You may be aware that a previous event called CryptoParty was
organized during the OpenITP Tech Summit on 27th November.
However, the organizers required people to give their real ID in
order to participate, requirement that was considered as not
acceptable by a number of people, including
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/11/29/facebook_likes_skype_used_to_build_fbi_case_against_california_terrorism.html
Feds Monitor Facebook Likes, Infiltrate Skype Chats To Build Terrorism Case
By Ryan Gallagher
Posted Thursday, Nov. 29, 2012, at 4:33 PM ET
A like sign at the
For Iran's case, the government can cut off the Internet at any time but the
problem at this stage which they have tried to solve it is the
bank/military/etc. communication. If the Iranian government wants to cut the
Internet, their communication will cut as well and because of it, they want to
I think this report will be useful:
http://smallmedia.org.uk/sites/default/files/Satellite%20Jamming.pdf
Sent from my iPhone
On 30 Nov 2012, at 20:05, Joel Harding joel.k.h...@gmail.com wrote:
I have some serious doubts if this is even possible. My thoughts are
that an antenna strong enough
..on Sat, Dec 01, 2012 at 10:31:25AM +, dan jones wrote:
You may be aware that a previous event called CryptoParty was
organized during the OpenITP Tech Summit on 27th November.
However, the organizers required people to give their real ID in
order to participate, requirement that
Secdev detected BGP announcements from Syria as of 7:30 AM Eastern
standard time.
For our initial monitoring we look at the updates that are broadcast,
because dumps of those are available every 15 minutes. However a more
complete status is available every two hours, which will provide
better
On December 1st at approximately 14:30 GMT x-apple-data-detectors://1,
SecDev's Syria Operations Group monitoring the Syrian Internet witnessed a
substantial amount of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) route update
announcements related to Syrian Internet Protocol (IP) blocks. The
announcements were
are you sure?
https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/IR.html
On Nov 30, 2012, at 11:15 PM, Amir Rahmati wrote:
Nice article. The information about Iran is inaccurate though. Iran only has
2 ASes which are both controlled by the government. They can easily limit or
cut internet access at
This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria
Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware
taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus,
http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1
It looks like the
And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that internal
investigation Blue coat were running.
I also wonder what happened with that Dubai distributor?
Something tells me they're still doing business.
Restrictions make no difference in these cases when you have one company
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
- From memory (anyone knowing the please correct me if I am wrong) but the
London Cryptoparty which was held in the Google Campus also required real names
for health and safety reasons. This didn't stop people from signing-up with
fake e-mail
If anyone can get the name of the office or location, or specific names
of Syrian authorities involved, I might be able to do something with that.
Douglas
Email/PGP: d...@riseup.net 880B7171.
On 12/01/2012 01:36 PM, Bernard Tyers wrote:
About the photo: is there any idea where that photo was
Oh, I'm with you - I just wanted to send it along in case there were folks
who hadn't heard about it.
On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 11:44 AM, Bernard Tyers ei8...@ei8fdb.org wrote:
And reading that article now, I wonder what ever happened to that
internal investigation Blue coat were running.
I
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
True - it would be useful for a journalist to make some enquiries as to the
outcome of that investigation. My guess would be nothing.
It's also interesting that the article says 14 SG9000s made their way to Syria
- and there are 8 being used in
Can anyone pull the exif data from the photo? I'm not having any luck, but
I'm an amateur.
On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 12:06 PM, Douglas Lucas d...@riseup.net wrote:
If anyone can get the name of the office or location, or specific names
of Syrian authorities involved, I might be able to do
As I wrote in the initial post, this tweet picture *allegedly* shows
equipment in Damascus. That needs to be verified. These are, after all,
exciting and excitable times :-)
Rafal
Sent by PsiPhone mobile. Please excuse typos or other oddities.
On 2012-12-01, at 3:34 PM, Jillian C. York
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
On 01/12/2012 19:44, Bernard Tyers wrote: I also wonder what
happened with that Dubai distributor?
Last I heard was that, about a year ago, the US dept of commerce put
restrictions on a man called Waseem Jawad who was operating in the UAE
under the
Actually, the whole bandwidth comes from one source and then divides amongst
ISPs
Sent from my iPhone
On 1 Dec 2012, at 18:30, Burkov Dmitry dvb...@gmail.com wrote:
are you sure?
https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/IR.html
On Nov 30, 2012, at 11:15 PM, Amir Rahmati wrote:
Nice
Here's the original posting from Facebook:
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=433109386756486set=a.190671704333590.47245.188677754532985type=1
Worth trying that version for EXIF data?
The caption reads, roughly:
*Damascus | 12-1 | Pictures of a Damascus comm hubs showing the devices
used
All of the smaller ASes have to go through ITC to reach outside networks.
This also makes the filtering/DPI much easier as it can all happen at the
ITC gateway.
--
Amir
On Sat, Dec 1, 2012 at 1:30 PM, Burkov Dmitry dvb...@gmail.com wrote:
are you sure?
There is another photo that is on a Tarasul/STE Facebook fan page that
shows the same rack and some of the rest of the data center, that has been
around since this summer.
As for the rest of the devices, they are hooked up and functioning, just in
a different rack. There is a internal network
Here is a link to the Hauwei diagrams and internal structure of Tarassul. I'll
add other stuff as I dig it up.
https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0B2zVAXgUsk22Mk9NeHNQLVZ3VFU/edit
-Andrew
On Dec 2, 2012, at 11:38 AM, Andrew Lewis m...@andrewlew.is wrote:
There is another photo that is on a
Hi everyone,
Le 01/12/2012 20:36, Bernard Tyers a écrit :
About the photo: is there any idea where that photo was taken, and what
date? Is it possible to get photos of the back of the rack?
A similar picture was seen quite a while ago, on what was said to be the
official Tarassul (main ISP in
Both are dead now apparently.
On Dec 2, 2012, at 12:30 PM, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote:
Hi everyone,
Le 01/12/2012 20:36, Bernard Tyers a écrit :
About the photo: is there any idea where that photo was taken, and what
date? Is it possible to get photos of the back of the rack?
A
Hey, I'm thinking something that could be a total nonsense, but just in
case I would like to share my thougths.
Le 01/12/2012 19:39, Rafal Rohozinski a écrit :
This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the
Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet
As @MTarro stated:
http://twitter.com/MTarro/status/275097615727726593
Just bizarre to read the @BaltoSpectator swat situation play out on
Twitter. Almost like seeing IDF and Hamas tweet attacks.
Lots to sort out here, but certainly a few things to talk about. Here's
some loosely vetted
I should add that, gauging from @BaltoSpectator's tweets over the last
24 hours or so, his feelings about the detainment or commitment, and/or
the act of revealing them, may have precipitated tonight's event.
On 12/01/2012 11:49 PM, Douglas Lucas wrote:
In the most recent post on his site, dated
Hi,
I wonder - has anyone been scanning (for) X.25 pads in Syria?
Leased lines such as the one in Alexandria stayed up in Egypt during the
killswitch flipping; the same was true for X.25.
I guess neither of those will rely on IP networks and thus BGP route
withdraw won't impact them very much,
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