[ISN] Crafts website hacked by terrorists

2006-05-09 Thread InfoSec News
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2006/05/07/crafts_website_hacked_by_terrorists/

By Michael Levenson
Globe Staff  
May 7, 2006

A plumber who loves glass etching, Andrew Roberge had crafts to sell.  
His son, Mike, knew Web design. Carriage House Glass is the marriage
of their talents, an online catalog of sandblasted vases and goblets
that ''caters to those who love beautiful and unique gifts, the site
proclaims.

But the website, which they started four years ago, offered more than
just beautiful baubles, specialists in terrorism say. The site
contained hidden files filled with the radical writings of a top aide
to Osama bin Laden, including ''The International Islamic Resistance
Call, Abu Musab al-Suri's 1,600-page manifesto advocating jihad.

The website was hacked a year ago by followers of Suri, a Syrian-born
Al Qaeda leader, who turned the Roberge's labor of love into an online
reading room for aspiring mujahadeen, the specialists said. The
revelation came as a shock to the Roberges, who said they had no idea
that Islamic extremists had intruded on their website.

''We got hacked! Unbelievable! exclaimed Mike Roberge, when told last
week of the hidden content on his site.

His startled father added, ''Believe me, I wouldn't let this
[expletive] get on my site. I don't need that. I don't need none of
that. I'm a firm believer in minding my own business.

The father and son from Lawrence vowed to delete the postings and
replace them with images of eagles and American flags, ''something
wicked patriotic, Mike Roberge said.

A link to the hidden files on the website was circulated on bulletin
boards frequented by Muslim extremists for a year, said Jarret
Brachman, director of research at the Combating Terrorism Center at
the US Military Academy in West Point, N.Y.

Regular visitors to www.carriagehouseglass.com could never see the
hidden material, specialists said. Only visitors who knew the address
of the pages inside could access the cache of downloadable Arabic
writings, and see the flash animation featuring the Kaaba, the black
stone cube that Muslims face when they pray in Mecca.

Brachman and other researchers had been aware of the files, but said
the intrusion onto the site was not unusual in the burgeoning world of
online Islamic extremism.

''This is a very tangential, very peripheral site that only those who
are actively following this sort of literature would be accessing,  
Brachman said.

''It doesn't cause me alarm: these guys are pests in terms of this
stuff, he said. ''This is standard procedure for these guys to post
this kind of material.

FBI spokeswoman Gail A. Marcinkiewicz declined to comment on whether
the agency knew of the website or was monitoring it. She said the FBI
would investigate a website only if it directly advocated violence.  
Specialists said Suri's writings advocate violence, but Marcinkiewicz
said, ''unless . . . there's something very urgent in that paper, it's
not that we wouldn't take a look at it, it's just that we have to
prioritize. There's no quick and easy answer here.

''Without knowing what it's saying, it may go the bottom of the pile
of all the 101 things we have to do over here, she added.

Piggybacking on Carriage House Glass, which is password-protected,
allowed extremists to avoid using a credit card or other traceable
data needed to start a new website, said Rita Katz, director of the
Search for International Terrorist Entities in New York.

''Of course, it's a disturbing phenomenon, but we know that Al Qaeda
and the jihadist online community is quite sophisticated, and they use
our own techniques against us, Katz said. ''It's disturbing because
it could happen to anyone.

As more terrorist training grounds shut down globally, more extremists
are going online, said Steven R. Corman, an Arizona State University
professor who has studied the shift.

Michael Levenson can be reached at mlevenson (at) globe.com.

© Copyright 2006 The New York Times Company




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[ISN] Gone in 60 seconds -- the high-tech version

2006-05-09 Thread InfoSec News
http://news.com.com/Gone+in+60+seconds--the+high-tech+version/2100-7349_3-6069287.html

By Robert Vamosi 
Special to CNET News.com
May 6, 2006

Let's say you just bought a Mercedes S550--a state-of-the-art,
high-tech vehicle with an antitheft keyless ignition system.

After you pull into a Starbucks to celebrate with a grande latte and a
scone, a man in a T-shirt and jeans with a laptop sits next to you and
starts up a friendly conversation: Is that the S550? How do you like
it so far? Eager to share, you converse for a few minutes, then the
man thanks you and is gone. A moment later, you look up to discover
your new Mercedes is gone as well.

Now, decrypting one 40-bit code sequence can not only disengage the
security system and unlock the doors, it can also start the
car--making the hack tempting for thieves. The owner of the code is
now the true owner of the car. And while high-end, high-tech auto
thefts like this are more common in Europe today, they will soon start
happening in America. The sad thing is that manufacturers of keyless
devices don't seem to care.

Wireless or contactless devices in cars are not new. Remote keyless
entry systems--those black fobs we all have dangling next to our car
keys--have been around for years. While the owner is still a few feet
away from a car, the fobs can disengage the auto alarm and unlock the
doors; they can even activate the car's panic alarm in an emergency.

First introduced in the 1980s, modern remote keyless entry systems use
a circuit board, a coded radio-frequency identification (RFID)  
technology chip, a battery and a small antenna. The last two are
designed so that the fob can broadcast to a car while it's still
several feet away.

The RFID chip in the key fob contains a select set of codes designed
to work with a given car. These codes are rolling 40-bit strings: With
each use, the code changes slightly, creating about 1 trillion
possible combinations in total. When you push the unlock button, the
keyfob sends a 40-bit code, along with an instruction to unlock the
car doors. If the synced-up receiver gets the 40-bit code it is
expecting, the vehicle performs the instruction. If not, the car does
not respond.

A second antitheft use of RFID is for remote vehicle immobilizers.  
These tiny chips, embedded inside the plastic head of the ignition
keys, are used with more than 150 million vehicles today. Improper use
prevents the car's fuel pump from operating correctly. Unless the
driver has the correct key chip installed, the car will run out of
fuel a few blocks from the attempted theft. (That's why valet keys
don't have the chips installed; valets need to drive the car only
short distances.)

One estimate suggests that since their introduction in the late 1990s,
vehicle immobilizers have resulted in a 90 percent decrease in auto
thefts nationwide.

But can this system be defeated? Yes.

Keyless ignition systems allow you the convenience of starting your
car with the touch of a button, without removing the chip from your
pocket or purse or backpack. Like vehicle immobilizers, keyless
ignition systems work only in the presence of the proper chip. Unlike
remote keyless entry systems, they are passive, don't require a
battery and have much shorter ranges (usually six feet or less). And
instead of sending a signal, they rely on a signal being emitted from
the car itself.

Given that the car is more or less broadcasting its code and looking
for a response, it seems possible that a thief could try different
codes and see what the responses are. Last fall, the authors of a
study from Johns Hopkins University and the security company RSA
carried out an experiment using a laptop equipped with a microreader.  
They were able to capture and decrypt the code sequence, then
disengage the alarm and unlock and start a 2005 Ford Escape SUV
without the key. They even provided an online video of their car
theft.

But if you think that such a hack might occur only in a pristine
academic environment, with the right equipment, you're wrong.


Real-world examples

Meet Radko Soucek, a 32-year-old car thief from the Czech Republic.  
He's alleged to have stolen several expensive cars in and around
Prague using a laptop and a reader. Soucek is not new to auto
theft--he has been stealing cars since he was 11 years old. But he
recently turned high-tech when he realized how easily it could be
done.

Ironically, what led to his downfall was his own laptop, which held
evidence of all his past encryption attempts. With a database of
successful encryption strings already stored on his hard drive, he had
the ability to crack cars he'd never seen before in a relatively short
amount of time.

And Soucek isn't an isolated example. Recently, soccer player David
Beckham had not one, but two, antitheft-engineered BMW S5 SUVs stolen.  
The most recent theft occurred in Madrid, Spain. Police believe an
auto theft gang using software instead of hardware pinched both of
Beckham's BMWs.

How a 

[ISN] SCADA on thin ice - Industrial control systems pose little-noticed security threat

2006-05-09 Thread InfoSec News
http://www.fcw.com/article94273-05-08-06-Print

By Michael Arnone
May 8, 2006 

The electronic control systems that act as the nervous system for all
critical infrastructures are insecure and pose disastrous risks to
national security, cybersecurity experts warn.

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and process control
systems are two common types of industrial control systems that
oversee the operations of everything from nuclear power plants to
traffic lights. Their need for a combination of physical security and
cybersecurity has largely been ignored, said Scott Borg, director and
chief economist at the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, an independent
research group funded by the Homeland Security Department.

Control systems security is one of six areas of critical
vulnerabilities Borg included in a new cybersecurity checklist
released in April by the research group.

The private-sector owners of critical infrastructure refuse to release
data and deny that their aging, inherently insecure systems pose any
security risk, said Dragos Ruiu, an information technology security
consultant to the U.S. government who runs several hacker conferences.  
Control systems security has been a hot topic in the past year at
those conferences.

It's one of those issues that is so big, you just don't want to see
it because any solutions will be expensive, awkward and prohibitive,  
Ruiu added.

Average hackers can break into the systems, said Robert Graham, chief
scientist at Internet Security Systems (ISS). He, Borg and other
experts fear that major cyberattacks on control systems could have
socioeconomic effects as severe and far-reaching as Hurricane Katrina
or even the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in Ukraine.

Most experts agree that measuring the risk from cyberattacks on
critical infrastructure is difficult. Attacks are rare because control
systems are still complex and individualized enough to make cracking
them difficult, although a hacker who knows a particular system well
can break into it easily, said Jason Larson, senior cybersecurity
researcher at the Idaho National Laboratory, which leads federal
efforts into critical infrastructure cybersecurity.

Even if a facility has not been attacked, that doesn't mean it's
secure or the threat isn't real, said Michael Assante, senior manager
of critical infrastructure protection at the laboratory. The idea
that the technology is obscure and not well-understood by a potential
aggressor is dangerous thinking, he wrote in an e-mail message.

Government and industry have known for years that critical
infrastructures offer ripe targets for attack. In 2002, the FBI's
National Infrastructure Protection Center found that al Qaeda members
had sought information on control systems for water supply and
wastewater management facilities.


Open-heart surgery

Control systems are built to run around the clock for decades without
interruption or human intervention. A single critical infrastructure
facility can have thousands of SCADA devices spread over hundreds of
miles.

Because of the systems' structure and management, standard IT security
practices don't work for them, experts say.

It's more like open-heart surgery, said William Rush, a physicist at
the Gas Technology Institute, a nonprofit research organization for
the natural gas industry.

The systems have proprietary operating systems and applications that
run on 20- to 30-year-old hardware built before security became a
major IT issue, leaving them riddled with vulnerabilities.

According to conventional wisdom, critical infrastructure owners can't
upgrade or patch systems because any jitter or delay caused by IT
security features could lead to catastrophic breakdowns costing
millions of dollars. Any mistakes in IT implementation could affect
the processes the systems control, leading to product alterations,
chemical interactions, explosions or worse.

The situation got even more complicated in late 2001 when
infrastructure owners started connecting their control systems to
Internet-enabled corporate networks to maximize the use of their
sophisticated equipment, said Eric Byres, research leader at the
Internet Engineering Lab at the British Columbia Institute of
Technology, a leading industrial cybersecurity research facility.

That introduced new vulnerabilities on top of existing ones and
created complex connections that opened new backdoors, Byres said. The
result is a smorgasbord for would-be attackers. It's open season, he
said.


'The stories here are terrifying'

Utility owners say they realize cyberattacks pose a risk but don't see
it as a huge problem, Rush said. The federal government says industry
is responsible for protecting critical infrastructure and has told
both industry and vendors to get moving. Vendors, however, are waiting
for sufficient demand for security products to make them, while
industry is waiting for an ample supply of products to buy them.

It's a chicken-and-egg situation, Rush 

[ISN] Antispam firm says it was victim of sophisticated attack

2006-05-09 Thread InfoSec News
http://computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasicarticleId=111208

By Jaikumar Vijayan
May 05, 2006
Computerworld

The CEO of an antispam firm whose service was knocked off-line by a
spammer earlier this week claimed that his company was the victim of a
sophisticated attack carried out, in part, with the help of someone at
a top-tier Internet service provider (ISP).

But some security experts expressed doubts abut the company's claims
and said they appear to be an attempt to deflect attention from the
criticism it has recived for the way in which it handled the attacks.

Eran Reshef, CEO of Blue Security Inc., an Israeli antispam firm, said
his company was attacked by a major spammer named PharmaMaster who
used a combination of methods to knock out the company's Web site and
the servers hosting its services.

Blue Security, which has its U.S. headquarters in Menlo Park, Calif.,
operates an antispam service designed to deter junk-mailers by
spamming them back. Blue Security's Do Not Intrude program allows
individuals to register their e-mail addresses with the company and
essentially flood spammers who send them e-mail with automated opt-out
requests.

The attacks that crippled Blue Service were preceded by PharmaMaster
sending out threatening e-mails to subscribers of the Do Not Intrude
Registry, warning them of even more spam if they did not withdraw
their subscriptions.

PharmaMaster then appears to have gotten someone at a major ISP to
block Blue Security's IP address on the Internet's backbone routers,
most probably via a process called black-holing, Reshef claimed. With
black-holing, an ISP essentially removes the advertised path to a
particular Web site or IP address -- making it completely inaccessible
to the outside world. According to Reshef, PharmaMaster informed Blue
Security that he had gotten an ISP to agree to black-hole the company
before the attacks started.

Immediately, we started seeing our IP address getting blacklisted by
other ISPs, Reshef said. As a result, traffic to the company's main
Web site dropped from the usual 100 hits per minute to about two per
minute in less than an hour -- and nothing at all from outside of
Israel. At almost the same time, massive distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks were launched against the dedicated servers that
provide Blue Security's antispam service. The servers, located at five
separate hosting provider sites, were bombarded with up to 2GB of
traffic per second, rendering them inaccessible.

In what Reshef said was a bid to tell subscribers what was happening,
Blue Security pointed the company's corporate Web server URL to its
blog, which is hosted by Six Apart Ltd. in San Francisco. PharmaMaster
then launched a DDoS attack against the server hosting Blue Security's
blog. That caused thousands of other blogs hosted by Six Apart to be
knocked off-line.

The DDoS attacks against the company's dedicated servers meanwhile
resulted in service disruptions to five hosting providers as well as
major Domain Name System service provider Tucows Inc., he said.

Pointing the company's main URL to the Blue Security blog site on Six
Apart when it was under attack may not have been the best idea, Reshef
said. But at the time, the company had little idea that the attacker
would launch a separate DoS attack on the blog site as well.

But Todd Underwood, chief operations and security officer at Renesys
Inc., a Manchester, N.H.-based Internet monitoring company, said that
based on traffic analysis, Blue Security's main Web site appears to
have been under a DDoS attack for at least two days before it
redirected its URL to the blog.

I do think if you are under attack, it is your duty not to redirect
it against someone else, Underwood said. It is not a fair or an
ethical decision, he said, adding that it is hard to imagine that
Blue Security didn't know it was being hit with a DDoS attack when it
pointed its URL to the blog site.

Underwood also said that it was unlikely that a spammer would have
been able to get an individual at a major ISP to install a no route  
to Blue Security, as Reshef claimed. These are not the kind of
networks where people can sneak in and make routing configuration
changes without logging that change or discussing it with others, he
said. The suggestion that some Russian spammer could bribe someone to
install a no-route is hard to believe, he said.

John Levine, chairman of the Internet Anti-Spam Research Group, said
that other antispam efforts have been similarly targeted as well. But
they did not involve an ISP. And neither did those who were attacked
respond like Blue Security did, he said. If you know you are under a
DoS attack, pointing your DNS at other parties is irresponsible, he
said.



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[ISN] Malaysia welcomes the world in fight against cyber-terrorism

2006-05-09 Thread InfoSec News
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2006/5/7/nation/14173729

BY JOHAN FERNANDEZ
May 7, 2006

IMPACT is its name, and making an impact in the battle against
cyber-terrorism is its mission. Unveiled in Austin, Texas, the
Malaysian initiative seeks to bring together governments and the
international private sector to deal with increasing threats in
cyberspace.

Known as the International multilateral partnership against
cyber-terrorism or IMPACT it will serve as a pioneer platform to
allow governments of the world to exchange notes and ideas, as well as
to facilitate the sharing of skills and best practices, with the
ultimate objective of combating these constantly evolving threats.

Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi who made this
announcement at the closing ceremony of the 15th World Congress on IT
(WCIT 2006) here on Friday said that IMPACT was not just a Malaysian
concern.

IMPACT is conceived as a partnership - between governments, as well
as between governments of the world and the international private
sector.

Given that some of the best skills and technologies in cyber-security
reside in the private sector, it is only natural that all governments
need to work closely with businesses to effectively combat
cyber-terrorism, he said.

He said the potential to wreak havoc and cause disruption to people,
firms, governments and entire global systems have increased as the
world became more globalised and dependent on information and
communications technology (ICT).

Today, governments across the world must be prepared to deal with
threats in cyberspace.

Even if one were to exclude the risks to life and limb, the economic
loss caused by the disruption of a cyber-attack can be truly severe -
for example, a nationwide blackout, collapse of trading systems or
perhaps the crippling of a central bank cheque clearing system, he
said.

He said the threats posed by cyber-terrorism were something that
modern societies and their governments could no longer ignore.

No country can manage this problem in isolation and to effectively
overcome this global threat and it is imperative that countries
throughout the world work in concert to wipe out this danger.

IMPACT has got off to a good start with some leading names lending
their support. America's Symantec Corporation, Japan's Trend Micro,
and Russia's KaperskyLlab have already agreed to be key partners and
to serve on IMPACT's international advisory board to be established
soon, he said.

The Prime Minister said he was encouraged that the private sector,
globally, has given its strong support and expected more of such
world-class companies following suit.

For a start, IMPACT would focus its activities in three key areas -
security certification, research and development; as well as
establishing a global emergency response centre.

IMPACT will be sited in Cyberjaya, at the heart of MSC Malaysia,  
with access to world-class ICT infrastructure.

I am confident that IMPACT, with the co-operation of governments and
the global private sector, will be able to find effective solutions to
the global threat of cyber-terrorism, Abdullah said.

I would like to invite all governments and the global private sector
to partner with us in this worthy cause, he added.

On the WCIT, the Prime Minister said Malaysia was honoured and excited
about hosting the next congress in 2008.

Apart from expanding our partnerships with global technology leaders,
we see our hosting of WCIT 2008 as an opportunity to stimulate further
discussion on technology and technology-related policy development,  
Abdullah said.

He also thanked former US secretary of state Colin Powell, who was one
of the keynote speakers on Friday, for his kind words about Malaysia.



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[ISN] Wells Fargo computer missing

2006-05-09 Thread InfoSec News
http://www.twincities.com/mld/pioneerpress/14513672.htm

BY SHERYL JEAN
Pioneer Press
May. 06, 2006

Wells Fargo  Co., the largest bank in Minnesota and the nation's
fifth largest, said Friday that a computer containing sensitive data
for some of its mortgage customers is missing and might have been
stolen.

It's not known whether the computer contained Minnesota customers'
information.

The computer, which was being transported by an unidentified global
shipping company between Wells Fargo locations, had names, addresses,
Social Security numbers and mortgage loan account numbers of some
Wells Fargo mortgage customers and potential customers.

It did not contain other types of customer account numbers.

Wells Fargo spokeswoman Peggy Gunn wouldn't estimate the number of
individuals who could be affected, citing an ongoing law enforcement
investigation. She added, The event affects a relatively small
percentage of Wells Fargo's customers.

San Francisco-based Wells Fargo said it had no indication that the
customer information has been accessed or misused. Gunn said the
computer has two layers of security, but she declined to elaborate.  
She also declined to describe the type of computer or how and when it
disappeared.

Wells Fargo will notify by mail individuals whose information was
stored on the computer by May 30. The bank is offering those affected
a free one-year credit monitoring service.

Wells Fargo has reported two other computer security breaches, in 2003
and 2004. The bank has had no indication that the information was
accessed or misused in either case, Gunn said.

Also Friday, Union Pacific Corp., the nation's largest railroad, said
it's investigating the theft of a computer containing the names and
Social Security numbers of 30,000 current and retired employees. The
computer was stolen April 29 from a human resources employee.

Nationally, more than 160 security breaches have occurred in the past
15 months, affecting more than 55 million accounts, according to
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a nonprofit privacy advocacy group based
in San Diego. Those breaches included more than 40 cases of stolen or
missing computers or laptops.

The general population is waking up to the fact that personal data is
not well secured, said Beth Givens, director of the Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse. New federal and state laws require companies to notify
customers when personal information is lost or stolen, which makes
them vulnerable to identity theft.

Online: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, www.privacyrights.org



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[ISN] Universities given security guidelines for foreign students

2006-05-09 Thread InfoSec News
http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2006/s1632039.htm

This is a transcript from PM. The program is broadcast around 
Australia at 5:10pm on Radio National and 6:10pm on ABC Local Radio.

Reporter: Sabra Lane
5 May, 2006  

MARK COLVIN: The fight against terrorism is shifting to Australian
university campuses and research institutions.

The Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs want academics to
report foreign students enrolled in particular subjects.

The Government also want to broaden export controls, forcing lecturers
to apply for licences if they're going to share their knowledge
abroad.

Sabra Lane reports.

SABRA LANE: It's not a so much a crackdown on students recruiting for
extremist causes, rather an attempt to detect spies in our midst and
stop them from getting their hands on research at conferences.

Last month, the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs sent the
document called Export Controls, Your Responsibilities to
universities and research institutions.

It says universities must inform the Government if suspicious parties
are trying to get their hands on material or research that could be
used in weapons of mass destruction programs.

President of the National Tertiary Education Union Carolyn Allport
acknowledges the need for national security measures, but says
academics weren't consulted.

(to Carolyn Allport) Are your members comfortable with dobbing in
students?

CAROLYN ALLPORT: I don't think they will be. I certainly don't think
they will be. So I think they're going to be very concerned about this
paper. We recognise it's an important strategic objective of the
Government, but at the same time, universities aren't there to be the
secret police.

SABRA LANE: Former senior intelligence analyst David Wright-Neville,
who now heads up the Global Terrorism Research Unit at Monash
University, says it's off the mark.

DAVID WRIGHT-NEVILLE: I think it's a little clumsy in the sorts of
obligations it places on academics. Academics certainly are aware of
the sorts of risks that we confront in the contemporary environment. I
don't think they need to reminded of that.

It's unreasonable to expect that academics can identify terrorist
activities. Trained intelligence officers with many years of
experience often find it very difficult to identify terrorists, so how
an academic with experience in fairly esoteric areas sometime, can do
the jobs of people who are trained to do it, is really beyond me.

SABRA LANE: With universities expanding offshore, the document says
the likelihood countries will exploit Australian expertise for WMD
programs is increasing.

While short on details, it also reveals export control laws are under
review, with the Government keen to include intangible technology
transfer.

Carolyn Allport explains.

CAROLYN ALLPORT: Research, papers produced by academics in
universities, or working papers, you know, seminar papers, seminars
themselves, conferences, this is what's listed in the paper.

They also suggest that people who are making requests from certain
designated countries to come to a conference here are also seen to be
risky. If there was a conference on, I don't know, some sort of
chemical conference here, for example, and someone from Iran or North
Korea or China made a request to come to that conference, I'm assuming
from what I read here that the Government automatically sees these
people as potential terrorists.

SABRA LANE: A 2004 report to the United States Congress on economic
and industrial espionage found some foreigners deliberately sought
jobs at universities and research houses to acquire secrets for their
home countries.

An intelligence analyst who declined to be interviewed by PM says the
guidelines are needed as America's enemies are targeting allies like
Australia and Canada. Countries he claims have underestimated
espionage.

David Wright-Neville disagrees.

DAVID WRIGHT-NEVILLE: It suggests that we're still in the stage of
sort of knee jerk panic reactions, and I really think we need to have
a Bex and have a good lie down for a while, that really none of this
sort of stuff is going to address the long-term threat posed by
terrorism and in fact I think it runs the risk of being
counter-productive.

MARK COLVIN: David Wright-Neville ending that report by Sabra Lane.



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[ISN] Petrol firm suspends chip-and-pin

2006-05-09 Thread InfoSec News
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/4980190.stm

BBC News
6 May 2006

Petrol giant Shell has suspended chip-and-pin payments in 600 UK
petrol stations after more than £1m was siphoned out of customers'
accounts.

Eight people, including one from Guildford, Surrey, and another from
Portsmouth, Hants, have been arrested in connection with the fraud
inquiry.

The Association of Payment Clearing Services (Apacs) said the fraud
related to just one petrol chain.

Shell said it hoped to reintroduce chip-and-pin as soon as possible.


Plastic crime

The fraud is being investigated by the Metropolitan Police cheque and
plastic crime unit.

These Pin pads are supposed to be tamper resistant, they are supposed
to shut down, so that has obviously failed, said Apacs spokeswoman
Sandra Quinn.

She said Apacs was confident the problem was specific to Shell and not
a systemic issue.

A Shell spokeswoman said: Shell's chip-and-pin solution is fully
accredited and complies with all relevant industry standards.

We have temporarily suspended chip-and-pin availability in our UK
company-owned service stations.

This is a precautionary measure to protect the security of our
customers' transactions.

You can still pay for your fuel, goods or services with your card by
swipe and signature.

We will reintroduce chip-and-pin as soon as it is possible, following
consultation with the terminal manufacturer, card companies and the
relevant authorities.

Shell has nearly 1,000 outlets in the UK, 400 of which are run by
franchisees who will continue to use chip-and-pin.



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