Re: [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset

2024-03-22 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 3/22/24 10:18, H. Peter Anvin wrote: On March 21, 2024 6:45:48 AM PDT, "Daniel P. Smith" wrote: Hi Ard! On 2/15/24 02:56, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:31, Ross Philipson wrote: From: Arvind Sankar There are use cases for storing the offset o

Re: [PATCH v8 14/15] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module

2024-03-21 Thread Daniel P. Smith
Hi Ard, On 2/23/24 04:36, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: On Thu, 22 Feb 2024 at 14:58, Daniel P. Smith wrote: On 2/15/24 03:40, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:32, Ross Philipson wrote: From: "Daniel P. Smith" The Secure Launch platform module is a late init modu

Re: [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset

2024-03-21 Thread Daniel P. Smith
Hi Ard! On 2/15/24 02:56, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:31, Ross Philipson wrote: From: Arvind Sankar There are use cases for storing the offset of a symbol in kernel_info. For example, the trenchboot series [0] needs to store the offset of the Measured Launch Environment

Re: [PATCH v8 14/15] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module

2024-02-22 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 2/15/24 03:40, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:32, Ross Philipson wrote: From: "Daniel P. Smith" The Secure Launch platform module is a late init module. During the init call, the TPM event log is read and measurements taken in the early boot stub code a

Re: [PATCH v7 02/13] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation

2024-01-31 Thread Daniel P. Smith
st to help is no small undertaking. V/r, Daniel P. Smith ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

Re: [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file

2023-07-07 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 6/16/23 16:15, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 04:01:09PM -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote: On 5/15/23 21:43, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Mon, May 15, 2023 at 08:41:00PM -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote: On 5/15/23 17:22, Matthew Garrett wrote: What if I don't use grub, but use

Re: [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file

2023-06-16 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/15/23 21:43, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Mon, May 15, 2023 at 08:41:00PM -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote: On 5/15/23 17:22, Matthew Garrett wrote: What if I don't use grub, but use something that behaves equivalently? Which value should be used here? Generally we would request

Re: [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation

2023-06-16 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 6/16/23 12:54, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Fri, Jun 16, 2023 at 12:44:27PM -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote: On 5/12/23 06:47, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:11PM +, Ross Philipson wrote: +Secure Launch does not interoperate with KASLR. If possible, the MLE should

Re: [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation

2023-06-16 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/12/23 06:47, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:11PM +, Ross Philipson wrote: +Secure Launch does not interoperate with KASLR. If possible, the MLE should be +built with KASLR disabled:: Why does Secure Launch not interoperate with KASLR? Re: IOMMUs Until the

Re: [PATCH v6 13/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch

2023-05-15 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/12/23 12:22, Ross Philipson wrote: On 5/12/23 07:43, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:22PM +, Ross Philipson wrote: The Secure Launch MLE environment uses PCRs that are only accessible from the DRTM locality 2. By default the TPM drivers always initialize the

Re: [PATCH v6 11/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths

2023-05-15 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/15/23 14:16, Ross Philipson wrote: On 5/12/23 07:40, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:20PM +, Ross Philipson wrote: If the MLE kernel is being powered off, rebooted or halted, then SEXIT must be called. Note that the SEXIT GETSEC leaf can only be called after a

Re: [PATCH v6 07/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub

2023-05-15 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/12/23 12:17, Ross Philipson wrote: On 5/12/23 07:26, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:16PM +, Ross Philipson wrote: +static void sl_find_event_log(struct slr_table *slrt) If this is called after the EFI stub then we're presumably post-ExitBootServices and we're

Re: [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements

2023-05-15 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/10/23 23:33, Herbert Xu wrote: Ross Philipson wrote: +static void __sha_transform(u32 *digest, const char *data) +{ + u32 ws[SHA1_WORKSPACE_WORDS]; + + sha1_transform(digest, data, ws); + + memzero_explicit(ws, sizeof(ws)); +} + +void early_sha1_init(struct sha1_state

Re: [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file

2023-05-15 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/15/23 17:22, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Mon, May 15, 2023 at 05:15:15PM -0400, Daniel P. Smith wrote: On 5/12/23 06:55, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:13PM +, Ross Philipson wrote: +#define SLR_TABLE_MAGIC0x4452544d From convention I'd expect

Re: [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements

2023-05-15 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/9/23 21:21, Eric Biggers wrote: On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:15PM +, Ross Philipson wrote: From: "Daniel P. Smith" The SHA algorithms are necessary to measure configuration information into the TPM as early as possible before using the values. This implement

Re: [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file

2023-05-15 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/12/23 06:55, Matthew Garrett wrote: On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:13PM +, Ross Philipson wrote: +#define SLR_TABLE_MAGIC0x4452544d From convention I'd expect this to be 0x534c5254, but not really an issue. Apologies, but which convention? +/* SLR defined

Re: [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file

2023-05-15 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/10/23 19:04, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: On Thu May 4, 2023 at 5:50 PM EEST, Ross Philipson wrote: Introduce the Secure Launch Resource Table which forms the formal interface between the pre and post launch code. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson --- include/linux/slr_table.h | 270

Re: [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements

2023-05-09 Thread Daniel P. Smith
On 5/5/23 12:34, Simon Horman wrote: On Thu, May 04, 2023 at 02:50:15PM +, Ross Philipson wrote: From: "Daniel P. Smith" The SHA algorithms are necessary to measure configuration information into the TPM as early as possible before using the values. This implement

Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support

2022-02-25 Thread Daniel P. Smith
everal use cases that are not otherwise possible. Please see my response to Paul Moore or visit trenchboot.org/events to see the numerous talks on usages and capabilities that are possible because of DRTM. V/r, Daniel P. Smith ___ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec