Re: [gentoo-user] My last words on cryptology and cryptography.

2008-06-27 Thread Sebastian Wiesner
Steven Lembark [EMAIL PROTECTED] at Thursday 26 June 2008, 23:52:17
  I submit that brute forcing an AES key of reasonably length is
  currently impossible in an amount of time that would matter to the
  human race.

 On average yes.

 As already pointed out, however, there is nothing
 to prevent the first guess from matching a key and
 cracking one particular example of the cipher in
 0.0001 seconds.

A probability of something like 1 / 5 to die in a car accident does not 
one prevent from driving a car.  But a probability of 1 / (2^256) of 
finding the first key right away at the first guess is easily held up 
against key security of AES ...  now that's a very strange mismatch.

Apparently you consider the security of your life much, much less worth than 
security of your encrypted hard disk ...

-- 
Freedom is always the freedom of dissenters.
  (Rosa Luxemburg)


signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.


Re: [gentoo-user] My last words on cryptology and cryptography.

2008-06-26 Thread Alan McKinnon
On Thursday 26 June 2008, Chris Walters wrote:
 Sebastian Wiesner wrote:

 | I don't and I did not say so, things like the Debian disaster bring
 | you back to reality from dreams ...

This is the favoured method of cracking encryption - misuse by the user. 
The canonical example is of course Enigma and the stupid mistake that 
let the Allies crack it. This is entirely analogous to the Debian 
fiasco.

 With desktop computing power and speed growing at the rate that it
 currently is, does it stretch the imagination so much that
 supercomputer power and speed is also growing at a similar rate. 
 Even if an AES256 key cannot be broken in a million years by one
 supercomputer (*I* would like to see a citation for that), there will
 soon be a time when it will be able to be cracked in a much shorter
 time - with one supercomputer.

No-one has ever seriously said that it will take X time to crack a key. 
The possibility exists that the first key randomly selected in a brute 
force attack will match which gives you a time to crack in the 
millisecond range.

The calculation is quite simple - measure how quickly a specific 
computer can match keys. Divide this into the size of the keyspace. The 
average time to brute force a key is half that value. AFAIK this still 
averages out at enormous numbers of years, even at insane calculation 
rates like what RoadRunner can achieve.

All this presupposes that the algorithm in question has no known 
cryptographic weaknesses so brute force is the only feasible method of 
attack currently.


-- 
Alan McKinnon
alan dot mckinnon at gmail dot com

-- 
gentoo-user@lists.gentoo.org mailing list



Re: [gentoo-user] My last words on cryptology and cryptography.

2008-06-26 Thread kashani

Alan McKinnon wrote:
The calculation is quite simple - measure how quickly a specific 
computer can match keys. Divide this into the size of the keyspace. The 
average time to brute force a key is half that value. AFAIK this still 
averages out at enormous numbers of years, even at insane calculation 
rates like what RoadRunner can achieve.


256 bit keys. The 
115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639936 
keys are quite a lot to check (although, if all the atoms in the 
universe [estimated 10^78] were to test 1 key/sec, it'd only take about 
0.1157920892 seconds). However.. 512 bit keys with all the atoms testing 
a trillion keys/second would take about 
(2^512)/(10^78)/60/60/24/(36525/100)/(10^12) or 4.2486779507765473608e56 
years..


	I submit that brute forcing an AES key of reasonably length is 
currently impossible in an amount of time that would matter to the human 
race.


kashani
--
gentoo-user@lists.gentoo.org mailing list



Re: [gentoo-user] My last words on cryptology and cryptography.

2008-06-26 Thread Sebastian Wiesner
Alan McKinnon [EMAIL PROTECTED] at Thursday 26 June 2008, 10:54:43
 The calculation is quite simple - measure how quickly a specific
 computer can match keys. Divide this into the size of the keyspace. The
 average time to brute force a key is half that value. AFAIK this still
 averages out at enormous numbers of years, even at insane calculation
 rates like what RoadRunner can achieve.

According to Wikipedia RoadRunner is designed for 1.7 petaflops in peak.  
Assuming for the sake of simplicity, that decryption can be performed 
within a single flop:

(2^256) / (1.7 * 10^15) / 2 ~= 3.5 * 10^61

In years: 

3.5 * 10^61 / 3600 / 24 / 356 ~= 10^54

Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems impossible to me, to reduce this get 
the required amount somewhere near to the life time of a human being ;)

-- 
Freedom is always the freedom of dissenters.
  (Rosa Luxemburg)


signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.


Re: [gentoo-user] My last words on cryptology and cryptography.

2008-06-26 Thread Alan McKinnon
On Thursday 26 June 2008, Sebastian Wiesner wrote:
 Alan McKinnon [EMAIL PROTECTED] at Thursday 26 June 2008,
 10:54:43

  The calculation is quite simple - measure how quickly a specific
  computer can match keys. Divide this into the size of the keyspace.
  The average time to brute force a key is half that value. AFAIK
  this still averages out at enormous numbers of years, even at
  insane calculation rates like what RoadRunner can achieve.

 According to Wikipedia RoadRunner is designed for 1.7 petaflops in
 peak. Assuming for the sake of simplicity, that decryption can be
 performed within a single flop:

 (2^256) / (1.7 * 10^15) / 2 ~= 3.5 * 10^61

 In years:

 3.5 * 10^61 / 3600 / 24 / 356 ~= 10^54

 Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems impossible to me, to reduce
 this get the required amount somewhere near to the life time of a
 human being ;)

Even with your ultra-liberal assumptions, it still comes out to:

1

times longer than the entire universe is believed to have existed thus 
far (14 billion years). That is an unbelievable stupendously long 
period of time. Yeah, I'd agree that brute force is utterly unfeasible 
as a vector of attack. Not even the almighty NSA could ever pull that 
one off as there simply aren't enough atoms in the universe to make a 
supercomputer big enough.

Numbers don't lie.

-- 
Alan McKinnon
alan dot mckinnon at gmail dot com

-- 
gentoo-user@lists.gentoo.org mailing list



Re: [gentoo-user] My last words on cryptology and cryptography.

2008-06-26 Thread Steven Lembark


I submit that brute forcing an AES key of reasonably length is 
currently impossible in an amount of time that would matter to the human 
race.


On average yes.

As already pointed out, however, there is nothing
to prevent the first guess from matching a key and
cracking one particular example of the cipher in
0.0001 seconds.

Therefore, brute forcing an AES key of any length
is quite possible, even if it is unlikely. q.e.d.

--
gentoo-user@lists.gentoo.org mailing list



Re: [gentoo-user] My last words on cryptology and cryptography.

2008-06-26 Thread kashani

Steven Lembark wrote:


I submit that brute forcing an AES key of reasonably length is 
currently impossible in an amount of time that would matter to the 
human race.


On average yes.

As already pointed out, however, there is nothing
to prevent the first guess from matching a key and
cracking one particular example of the cipher in
0.0001 seconds.

Therefore, brute forcing an AES key of any length
is quite possible, even if it is unlikely. q.e.d.



	This is not interesting data nor particularly relevant. That said, the 
chances of your key is not randomly guessed are far far better than 
average. Getting lucky is not the same as being able to evaluate a 
significant portion of the key space in a short period of time.


kashani
--
gentoo-user@lists.gentoo.org mailing list



Re: [gentoo-user] My last words on cryptology and cryptography.

2008-06-25 Thread Chris Walters

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Sebastian Wiesner wrote:
| Jason Rivard [EMAIL PROTECTED] at Wednesday 25 June 2008, 23:53:23
[snip]
| A OTP cannot be broken using brute force, so the term perfectly secure
| fits here, imho, at least a bit ;)

A OTP cipher would be *theoretically* impossible to crack, even given infinite
computing power.  I use the word theoretically here because this perfect
security of OTP depends on a purely theoretical perfect setting.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-time_pad

| Does that difference really matter for ciphers like AES or at least for
| brute-force attacks on random 256-bit keys?

The key word here is random.  Nothing generated by your computer can generate
pure entropy, only a good representation of it.  Now if you have a computer
network at your disposal, and can get the computers working in parallel or in a
distributed manner, you will notice that tasks are completed much faster than
with one computer working on that task.  A network of supercomputers would be
able to, in a sense, either work on breaking a single key at a time (assuming
CBC with keys = blocks), then you could decrypt the message one block at a
time.  I did not say it would be very fast, just faster than many people would
like to assume.

[snip]

| Still, there is a difference between the algorithm as such and a
| cryptosystem applying this algorithm.
|
| Btw, apart from general stuff like weak passphrases, that apply to most
| cryptosystems, really bad leaks often came from weak algorithms.  Consider
| WEP.

An algorithm is just a recipe - a set of steps to achieve a task.  The
implementation is the *only* thing that counts.  A weak implementation of
AES256 would lead to a weak cryptosystem.  While a strong implementation would,
theoretically, lead to a strong cryptosystem.  I will state my view as a
programmer.  An algorithm is next to useless without a working application that
uses it.

As an aside, let us say you use a USB thumb drive or the like to store a master
key, from which cryptographically random quality keys are derived.  There would
be two weak points in that system.  You, and the thumb drive.  If any entity
can get you, your computer and your thumb drive, your data could be decrypted
without the need for a supercomputer.

[snip]

| Anyway, you may believe, what you want to believe, I'm just reflecting,
| what
| real experts like Bruce Schneier have been telling for years:  It's
| wrong to trust into simple ciphers, but it's equally wrong, to believe,
| that anything can be broken.
| It is equally wrong to believe that any cipher is immune to attack
|
| I don't and I did not say so, things like the Debian disaster bring you back
| to reality from dreams ...

With desktop computing power and speed growing at the rate that it currently
is, does it stretch the imagination so much that supercomputer power and speed
is also growing at a similar rate.  Even if an AES256 key cannot be broken in
a million years by one supercomputer (*I* would like to see a citation for
that), there will soon be a time when it will be able to be cracked in a much
shorter time - with one supercomputer.

Regards,
Chris
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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=ond2
-END PGP SIGNATURE-
--
gentoo-user@lists.gentoo.org mailing list