[liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Brian Conley
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/02/14/frost-attack-unlocks-android-phones-data-by-chilling-its-memory-in-a-freezer/ -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Steve Weis
This is a good illustration how data in use is exposed to physical attacks on most computing devices. An interesting side-note is that Android phones are starting to ship with a hardware security module (HSM), which can be used for crypto operations and key storage. Duo Security is one company

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Brian Conley
Thanks Steve, Any idea why the researchers would posit that iOS devices may be less susceptible? Brian On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:08 AM, Steve Weis stevew...@gmail.com wrote: This is a good illustration how data in use is exposed to physical attacks on most computing devices. An

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Parker Higgins
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 2/21/13 10:32 AM, Brian Conley wrote: Any idea why the researchers would posit that iOS devices may be less susceptible? Not sure if this is what they have in mind, but this particular technique requires a battery pop to get into fastboot mode,

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Brian Conley
hrm, also true for the newest line of google nexus i believe. On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:37 AM, Parker Higgins par...@eff.org wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 2/21/13 10:32 AM, Brian Conley wrote: Any idea why the researchers would posit that iOS devices may be

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
Brian Conley: hrm, also true for the newest line of google nexus i believe. In any phone where one might be able to open the case, I assume someone will also just be able to tap the bus lines. Thus, the easy route (booting off of a special image) might not be simple but these devices aren't

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Brian Conley
Always trust Jake to cut right to the bare honest ugly (and depressing!) truth. thanks! B On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:48 AM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.netwrote: Brian Conley: hrm, also true for the newest line of google nexus i believe. In any phone where one might be able to open

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Michael Rogers
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 21/02/13 18:32, Brian Conley wrote: Any idea why the researchers would posit that iOS devices may be less susceptible? iOS has several classes of encrypted storage. For the NSFileProtectionComplete class, the class key that protects the

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
Brian Conley: Always trust Jake to cut right to the bare honest ugly (and depressing!) truth. If you really want to be depressed about mobile security, I encourage you to acquire the cellebrite UFED forensics device: http://www.cellebrite.com/mobile-forensic-products/ufed-touch-ultimate.html

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Nadim Kobeissi
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 2:08 PM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.netwrote: It seems like one of the few times the use of something like TRESOR would improve: http://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/tresor TRESOR looks very interesting! I wonder what's preventing its kind of techniques from

Re: [liberationtech] Freeze the memory out of a galaxy nexus?

2013-02-21 Thread Steve Weis
TRESOR uses debug registers and only protects key material. It doesn't protect the code that actually reads that key in or out of the register, nor any of the data that is actually decrypted with the key. So, it provides protection just for keys against passive, read-only attacks against memory.