Re: [liberationtech] Announcing a privacy preserving authentication protocol

2013-03-21 Thread Rich Kulawiec
On Tue, Mar 12, 2013 at 06:31:56PM -0500, Kyle Maxwell wrote: A. This doesn't eliminate phishing because users will still enter their credentials at a site that doesn't actually match the one where the cert was previously signed. Otherwise, existing HTTPS controls would already protect them.

Re: [liberationtech] Announcing a privacy preserving authentication protocol

2013-03-21 Thread Guido Witmond
On 03/21/2013 09:02 PM, Rich Kulawiec wrote: True, but phishing is not currently a solvable problem anyway; it falls into a class of problems that can't be solved no matter how much clever technology is developed because all of that technology presumes that end user systems are secure...and

Re: [liberationtech] Announcing a privacy preserving authentication protocol

2013-03-13 Thread Petter Ericson
Well, given that protocol uses essentially now new tech (apart from the message bit, which to me looks a bit superfluous), it should require relatively little time to implement properly. Furthermore, there are various parts of the protocol that are Good Ideas, independently of the other parts -

Re: [liberationtech] Announcing a privacy preserving authentication protocol

2013-03-13 Thread Guido Witmond
Thank you for your concerns, I think I have the issues you mention covered in the 'protocol' On 03/13/2013 12:31 AM, Kyle Maxwell wrote: I appreciate the intention, but I see a lot of problems here. Without doing an exhaustive analysis: A. This doesn't eliminate phishing because users will

Re: [liberationtech] Announcing a privacy preserving authentication protocol

2013-03-13 Thread Guido Witmond
On 03/13/2013 08:33 AM, Petter Ericson wrote: Kyle: A. This doesn't eliminate phishing because users will still enter their credentials at a site that doesn't actually match the one where the cert was previously signed. Otherwise, existing HTTPS controls would already protect them. Not