Re: [RFC] /dev/random for in-kernel use

2014-04-27 Thread Stephan Mueller
Am Sonntag, 27. April 2014, 20:19:41 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: Hi Theodore, > On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 08:49:48PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > With the heavy update of random.c during the 3.13 development, the > > re-seeding of the nonblocking_pool from the input_pool is now prevented > > for a

RE: [PATCH] crypto: caam - Fix key inlining in AEAD shared descriptors

2014-04-27 Thread Ruchika Gupta
Reviewed-by: Ruchika Gupta > -Original Message- > From: Vakul Garg [mailto:va...@freescale.com] > Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2014 8:56 PM > To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org > Cc: herb...@gondor.apana.org.au; Geanta Neag Horia Ioan-B05471; Gupta > Ruchika-R66431; Porosanu Alexandru-B06830 > S

Re: [RFC] /dev/random for in-kernel use

2014-04-27 Thread Theodore Ts'o
On Sun, Apr 27, 2014 at 08:49:48PM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote: > With the heavy update of random.c during the 3.13 development, the re-seeding > of the nonblocking_pool from the input_pool is now prevented for a duration > of > random_min_urandom_seed seconds. Furthermore, the nonblocking_pool

[RFC] /dev/random for in-kernel use

2014-04-27 Thread Stephan Mueller
Hi, before I start, please allow me to point out that this email is not a discussion about entropy. There was already too much such discussion without any conclusion. This email shall just explore the pros and cons as well as an implementation of making the logic behind /dev/random available fo