Ross Philipson wrote:
>
> +static void __sha_transform(u32 *digest, const char *data)
> +{
> + u32 ws[SHA1_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
> +
> + sha1_transform(digest, data, ws);
> +
> + memzero_explicit(ws, sizeof(ws));
> +}
> +
> +void early_sha1_init(struct sha1_state *sctx)
> +{
> +
On Thu May 4, 2023 at 5:50 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
> The routine slaunch_setup is called out of the x86 specific setup_arch
> routine during early kernel boot. After determining what platform is
> present, various operations specific to that platform occur. This
> includes finalizing
On Thu May 4, 2023 at 5:50 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
> Introduce the Secure Launch Resource Table which forms the formal
> interface between the pre and post launch code.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson
> ---
> include/linux/slr_table.h | 270
>
On Thu May 4, 2023 at 5:50 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
> On Intel, the APs are left in a well documented state after TXT performs
> the late launch. Specifically they cannot have #INIT asserted on them so
> a standard startup via INIT/SIPI/SIPI cannot be performed. Instead the
> early SL stub
On 5/9/23 01:15, Sourabh Jain wrote:
On 04/05/23 04:11, Eric DeVolder wrote:
The hotplug support for kexec_load() requires coordination with
userspace, and therefore a little extra help from the kernel to
facilitate the coordination.
In the absence of the solution contained within this
On 5/9/23 17:52, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
On Wed, May 03 2023 at 18:41, Eric DeVolder wrote:
In the patch 'kexec: exclude elfcorehdr from the segment digest'
See reply to 8/8
yep
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 53bab123a8ee..80538524c494 100644
---
On 5/9/23 17:39, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
On Wed, May 03 2023 at 18:41, Eric DeVolder wrote:
This patch is dependent upon the patch 'crash: change
Seriously? You send a patch series which is ordered in itself and then
tell in the changelog of patch 8/8 that it depends on patch 7/8?
This
On Thu May 4, 2023 at 5:50 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
> From: "Daniel P. Smith"
>
> The Secure Launch platform module is a late init module. During the
> init call, the TPM event log is read and measurements taken in the
> early boot stub code are located. These measurements are extended
>
On Thu May 4, 2023 at 5:50 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote:
> From: "Daniel P. Smith"
>
> The Secure Launch platform module is a late init module. During the
> init call, the TPM event log is read and measurements taken in the
> early boot stub code are located. These measurements are extended
>
On Wed May 10, 2023 at 4:21 AM EEST, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:15PM +, Ross Philipson wrote:
> > From: "Daniel P. Smith"
> >
> > The SHA algorithms are necessary to measure configuration information into
> > the TPM as early as possible before using the values. This
On Mon, May 01, 2023 at 09:54:43PM +0200, Ricardo Ribalda wrote:
> On Mon, 1 May 2023 at 19:41, Conor Dooley wrote:
> > On Mon, May 01, 2023 at 02:38:22PM +0200, Ricardo Ribalda wrote:
> > > If PGO is enabled, the purgatory ends up with multiple .text sections.
> > > This is not supported by
On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:09PM +, Ross Philipson wrote:
> This patchset provides detailed documentation of DRTM, the approach used for
> adding the capbility, and relevant API/ABI documentation. In addition to the
> documentation the patch set introduces Intel TXT support as the first
The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and
later AMD SKINIT) to vector to during the late launch. The symbol
sl_stub_entry is that entry point and its offset into the kernel is
conveyed to the launching code using the MLE (Measured Launch
Environment) header in the
Introduce background, overview and configuration/ABI information
for the Secure Launch kernel feature.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson
---
Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/security/launch-integrity/index.rst | 10 +
On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:11PM +, Ross Philipson wrote:
> +=
> +System Launch Integrity documentation
> +=
> +
> +.. toctree::
By convention, doc toctree have 2-level depth (only page title and
first-level headings
Hi Dan
on 5/8/2023 5:45 PM, Zhijian Li (Fujitsu) wrote:
> Dan,
>
>
> On 29/04/2023 02:59, Dan Williams wrote:
>> Li Zhijian wrote:
>>> Hello folks,
>>>
>>> About 2 months ago, we posted our first RFC[3] and received your kindly
>>> feedback. Thank you :)
>>> Now, I'm back with the code.
>>>
>>>
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