On (04/03/18 19:13), Vaneet Narang wrote:
> Hi Sergey,
>
> >You shrink a 2 bytes offset down to a 1 byte offset, thus you enforce that
> 2 Byte offset is not shrinked to 1 byte, Its only 1 bit is reserved out of
> 16 bits of offset. So only 15 Bits can be used to store offset value.
Yes, you are
Hi all,
While doing some static analysis I came across the following piece of code at
drivers/crypto/chelsio/chtls/chtls_io.c:1203:
1203 if (!size)
1204 break;
1205
1206 if (unlikely(ULP_SKB_CB(skb)->flags &
ULPCB_FLAG_NO_APPEND))
1207
On 03/30/2018 01:53 AM, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
All ciphers implemented in Linux have a block size less than or
equal to 16 bytes and the most demanding hw require 16 bytes
alignment for the block buffer.
We avoid 2 VLAs[1] by always allocating 16 bytes with 16 bytes
alignment, unless the
Add null checks on lookup_tid() return value in order to prevent
null pointer dereferences.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1467422 ("Dereference null return value")
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1467443 ("Dereference null return value")
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1467445 ("Dereference null return value")
Hi Sergey,
>You shrink a 2 bytes offset down to a 1 byte offset, thus you enforce that
2 Byte offset is not shrinked to 1 byte, Its only 1 bit is reserved out of
16 bits of offset. So only 15 Bits can be used to store offset value.
>'page should be less than 32KB', which I'm sure will be
On (04/02/18 11:21), Maninder Singh wrote:
[..]
> >> static const char * const backends[] = {
> >> "lzo",
> >> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZ4)
> >> "lz4",
> >> +#if (PAGE_SIZE < (32 * KB))
> >> +"lz4_dyn",
> >> +#endif
> >
> >This is not the list of supported
On 03/31/2018 07:30 PM, Gilad Ben-Yossef wrote:
...
>> Are there other crypto drivers doing this?
>
> I thought the exact same thing until I ran into a presentation about the s390
> secure keys implementation. I basically imitated their use (or abuse?)
> of the Crypto API
> assuming it is the way
On Sat, Mar 31, 2018 at 08:30:46PM +0300, Gilad Ben-Yossef wrote:
>
> However, as it uses the exact same mechanism of the regular xts-aes-ccree
> but takes the key from another source, I've marked it with a test of
> alg_test_null() on the premise that if the xts-aes-ccree works, so must this.
On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 09:01:02AM +0300, Tudor Ambarus wrote:
>
> I set the err inside the if branch so that the compiler will
> warn me in case of undefined value for err. Like here:
>
> https://rusty.ozlabs.org/?p=232
Yes but then sometimes the compiler will get it wrong and we will
then have
In crypto_authenc_esn_setkey we save pointers to the authenc keys
in a local variable of type struct crypto_authenc_keys and we don't
zeroize it after use. Fix this and don't leak pointers to the
authenc keys.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus
---
crypto/authencesn.c | 1
In crypto_authenc_setkey we save pointers to the authenc keys in
a local variable of type struct crypto_authenc_keys and we don't
zeroize it after use. Fix this and don't leak pointers to the
authenc keys.
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus
---
crypto/authenc.c | 1 +
1
On 03/30/2018 08:27 PM, Herbert Xu wrote:
On Mon, Mar 26, 2018 at 02:59:06PM +0300, Tudor Ambarus wrote:
Remove useless assignment of ret to -ENOMEM in rsa_verify.
Remove useless initialization of ret to zero at declaration in
rsa_enc/dec/sign/verify.
Benefit of the power of undefined values
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