Hello,
Is it possible to encrypt email attachments with GnuPG? I've read you have
to install some extra libraries but i don't know what i'm supposed to be
doing?
any help would be appreciated.
S
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Hi Mukund,
On 10/11/2010 02:47 PM, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
Hi Tiago
I just purchased OpenPGP cards and Gemalto USB Shell Token V2 readers
(see https://www.mukund.org/). They work perfectly for me.
I'll explain what I use to access them. Maybe you can adapt it to your
own use.
[...]
I
On 10/8/2010 10:16 AM, Mark H. Wood wrote:
If you ever decide to promote that alternate interface, the approach I
would try is to sneak it in by actually making it an alternative
This is one of the things we were specifically warned against in HCI.
Give people two interfaces and the new
On 11/10/10 8:56 PM, sunegtheoverlord wrote:
Hello,
Is it possible to encrypt email attachments with GnuPG? I've read you have
to install some extra libraries but i don't know what i'm supposed to be
doing?
any help would be appreciated.
Messages sent in OpenPGP/MIME format (with
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512
Hi
On Monday 11 October 2010 at 10:56:33 AM, in
mid:29932548.p...@talk.nabble.com, sunegtheoverlord wrote:
Hello,
Is it possible to encrypt email attachments with GnuPG?
I've read you have to install some extra libraries but
i don't know
Hello,
I just had the idea that it might be a good countermeasure against malicious
software not to use a cached passphrase without any user interaction (and thus
without user notice). A good compromise would be to open a dialog which does
not ask for the passphrase but just for the
On 10/11/2010 09:25 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
I just had the idea that it might be a good countermeasure against malicious
software not to use a cached passphrase without any user interaction (and
thus
without user notice). A good compromise would be to open a dialog which does
not ask for
On 10/11/2010 9:25 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
I just had the idea that it might be a good countermeasure against
malicious software not to use a cached passphrase without any user
interaction (and thus without user notice).
The most obvious way I see to circumvent this involves throwing a
On 10/11/2010 10:20 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
On 10/11/2010 9:25 PM, Hauke Laging wrote:
I just had the idea that it might be a good countermeasure against
malicious software not to use a cached passphrase without any user
interaction (and thus without user notice).
The most obvious way
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Hauke Laging wrote:
Hello,
I just had the idea that it might be a good countermeasure against malicious
software not to use a cached passphrase without any user interaction (and
thus
without user notice). A good compromise would be to open a
On 10/11/2010 09:56 PM, Larry Brower wrote:
This seems like something that would get really annoying really
quickly. Why not just change settings to not cache the passphrase if
you do not like using it this way ?
re-entering the passphrase each time is significantly more annoying than
On 10/11/2010 10:44 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
It would help against the situation where the malicious client does
*not* have superuser access and cannot directly override the prompting
mechanism through other mechanisms.
This attack mode appears to me to be so niche that I don't see any
On 10/12/2010 12:34 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote:
Heck, this doesn't even defend against an *unprivileged* attack. Give
me unprivileged access to your user account I'll edit your .profile to
put a .malware/ subdirectory on your PATH and drop my trojaned GnuPG in
there. Once the malware
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