good reasons why it is not an
alternative just to allow more time, more time under the
same conditions as have prevailed since 1991. 

Walzer writes: 

"Today, the UN inspection regime is in place in Iraq only
because of what many American liberals and leftists, and
many Europeans too, called a reckless US threat to go to
war.  Without that threat, however, UN negotiators would
still be dithering with Iraqi negotiators, working on, but
never finally agreeing on, the details of an inspection
system; the inspectors would not even have packed their bags
(and most of the leaders of Europe would be pretending that
this was a good thing). **Some of us are embarrassed to
realize that the threat we opposed is the chief reason for
the existence of a strong inspection system, and the
existence of a strong inspection system is today the best
argument against going to war.** ...  

"[Those of us opposed to a war] have demands to make not
only on Bush and Co. but also on the leaders of France and
Germany, Russia and China, who, although they have recently
been supporting continued and expanded inspections, have
also been ready, at different times in the past, to appease
Saddam.  If this preventable war is fought, all of them will
share responsibility with the US.  When the war is over,
they should all be held to account." 

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 

"The Right Way," The New York Review of Books (13 March
2003) 
by Michael Walzer 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16110

There are two ways of opposing a war with Iraq.  The first
way is simple and wrong; the second way is right but
difficult.

The first way is to deny that the Iraqi regime is
particularly ugly, that it lies somewhere outside the range
of ordinary states, or to argue that, however ugly it is, it
doesn't pose any significant threat to its neighbors or to
world peace.  Perhaps, despite Saddam's denials, his
government is in fact seek-ing to acquire nuclear weapons. 
But other governments are doing the same thing, and if or
when Iraq succeeds in developing such weapons - so the
argument continues - we can deal with that through
conventional deterrence, in exactly the same way that the US
and the Soviet Union dealt with each other in the cold war
years.  

Obviously, if this argument is right, there is no reason to
attack Iraq.  Nor is there any reason for a strong
inspection system, or for the current embargo, or for the
northern and southern "no-fly" zones.  Some of the most
vocal organizers of the antiwar movement, here and in
Europe, seem to have adopted exactly this position.  It has
been overrepresented among speakers at the big
demonstrations against the war.  Most of the demonstrators,
I believe, don't hold this first view; nor is it held by the
wider constituency of actual and potential opponents of
Bush's foreign policy.  But we have to recognize a constant
temptation of antiwar politics: to pretend that there really
isn't a serious enemy out there.

This pretense certainly keeps things simple, but it is wrong
in every possible way.  The tyranny and brutality of the
Iraqi regime are widely known and cannot be covered up.  Its
use of chemical weapons in the recent past; the recklessness
of its invasions of Iran and Kuwait; the rhetoric of threat
and violence that is now standard in Baghdad; the record of
the 1990s, when UN inspectors were systematically
obstructed; the cruel repression of the uprisings that
followed the Gulf War of 1991; the torture and murder of
political opponents - how can all this be ignored by a
serious political movement? 

Nor should anyone be comfortable with the idea of an Iraq
armed with nuclear weapons and then deterred from using
them.  Not only is it unclear that deterrence will work with
a regime like Saddam's, but the emerging system of
deterrence will be highly unstable.  For it won't only
involve the US and Iraq; it will also involve Israel and
Iraq.  If Iraq is permitted to build nuclear weapons, Israel
will have to acquire what it doesn't have at the present
time: second-strike capacity.  And then there will be
Israeli ships in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean
equipped with nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.  This
may be "conventional" deterrence, but it is insane to look
forward to it.  

The right way to oppose the war is to argue that the present
system of containment and control is working and can be made
to work better.  This means that we should acknowledge the
awfulness of the Iraqi regime and the dangers it poses, and
then aim to deal with those dangers through coercive
measures short of war.  But this isn't a policy easy to
defend, for we know exactly what coercive measures are
necessary, and we also know how costly they are.

First, the existing embargo: this can and should be adjusted
so as to allow a wider range of products necessary to the
civilian population into the country, while still excluding
military supplies and the technologies necessary to the
development of weapons of mass destruction.  But however
"smart" the sanctions are, they will still constitute a
partial blockade and a forceful restraint of trade, and,
given the way Saddam spends his available funds, they will
impose severe hardships on ordinary Iraqis.  It is fair to
say that their own government is responsible for these
hardships, since it could spend its money differently, but
that does not make them easier to bear.  Malnourished
children, hospitals without medical supplies, declining
longevity rates: all this is the (indirect) consequence of
the embargo.  

Second, the "no-fly" zones: preventing Iraqi planes from
flying over an area that amounts to about half of the
country requires constant American overflights, and this
requires in turn what has averaged out as twice-weekly
bombings of radar and antiaircraft facilities.  So far, no
planes or pilots have been lost, and I believe that few
civilians have been killed or injured in the bombing raids. 
Still, this is a risky and costly business, and if it is
"short" of war, it isn't far short.  On the other hand, if
Saddam were allowed free rein in the north and south,
against the Kurds and the Shias, the result would probably
be a repression so brutal that it would justify, perhaps
even require, a military intervention on humanitarian
grounds.  And that would be a full-scale war.

Third, the UN inspections: these will have to go on
indefinitely, as a regular feature of the Iraqi landscape. 
For whether or not the inspectors find and destroy weapons
of mass destruction (some of these are very easy to hide),
they themselves are a barrier to any deployment of such
weapons.  So long as they are moving freely and aggressively
around the country, on their own time schedule, Iraq will be
under increasing restraint.  But the inspection regime will
collapse, as it collapsed in the Nineties, unless there is a
visible readiness to use force to sustain it.  And this
means that there have to be troops in the vicinity, like the
troops the US government is currently moving into position. 
It would be better, obviously, if these troops were not only
American.  But, again, maintaining a readiness of this sort,
whoever maintains it, is costly and risky. 

Defending the embargo, the American overflights, and the UN
inspections: this is the right way to oppose, and to avoid,
a war.  But it invites the counter-argument that a short
war, which made it possible to end the embargo, and the
weekly bombings, and the inspection regime, would be morally
and politically preferable to this "avoidance."  A short
war, a new regime, a demilitarized Iraq, food and medicine
pouring into Iraqi ports: wouldn't that be better than a
permanent system of coercion and control?  Well, maybe.  But
who can guarantee that the war would be short and that the
consequences in the region and elsewhere will be limited?  

We say of war that it is the "last resort" because of the
unpredictable, unexpected, unintended, and unavoidable
horrors that it regularly brings.  In fact, war isn't the
last resort, for "lastness" is a metaphysical condition,
which is never actually reached in real life: it is always
possible to do something else, or to do it again, before
doing whatever it is that comes last.  The notion of
lastness is cautionary -  but this is a necessary caution:
look hard for alternatives before you "let loose the dogs of
war."  

Right now, even at this last minute, there still are
alternatives, and that is the best argument against going to
war.  I think that it is a widely accepted argument, even
though it isn't easy to march with.  What do you write on
the placards?  What slogans do you shout?  We need a
complicated campaign against the war, whose participants are
ready to acknowledge the difficulties and the costs of their
politics.   

Or, better, we need a campaign that isn't focused only on
the war (and that might survive the war) - a campaign for a
strong international system, organized and designed to
defeat aggression, to stop massacres and ethnic cleansing,
to control weapons of mass destruction, and to guarantee the
physical security of all the world's peoples.  The threefold
constraints on Saddam's regime are only one example, but a
very important one, of how such an international system
should function.

But an international system has to be the work of many
different states, not of one state.  There have to be many
agents ready to take responsibility for the success of the
system, not just one.  Today, the UN inspection regime is in
place in Iraq only because of what many American liberals
and leftists, and many Europeans too, called a reckless US
threat to go to war.  Without that threat, however, UN
negotiators would still be dithering with Iraqi negotiators,
working on, but never finally agreeing on, the details of an
inspection system; the inspectors would not even have packed
their bags (and most of the leaders of Europe would be
pretending that this was a good thing).  Some of us are
embarrassed to realize that the threat we opposed is the
chief reason for the existence of a strong inspection
system, and the existence of a strong inspection system is
today the best argument against going to war.   

It would have been much better if the US threat had not been
necessary - if the threat had come, say, from France and
Russia, Iraq's chief trading partners, whose unwillingness
to confront Saddam and give some muscle to the UN project
was an important cause of the collapse of inspections in the
1990s.  This is what internationalism requires: that other
states, besides the US, take responsibility for the global
rule of law and that they be prepared to act, politically
and militarily, with that end in view.  American
internationalists - there are a good number of us though not
enough - need to criticize the Bush administration's
unilateralist impulses and its refusal to cooperate with
other states on a whole range of issues from global warming
to the International Criminal Court.   

But multilateralism requires help from outside the US.  It
would be easier to make our case if it were clear that there
were other agents in international society capable of acting
independently and, if necessary, forcefully, and ready to
answer for what they do, in places like Bosnia, or Rwanda,
or Iraq.  When we campaign against a second Gulf War, we
should also be campaigning for that kind of multilateral
responsibility.  And this means that we have demands to make
not only on Bush and Co.  but also on the leaders of France
and Germany, Russia and China, who, although they have
recently been supporting continued and expanded inspections,
have also been ready, at different times in the past, to
appease Saddam.  If this preventable war is fought, all of
them will share responsibility with the US.  When the war is
over, they should all be held to account.  
        - February 13, 2003 

Copyright © 1963-2003 NYREV, Inc.  All rights reserved

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 


Stephen Straker 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>   
Vancouver, B.C.   
[Outgoing mail scanned by Norton AntiVirus]


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