[gentoo-user] *.h files in gnome applications

2013-08-02 Thread András Csányi
Hi All,

I would like to ask some help. I would like to emerge Unity to my
system and nautilus is part of it, but the emerge fails with this
error message:

libtool: compile:  x86_64-pc-linux-gnu-gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I..
-DG_LOG_DOMAIN=\Eel\ -I.. -I.. -pthread -I/usr/include/gtk-3.0
-I/usr/include/at-spi2-atk/2.0 -I/usr/include/gtk-3.0
-I/usr/include/gio-unix-2.0/ -I/usr/include/cairo
-I/usr/include/pango-1.0 -I/usr/include/harfbuzz
-I/usr/include/pango-1.0 -I/usr/include/atk-1.0 -I/usr/include/cairo
-I/usr/include/pixman-1 -I/usr/include/freetype2 -I/usr/include/libdrm
-I/usr/include/gdk-pixbuf-2.0 -I/usr/include/libpng16
-I/usr/include/glib-2.0 -I/usr/lib64/glib-2.0/include -pthread
-I/usr/include/gail-3.0 -I/usr/include/gnome-desktop-3.0
-I/usr/include/gtk-3.0 -I/usr/include/at-spi2-atk/2.0
-I/usr/include/gtk-3.0 -I/usr/include/gio-unix-2.0/
-I/usr/include/cairo -I/usr/include/pango-1.0 -I/usr/include/harfbuzz
-I/usr/include/pango-1.0 -I/usr/include/atk-1.0 -I/usr/include/cairo
-I/usr/include/pixman-1 -I/usr/include/freetype2 -I/usr/include/libdrm
-I/usr/include/gdk-pixbuf-2.0 -I/usr/include/libpng16
-I/usr/include/glib-2.0 -I/usr/lib64/glib-2.0/include
-I/usr/include/libxml2 -I/usr/include/gsettings-desktop-schemas
-DDATADIR=\/usr/share\ -DSOURCE_DATADIR=\../data\
-DGNOMELOCALEDIR=\/usr/share/locale\ -march=core2 -O2 -pipe -c
eel-stock-dialogs.c  -fPIC -DPIC -o .libs/eel-stock-dialogs.o
eel-gnome-extensions.c:34:50: fatal error:
libgnome-desktop/gnome-desktop-utils.h: No such file or directory
compilation terminated.
make[2]: *** [eel-gnome-extensions.lo] Error 1
make[2]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs
make[2]: Leaving directory
`/var/tmp/portage/gnome-base/nautilus-3.6.3_p0_p16/work/nautilus-3.6.3/eel'
make[1]: *** [all-recursive] Error 1
make[1]: Leaving directory
`/var/tmp/portage/gnome-base/nautilus-3.6.3_p0_p16/work/nautilus-3.6.3'
make: *** [all] Error 2

Due to that it is part of the unity-gentoo overlay and it is patched
heavily by the Unity team I do not ask nobody on this list to help me
solve this issue. The only thing I ask is to help me understand what
is it. I know here are lot of experienced people who may met issue
like this.

When I re-emerge the packages listed by equery g nautilus my issue
remains unsolved.

equery b libgnome-desktop/gnome-desktop-utils.h
do not give any result.

I'm in that situation when I don't understand what happens. Where this
libgnome-desktop/gnome-desktop-utils.h comes from?

I already reported this to the package maintainer but... you know... I
cannot stay on my bottom... :)

Thanks for any help in advance!

András

-- 
--  Csanyi Andras (Sayusi Ando)  -- http://sayusi.hu --
http://facebook.com/andras.csanyi
--  Trust in God and keep your gunpowder dry! - Cromwell



Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-27 Thread Alan McKinnon
On Friday 27 June 2008, kashani wrote:
  The thing about this keys is, that there is no better way than to
  brute force such keys. The algorithm uses a function which inverse
  is a known hard problem which resides in NP, which is a class of
  functions equal to just guessing.

 I don't believe this is true. The algorithm uses a function which is
 *assumed* to be a hard problem. You assume the problem is hard
 because you and anyone you know have not been able to make it easy.
 That does not mean that someone has not discovered some math that
 does make it easy.

It's more than a thumb-suck assumption. In maths, assume is overloaded 
to have an entirely different meaning to what it has in everyday life, 
much like theory in science.

The assumption comes from all the solid maths surrounding the NP 
problem. As any decent mathematician/cryptologist will tell you, 
cracking this one is the current holy grail in their field and the 
amount of man-power being applied to solving it is staggering. Neil 
mentioned GCHQ developing public key several years before RSA, but do 
note that RSA still had the same bright idea that GCHQ had, only a few 
short years later. There are thousands of examples in math and science 
of the same huge advances being made by two parties independently - 
because they are working from the same known base. I feel quite 
confident that the NP problem will be no different.

-- 
Alan McKinnon
alan dot mckinnon at gmail dot com

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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-27 Thread Neil Bothwick
On Fri, 27 Jun 2008 10:51:57 +0200, Alan McKinnon wrote:

 Neil 
 mentioned GCHQ developing public key several years before RSA, but do 
 note that RSA still had the same bright idea that GCHQ had, only a few 
 short years later.

The important point was that they kept quiet about it. Even after RSA
entered the public domain, they let everyone think it was news to them.

Mind you, the UK government kept quiet about breaking Enigma after WWII
was over, so they could sell these secure systems to their Commonwealth
friends.


-- 
Neil Bothwick

Top Oxymorons Number 2: Exact estimate


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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-27 Thread Stroller


On 27 Jun 2008, at 00:37, Neil Bothwick wrote:


On Fri, 27 Jun 2008 00:47:34 +0200, Sebastian Günther wrote:


If the NSA had a sufficient algorithm, that is capable of
reducing the time that much, they should also be able to prove P=NP.
This is worth 1.000.000$ iirc and somehow you should get a Nobel  
Prize

for it.


I'm sure the NSA would be happy to forego the prize and keep quiet  
about

being able to break a secure cipher.


I can't help wondering if - since P=NP is such a big problem - the  
advantages of having this knowledge in the public domain might  
override the advantages of mere spying.


Stroller.

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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-27 Thread Neil Bothwick
On Fri, 27 Jun 2008 10:44:00 +0100, Stroller wrote:

  I'm sure the NSA would be happy to forego the prize and keep quiet  
  about
  being able to break a secure cipher.  
 
 I can't help wondering if - since P=NP is such a big problem - the  
 advantages of having this knowledge in the public domain might  
 override the advantages of mere spying.

I'm sure the holy grail for the NSA is a cipher that everyone thinks is
totally secure but they can break. These agencies aren't interested in the
greater good, only furthering their own goals.


-- 
Neil Bothwick

Tagline file empty. Please refill the bit bucket.


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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-27 Thread Sebastian Wiesner
kashani [EMAIL PROTECTED] at Friday 27 June 2008, 02:28:21
 Here's a reference to the interesting meet-in-the-middle attack which
 reduced 3DES key space down to 112 bits from 192. 
3DES always had an effective key size of 112 bits, because it uses the 
original DES algorithm applied in the following scheme E1(D2(E1(M)) with 
two different 56-bit DES keys.  3DES never had 192 bit keys.

The meet-in-the-middle attack has nothing to do with 3DES.  In fact, 3DES 
was designed the way it works now to _prevent_ meet-in-the-middle attacks.  
Such attacks can be applied to ciphers, that apply a single algorithm with 
two different keys:  E1(E2(M))  

Mathematical, the key size of the latter cipher is equal to 3DES:  56+56 = 
112.  But the latter cipher is vulnerable to meet-in-the-middle attacks, 
which is why 3DES uses the second key to apply the DES decryption function 
with a different key right between the consecutive DES encryptions.

 Obviously that was unknown when 3DES was built.
I doubt.  If meet in the middle was unknown at the time of 3DES development, 
we wouldn't have 3DES today, but 2DES, being as simple as E1(E2(M)).

-- 
Freedom is always the freedom of dissenters.
  (Rosa Luxemburg)


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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-27 Thread Alan McKinnon
On Friday 27 June 2008, Neil Bothwick wrote:
 On Fri, 27 Jun 2008 10:44:00 +0100, Stroller wrote:
   I'm sure the NSA would be happy to forego the prize and keep
   quiet about
   being able to break a secure cipher.
 
  I can't help wondering if - since P=NP is such a big problem - the
  advantages of having this knowledge in the public domain might
  override the advantages of mere spying.

 I'm sure the holy grail for the NSA is a cipher that everyone thinks
 is totally secure but they can break. These agencies aren't
 interested in the greater good, only furthering their own goals.

This is the spooks we are talking about so I'm sure Neil is right and 
they are having wet dreams about this very thing.

All I can say is, thank $DEITY for open/free software and open 
algorithms.

-- 
Alan McKinnon
alan dot mckinnon at gmail dot com

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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-27 Thread Daniel Iliev
On Fri, 27 Jun 2008 11:08:04 +0100
Neil Bothwick [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 On Fri, 27 Jun 2008 10:44:00 +0100, Stroller wrote:
 
   I'm sure the NSA would be happy to forego the prize and keep
   quiet about
   being able to break a secure cipher.  
  
  I can't help wondering if - since P=NP is such a big problem - the  
  advantages of having this knowledge in the public domain might  
  override the advantages of mere spying.
 
 I'm sure the holy grail for the NSA is a cipher that everyone thinks
 is totally secure but they can break. These agencies aren't
 interested in the greater good, only furthering their own goals.
 
 


Sounds like AES fits the description :D

-- 
Best regards,
Daniel
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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-27 Thread Chris Walters

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Alan McKinnon wrote:
| On Friday 27 June 2008, Neil Bothwick wrote:
| On Fri, 27 Jun 2008 10:44:00 +0100, Stroller wrote:
| I'm sure the NSA would be happy to forego the prize and keep
| quiet about
| being able to break a secure cipher.
| I can't help wondering if - since P=NP is such a big problem - the
| advantages of having this knowledge in the public domain might
| override the advantages of mere spying.
| I'm sure the holy grail for the NSA is a cipher that everyone thinks
| is totally secure but they can break. These agencies aren't
| interested in the greater good, only furthering their own goals.
|
| This is the spooks we are talking about so I'm sure Neil is right and
| they are having wet dreams about this very thing.
|
| All I can say is, thank $DEITY for open/free software and open
| algorithms.

Somehow I doubt that the NSA has a magic bullet to crack AES encryption.  If
they did, it wouldn't be a part of the FIPS.  I'd bet dollars to doughnuts that
the US Navy has more cryptologists, etc. than the NSA - just a guess here.  It
would make perfect sense, though - since they have to use radios and satellites
to communicate with their ships at sea, they would be most interested in data
security - we wouldn't want our enemies ordering our ships or nuclear missile
subs to make attacks that weren't ordered by the President...

Chris
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[gentoo-user] h

2008-06-26 Thread Volker Armin Hemmann
On Donnerstag, 26. Juni 2008, Alan McKinnon wrote:
 On Thursday 26 June 2008, Sebastian Wiesner wrote:
  Alan McKinnon [EMAIL PROTECTED] at Thursday 26 June 2008,
  10:54:43
 
   The calculation is quite simple - measure how quickly a specific
   computer can match keys. Divide this into the size of the keyspace.
   The average time to brute force a key is half that value. AFAIK
   this still averages out at enormous numbers of years, even at
   insane calculation rates like what RoadRunner can achieve.
 
  According to Wikipedia RoadRunner is designed for 1.7 petaflops in
  peak. Assuming for the sake of simplicity, that decryption can be
  performed within a single flop:
 
  (2^256) / (1.7 * 10^15) / 2 ~= 3.5 * 10^61
 
  In years:
 
  3.5 * 10^61 / 3600 / 24 / 356 ~= 10^54
 
  Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems impossible to me, to reduce
  this get the required amount somewhere near to the life time of a
  human being ;)

 Even with your ultra-liberal assumptions, it still comes out to:

 1

 times longer than the entire universe is believed to have existed thus
 far (14 billion years). That is an unbelievable stupendously long
 period of time. Yeah, I'd agree that brute force is utterly unfeasible
 as a vector of attack. Not even the almighty NSA could ever pull that
 one off as there simply aren't enough atoms in the universe to make a
 supercomputer big enough.

 Numbers don't lie.

and this is why nobody uses brute force.

There a better ways to crack keys. NSA has tons of experts in mathematics and 
cryptoanalysis. Plus very sophisticated hardware. I am sure for most ciphers 
they use something much more efficient than stupid brute force.

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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-26 Thread Sebastian Günther
* Volker Armin Hemmann ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) [27.06.08 00:12]:
 and this is why nobody uses brute force.
 
 There a better ways to crack keys. NSA has tons of experts in mathematics and 
 cryptoanalysis. Plus very sophisticated hardware. I am sure for most ciphers 
 they use something much more efficient than stupid brute force.
 

The thing about this keys is, that there is no better way than to brute 
force such keys. The algorithm uses a function which inverse is a known 
hard problem which resides in NP, which is a class of functions equal to 
just guessing. If the NSA had a sufficient algorithm, that is capable of 
reducing the time that much, they should also be able to prove P=NP. 
This is worth 1.000.000$ iirc and somehow you should get a Nobel Prize 
for it.

For deeper and better insight, take some courses in cryptography and 
theoretical computer sience, they are quiet good at Clausthal.

Sebastian

-- 
  Religion ist das Opium des Volkes.   Karl Marx

 [EMAIL PROTECTED]@N GÜNTHER mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]


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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-26 Thread Neil Bothwick
On Fri, 27 Jun 2008 00:47:34 +0200, Sebastian Günther wrote:

 If the NSA had a sufficient algorithm, that is capable of 
 reducing the time that much, they should also be able to prove P=NP. 
 This is worth 1.000.000$ iirc and somehow you should get a Nobel Prize 
 for it.

I'm sure the NSA would be happy to forego the prize and keep quiet about
being able to break a secure cipher. Just like our GCHQ came up with
public key cryptography several years before Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
published RSA but kept it secret for over 30 years.


-- 
Neil Bothwick

If I save time, when do I get it back?


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Re: [gentoo-user] h

2008-06-26 Thread kashani

Sebastian Günther wrote:

* Volker Armin Hemmann ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) [27.06.08 00:12]:

and this is why nobody uses brute force.

There a better ways to crack keys. NSA has tons of experts in mathematics and 
cryptanalysis. Plus very sophisticated hardware. I am sure for most ciphers 
they use something much more efficient than stupid brute force.




The thing about this keys is, that there is no better way than to brute 
force such keys. The algorithm uses a function which inverse is a known 
hard problem which resides in NP, which is a class of functions equal to 
just guessing. 


I don't believe this is true. The algorithm uses a function which is 
*assumed* to be a hard problem. You assume the problem is hard because 
you and anyone you know have not been able to make it easy. That does 
not mean that someone has not discovered some math that does make it easy.


Here's a reference to the interesting meet-in-the-middle attack which 
reduced 3DES key space down to 112 bits from 192. Obviously that was 
unknown when 3DES was built.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triple_DES#Security

kashani
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