Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Donnerstag, 7. November 2013, 02:03:57 schrieb Nicholas Mc Guire: On Wed, 06 Nov 2013, Stephan Mueller wrote: Besides, how on earth shall an attacker even gain knowledge about the state of the CPU or disable CPU mechanisms? Oh, I forgot, your NSA guy. But if he is

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Mittwoch, 6. November 2013, 08:04:32 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 01:51:17PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote: That's unfortunate, since it leaves open the question of whether this jitter is something that could be at least somewhat predictable if you

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Samstag, 9. November 2013, 23:04:49 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Mittwoch, 6. November 2013, 08:04:32 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 01:51:17PM +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote: That's unfortunate, since it leaves open the question

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Sonntag, 10. November 2013, 17:31:07 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: In the case of CPUs, the jitter you observe in delta times results in part from the complexities of the inner state, and in part from real random noise. The first part is deterministic and might

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Sonntag, 10. November 2013, 21:28:06 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: Many CPUs allow to disable branch prediction, but this is very vendor specific (try to find MSR documentation). The biggest offender probably is the out-of-order execution engine, which cannot be disabled

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Mittwoch, 13. November 2013, 12:51:44 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: (And any setting that increases accesses to main memory is likey to introduce more entropy due to clock drift between the processor and the memory bus. Or where do you assume the entropy comes from

Re: [PATCH] CPU Jitter RNG: inclusion into kernel crypto API and /dev/random

Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Donnerstag, 14. November 2013, 11:51:03 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: An attacker would not try to detect patterns; he would apply knowledge of the internals. I do not buy that argument, because if an attacker can detect or deduce the internals of the CPU, he surely can

Re: [RFC PATCH] char: random: stir the output pools differently when the random_write lenght allows splitting the seed

Rafael Aquini wrote: This patch introduces changes to the random_write method so it can split the given seed and completely stir the output pools with different halves of it, when seed lenght allows us doing so. - ret = write_pool(blocking_pool, buffer, count); + ret =

Re: [RFC PATCH] char: random: stir the output pools differently when the random_write lenght allows splitting the seed

Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Freitag, 10. Januar 2014, 09:13:57 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: Rafael Aquini wrote: This patch introduces changes to the random_write method so it can split the given seed and completely stir the output pools with different halves of it, when seed lenght allows us doing

Re: [RFC PATCH] char: random: stir the output pools differently when the random_write lenght allows splitting the seed

Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Freitag, 10. Januar 2014, 12:37:26 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: Stephan Mueller wrote: Am Freitag, 10. Januar 2014, 09:13:57 schrieb Clemens Ladisch: Rafael Aquini wrote: This patch introduces changes to the random_write method so it can split the given seed

Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator

Stephan Mueller wrote: This is a clean-room implementation of the DRBG defined in SP800-90A. Why? I guess it's for certification? +static bool drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg, + unsigned char *buf) ... + ret = memcmp(drbg-prev, buf,

Re: [PATCH] hwrng: alea - Add support for Araneus Alea I USB RNG

Bob Ham wrote: > Adds support for the Araneus Alea I USB hardware Random Number > Generator. This RNG creates entropy at a high rate, about 100kb/s. > > Signed-off-by: Bob Ham > --- > > +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/alea.c Why didn't you just add the device ID to