On 11/26/20 5:57 PM, Thomas Deutschmann wrote:
>
> I disagree here: Packages installing tmpfiles configs requiring
> recursive chown on each boot are doing something wrong from my P.O.V.
No argument there, but me thinking they're wrong doesn't stop people
from doing it.
> Note that hardlinks
On Thu, 2020-11-26 at 17:45 -0500, Michael Orlitzky wrote:
> On 11/26/20 5:37 PM, Peter Stuge wrote:
> > Georgy Yakovlev wrote:
> > > I'll be switching default tmpfiles provider to sys-apps/systemd-
> > > tmpfiles
> > > by the end of the week by updating virtual/tmpfiles ebuild.
> >
> > Michael
On 2020-11-26 21:36, Michael Orlitzky wrote:
Most of these security issues were fixed in systemd-tmpfiles years ago,
and you can easily find upstream tmpfiles.d entries that contain e.g.
"Z" entries. In that case, the upstream file is not in error, and root
doesn't have to be actively tricked
On 11/26/20 5:37 PM, Peter Stuge wrote:
> Georgy Yakovlev wrote:
>> I'll be switching default tmpfiles provider to sys-apps/systemd-tmpfiles
>> by the end of the week by updating virtual/tmpfiles ebuild.
>
> Michael Orlitzky wrote:
>> Corollary: the tmpfiles.d specification can only be
> On 26 Nov 2020, at 22:37, Peter Stuge wrote:
> Michael Orlitzky wrote:
>> Corollary: the tmpfiles.d specification can only be implemented (safely)
>> on Linux after all.
>
> So should virtual/tmpfiles differentiate based on system?
>
It won’t be keyworded where it’s not available so Portage
Georgy Yakovlev wrote:
> I'll be switching default tmpfiles provider to sys-apps/systemd-tmpfiles
> by the end of the week by updating virtual/tmpfiles ebuild.
Michael Orlitzky wrote:
> Corollary: the tmpfiles.d specification can only be implemented (safely)
> on Linux after all.
So should
On 11/26/20 10:07 AM, Thomas Deutschmann wrote:
>
> Only root is allowed to write to these directories. In other words: To
> exploit this, a malicious local user (or a remote attacker who already
> gained user access) would have to trick root into creating specially
> crafted tmpfiles config
Dear all,
sorting packages in a group of "misc" packages was not useful.
We have to dissolve the project desktop-misc
There are some tickets which should be closed first before we reassign
the packages to maintainer-needed.
It would be good to review if there are packages which have to be
Hi,
I don't have any objections regarding the change of the default tmpfiles
provider but I would like to classify the vulnerability:
On 2020-11-25 22:57, Georgy Yakovlev wrote:
In case you don't know, opentmpfiles has an open CVE CVE-2017-18925:
root privilege escalation by symlink attack
Hi.
Also created https://github.com/gentoo/gentoo/pull/18411 for taking
maintainership.
чт, 26 нояб. 2020 г. в 12:01, Bernard Cafarelli :
>
> Le Thu, 26 Nov 2020 00:27:53 +0100
> Jonas Stein a écrit:
>
> > Dear all
> >
> > the following packages are up for grabs while dissolving
> > the
Le Thu, 26 Nov 2020 00:27:53 +0100
Jonas Stein a écrit:
> Dear all
>
> the following packages are up for grabs while dissolving
> the desktop-misc project:
>
> x11-misc/zim
> https://packages.gentoo.org/packages/x11-misc/zim
>
> It is a very powerful deskop wiki which is written in python. It
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