Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Am Samstag, 9. November 2013, 23:04:07 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: Hi Clemens, > Stephan Mueller wrote: > > Am Donnerstag, 7. November 2013, 02:03:57 schrieb Nicholas Mc Guire: > >> On Wed, 06 Nov 2013, Stephan Mueller wrote: > >>> Besides, how on earth shall an attacker even gain knowledge about th

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Am Samstag, 9. November 2013, 23:04:49 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: Hi Clemens, > Stephan Mueller wrote: > > Am Mittwoch, 6. November 2013, 08:04:32 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: > >> On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 01:51:17PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote: > That's unfortunate, since it leaves open the questio

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller wrote: > Am Donnerstag, 7. November 2013, 02:03:57 schrieb Nicholas Mc Guire: >> On Wed, 06 Nov 2013, Stephan Mueller wrote: >>> Besides, how on earth shall an attacker even gain knowledge about the >>> state of the CPU or disable CPU mechanisms? Oh, I forgot, your NSA >>> guy. But

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller wrote: > Am Mittwoch, 6. November 2013, 08:04:32 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: >> On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 01:51:17PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote: That's unfortunate, since it leaves open the question of whether this jitter is something that could be at least somewhat predictable

[PATCH] CRYPTO: async_tx: Fixed a couple of typos

Fixed 2 typos in async_xor.c --- crypto/async_tx/async_xor.c |4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/async_tx/async_xor.c b/crypto/async_tx/async_xor.c index 8ade0a0..bcaa1e9 100644 --- a/crypto/async_tx/async_xor.c +++ b/crypto/async_tx/async_xor.c @@ -48