On Wed, Jan 27, 2021 at 04:49:11PM +0800, Cao jin wrote:
> struct setup_data.len is the length of data field. In case of
> SETUP_INDIRECT, it should be sizeof(setup_indirect).
>
> Signed-off-by: Cao jin
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper
Daniel
Hey,
This is next attempt to create firmware and bootloader log specification.
Due to high interest among industry it is an extension to the initial
bootloader log only specification. It takes into the account most of the
comments which I got up until now.
The goal is to pass all logs produced
On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 01:18:22PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 19, 2020 at 04:51:53PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 04:51:51PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> > > On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:26:54PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > >
On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 04:51:51PM -0400, Arvind Sankar wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 08:26:54PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >
> > I am discussing with Ross the other option. We can create
> > .rodata.mle_header section and put it at fixed offset as
> > kernel_info
On Tue, Sep 29, 2020 at 10:03:47AM -0400, Ross Philipson wrote:
> On 9/25/20 3:18 PM, Arvind Sankar wrote:
[...]
> > You should see them if you do
> > readelf -r arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux
> >
> > In terms of the code, things like:
> >
> > addl%ebx, (sl_gdt_desc + 2)(%ebx)
> >
On Fri, May 29, 2020 at 10:11:40AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > On May 29, 2020, at 4:30 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >
> > Hey,
> >
> > Below you can find my rough idea of the bootloader log format which is
> > generic thing but initially will be u
Hey,
Below you can find my rough idea of the bootloader log format which is
generic thing but initially will be used for TrenchBoot work. I discussed
this proposal with Ross and Daniel S. So, the idea went through initial
sanitization. Now I would like to take feedback from other folks too.
So,
Hi Łukasz,
On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 04:38:02PM +0200, Lukasz Hawrylko wrote:
> On Tue, 2020-05-05 at 01:21 +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > This is an RFC patchset for the GRUB introducing the Intel TXT secure
> > launcher.
> > This is a part of la
On Wed, May 06, 2020 at 11:36:49AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Wed, May 6, 2020 at 6:33 AM Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:29:05AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 4:25 PM Daniel Kiper
> > > wrote:
> >
On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:29:05AM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Mon, May 4, 2020 at 4:25 PM Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >
> > Otherwise the kernel does not know its state and cannot enable various
> > security features depending on UEFI Secure Boot.
>
> I th
From: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/loader/i386/txt/txt.c | 887
include/grub/i386/memory.h | 5 +
2 files changed, 892 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/loader/i386/txt/txt.c
Otherwise the kernel does not know its state and cannot enable various
security features depending on UEFI Secure Boot.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c | 86 ++-
include/grub/i386/linux.h
It will be used by Intel TXT secure launcher introduced
by subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/commands/i386/tpm.c | 182 ++
include/grub/i386/tpm.h | 36 +
2 files changed, 218 insertions(+)
create mode 100644
..to avoid naming collision with TPM TIS and CRB driver introduced
by subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
docs/grub.texi | 15 ---
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 4 ++--
grub-core/commands/{tpm.c => tpm_verifier.c} |
.. to grub_rdmsr() and grub_wrmsr() respectively. New names are more
obvious than older ones.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/commands/i386/rdmsr.c | 2 +-
grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c | 2 +-
include/grub/i386/msr.h | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions
From: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
include/grub/i386/txt.h | 690
1 file changed, 690 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/grub/i386/txt.h
diff --git a/include/grub/i386/txt.h b/include/grub
From: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/loader/i386/txt/acmod.c | 575 ++
1 file changed, 575 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/loader/i386/txt/acmod.c
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/txt
From: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/Makefile.am| 3 +
grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 15 +++
grub-core/lib/i386/relocator32.S | 8 ++
grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c | 7 ++
grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c| 206
The functions calculate lowest and highest available RAM
addresses respectively.
Both functions are needed to calculate PMR boundaries for
Intel TXT secure launcher introduced by subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/mmap/mmap.c | 64
From: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
include/grub/i386/cpuid.h | 13
include/grub/i386/crfr.h | 186 ++
include/grub/i386/mmio.h | 90 ++
include/grub/i386/msr.h | 61
It will be used to properly detect and report UEFI Secure Boot status to
the x86 Linux kernel. The functionality will be added by subsequent patches.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 16 +---
include/grub/efi/efi.h | 5
From: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/loader/i386/txt/verify.c | 297 +
1 file changed, 297 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 grub-core/loader/i386/txt/verify.c
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/txt
This is needed to properly detect and report UEFI Secure Boot status
to the x86 Linux kernel. The functionality will be added by subsequent
patches.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/commands/efi/efifwsetup.c | 8
grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c| 16 +---
grub
Hi,
This is an RFC patchset for the GRUB introducing the Intel TXT secure launcher.
This is a part of larger work known as the TrenchBoot. Patchset can be split
into two distinct parts:
- 01-12: preparatory patches,
- 13-18: the Intel TXT secure launcher itself.
The initial implementation of
It does not make sense to have separate headers for separate static
functions. Additionally, we have to add some constants with MSR addresses
in subsequent patches. So, make one common place to store them.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/commands/i386/rdmsr.c | 2 +-
grub-core
Subsequent patches will use that constant.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/loader/i386/xen.c | 35 +--
include/grub/i386/memory.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/xen.c b/grub-core/loader
..to avoid potential conflicts and confusion.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/lib/i386/xen/relocator.S | 6 +++---
grub-core/lib/x86_64/xen/relocator.S | 4 ++--
grub-core/loader/i386/xen.c | 28 ++--
include/grub/i386/memory.h | 2 +-
4
The GUID will be used to properly detect and report UEFI Secure Boot
status to the x86 Linux kernel. The functionality will be added by
subsequent patches. The shim_lock protocol type is made public for
completeness.
Additionally, fix formatting of four preceding GUIDs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel
GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE instead of GRUB_ERR_BUG to signal
an error because errors encountered by this new routine are not bugs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
grub-core/commands/i386/rdmsr.c | 21 +
grub-core/commands/i386/wrmsr.c | 21 +
include/grub/i386/msr.h | 29
On Tue, Oct 01, 2019 at 03:28:01PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 2019-10-01 04:41, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >
> > OK, so, this is more or less what I had in my v3 patch before sending
> > this email. So, it looks that I am on good track. Great! Though I am not
> > sur
I am working on new version of patches but I have some concerns. Please
look below for more details...
On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 03:06:30PM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> On 5/24/19 2:55 AM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Due to limited space left in the setup header it was decided to
>
On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 01:30:46PM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 06, 2019 at 01:51:08PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 10:01:17AM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 03:50:31PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
&
On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 10:01:17AM -0400, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 03:50:31PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 11:55:02AM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > This change is needed to properly
On Fri, May 24, 2019 at 11:55:02AM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This change is needed to properly start the Linux kernel in Intel TXT mode and
> is a part of the TrenchBoot project (https://github.com/TrenchBoot).
>
> Daniel
>
> Documentation/x86/boo
-by: Daniel Kiper
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson
Reviewed-by: Eric Snowberg
---
I know that setup_header2 is not the best name. There were some
alternatives proposed like setup_header_extra, setup_header_addendum,
setup_header_more, ext_setup_header, extended_setup_header, extended_header
| 3 ++-
arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c | 8
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h| 1 +
9 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Daniel Kiper (2):
x86/boot: Introduce the setup_header2
x86/boot: Introduce dummy MLE header
DO NOT APPLY!!!
THIS PATCH INTRODUCES DUMMY MLE HEADER AND SIMPLY ILLUSTRATES HOW TO
EXTEND THE setup_header2 PROPERLY.
DO NOT APPLY!!!
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson
---
Documentation/x86/boot.txt | 6 ++
arch/x86
On Thu, Mar 28, 2019 at 11:15:53AM -0700, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
> So, per our conversation today, lets create a new, readonly, data structure
> pointed to by a single field in setup_header, in order to preserve what little
> space we have left in that structure (a whopping 24 bytes...)
>
> The new
On Fri, Mar 08, 2019 at 12:43:10PM +0100, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Documentation/x86/boot.txt is missing protocol 2.13 description.
>
> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper
Daniel
Commit-ID: a7012bdbdf406bbaa4e3de0cc3d8eb0faaacbf93
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/a7012bdbdf406bbaa4e3de0cc3d8eb0faaacbf93
Author: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 4 May 2018 07:59:47 +0200
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Mon,
Commit-ID: a7012bdbdf406bbaa4e3de0cc3d8eb0faaacbf93
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/a7012bdbdf406bbaa4e3de0cc3d8eb0faaacbf93
Author: Daniel Kiper
AuthorDate: Fri, 4 May 2018 07:59:47 +0200
Committer: Ingo Molnar
CommitDate: Mon, 14 May 2018 08:57:46 +0200
x86/xen/efi: Initialize
On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 10:15:15AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 11 April 2018 at 10:56, Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 12:38:24PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >> On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 10:00:52AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote
On Mon, Apr 16, 2018 at 10:15:15AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 11 April 2018 at 10:56, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 12:38:24PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >> On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 10:00:52AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> >> > On Tue, 201
On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 12:38:24PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 10:00:52AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Tue, 2018-04-03 at 18:07 +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > > On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 08:44:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
>
> [...]
&
On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 12:38:24PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 10:00:52AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Tue, 2018-04-03 at 18:07 +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > > On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 08:44:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
>
> [...]
&
On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 10:00:52AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-04-03 at 18:07 +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 08:44:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
[...]
> > > This looks like a bad idea: you're duplicating the secur
On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 10:00:52AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-04-03 at 18:07 +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 08:44:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
[...]
> > > This looks like a bad idea: you're duplicating the secur
On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 08:44:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-04-03 at 16:39 +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the
> > kernel
> > may not even know that it runs on secure boot enabled platfor
On Tue, Apr 03, 2018 at 08:44:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2018-04-03 at 16:39 +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the
> > kernel
> > may not even know that it runs on secure boot enabled platfor
Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the kernel
may not even know that it runs on secure boot enabled platform.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
---
arch/x86/xen/efi.c| 57 +
drivers/firmwa
Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the kernel
may not even know that it runs on secure boot enabled platform.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
arch/x86/xen/efi.c| 57 +
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
be automatic on
> > vmexit, by having it *only* in the guest's MSR-store area to be saved
> > on exit and restored on exit, but *not* in the host's MSR-store area?
s/on exit and restored on exit/on exit and restored on entry/?
Additionally, AIUI there is no "host's MSR-st
be automatic on
> > vmexit, by having it *only* in the guest's MSR-store area to be saved
> > on exit and restored on exit, but *not* in the host's MSR-store area?
s/on exit and restored on exit/on exit and restored on entry/?
Additionally, AIUI there is no "host's MSR-st
Hi Ard,
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 12:51:07PM +, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 9 January 2018 at 14:22, Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com> wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the kernel
> > may not even know th
Hi Ard,
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 12:51:07PM +, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 9 January 2018 at 14:22, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Initialize UEFI secure boot state during dom0 boot. Otherwise the kernel
> > may not even know that it runs on secure boot enab
code. Subsequent patch
will add efi_get_secureboot() call from Xen dom0 boot code.
There is no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot-core.c | 77
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secure
code. Subsequent patch
will add efi_get_secureboot() call from Xen dom0 boot code.
There is no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot-core.c | 77
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 66
Otherwise the kernel reports incorrect UEFI secure boot state in the Xen dom0.
By the way fix CFLAGS_mmu_pv.o assignment alignment.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
---
arch/x86/xen/Makefile |4 +++-
arch/x86/xen/efi.c| 11 +++
2 files chang
Otherwise the kernel reports incorrect UEFI secure boot state in the Xen dom0.
By the way fix CFLAGS_mmu_pv.o assignment alignment.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
arch/x86/xen/Makefile |4 +++-
arch/x86/xen/efi.c| 11 +++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion
Otherwise they are not freed after the kernel proper init.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
---
arch/x86/xen/efi.c |3 +++
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot-core.c | 12 ++--
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secure
Otherwise they are not freed after the kernel proper init.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
arch/x86/xen/efi.c |3 +++
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot-core.c | 12 ++--
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c |3 +++
3 files changed
/efi/libstub/secureboot-core.c | 77
+
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 66
+--
4 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
Daniel Kiper (4
This may help compiler to do some function call optimization.
This is rather cosmetic. If you like this patch apply.
If you do not you may ignore it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
---
arch/x86/xen/efi.c |2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/l
/efi/libstub/secureboot-core.c | 77
+
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c | 66
+--
4 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
Daniel Kiper (4
This may help compiler to do some function call optimization.
This is rather cosmetic. If you like this patch apply.
If you do not you may ignore it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
arch/x86/xen/efi.c |2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot-core.c |2
On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 11:16:39AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 10:39:10AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> >
> > * Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Hey Greg,
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jul
On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 11:16:39AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 20, 2017 at 10:39:10AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> >
> > * Daniel Kiper wrote:
> >
> > > Hey Greg,
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:43:32AM +0200, Greg Kroah
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 01:19:58PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 01:12:14PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 12:37:47PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > > Hey Greg,
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:43:
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 01:19:58PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 01:12:14PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 12:37:47PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > > Hey Greg,
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:43:
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 01:12:14PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 12:37:47PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Hey Greg,
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:43:32AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > 4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 01:12:14PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 12:37:47PM +0200, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Hey Greg,
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:43:32AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > 4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has
Hey Greg,
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:43:32AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
Why did you skip this patch for 4.11? IMO it should be applied there too.
Daniel
Hey Greg,
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 11:43:32AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 4.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
Why did you skip this patch for 4.11? IMO it should be applied there too.
Daniel
Commit-ID: 6c64447ec58b0bac612732303f7ab04562124587
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/6c64447ec58b0bac612732303f7ab04562124587
Author: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
AuthorDate: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 12:51:37 +0200
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Fri,
Commit-ID: 6c64447ec58b0bac612732303f7ab04562124587
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/6c64447ec58b0bac612732303f7ab04562124587
Author: Daniel Kiper
AuthorDate: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 12:51:37 +0200
Committer: Ingo Molnar
CommitDate: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 11:11:03 +0200
x86/xen/efi: Initialize
Commit-ID: 457ea3f7e97881f937136ce0ba1f29f82b9abdb0
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/457ea3f7e97881f937136ce0ba1f29f82b9abdb0
Author: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
AuthorDate: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 12:51:36 +0200
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org>
CommitDate: Fri,
Commit-ID: 457ea3f7e97881f937136ce0ba1f29f82b9abdb0
Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/457ea3f7e97881f937136ce0ba1f29f82b9abdb0
Author: Daniel Kiper
AuthorDate: Thu, 22 Jun 2017 12:51:36 +0200
Committer: Ingo Molnar
CommitDate: Fri, 23 Jun 2017 11:11:02 +0200
efi: Process the MEMATTR
used by
Xen to avoid such issues in the future.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheu...@linaro.org>
--
Align assignments to increase readability. Suggested by Ingo Molnar.
---
arch/x86/xen/
used by
Xen to avoid such issues in the future.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel
--
Align assignments to increase readability. Suggested by Ingo Molnar.
---
arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 45 -
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 33 deletions
Otherwise e.g. Xen dom0 on x86_64 EFI platforms crashes.
In theory we can check EFI_PARAVIRT too, however,
EFI_MEMMAP looks more generic and covers more cases.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheu...@linaro.org>
---
drivers/
Otherwise e.g. Xen dom0 on x86_64 EFI platforms crashes.
In theory we can check EFI_PARAVIRT too, however,
EFI_MEMMAP looks more generic and covers more cases.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel
---
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c |3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1
-
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c |3 ++-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
Daniel Kiper (2):
efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
-
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c |3 ++-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
Daniel Kiper (2):
efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
On Wed, Jun 21, 2017 at 11:24:06AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> > -static const struct efi efi_xen __initconst = {
> > - .systab = NULL, /* Initialized later. */
> > - .runtime_version
On Wed, Jun 21, 2017 at 11:24:06AM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Daniel Kiper wrote:
>
> > -static const struct efi efi_xen __initconst = {
> > - .systab = NULL, /* Initialized later. */
> > - .runtime_version = 0,/* Initial
On Wed, Jun 21, 2017 at 09:10:51AM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 20/06/2017 21:14, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Current approach, wholesale efi struct initialization from efi_xen, is not
> > good. Usually if new member is defined then it is properly initialized in
> > drive
On Wed, Jun 21, 2017 at 09:10:51AM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 20/06/2017 21:14, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > Current approach, wholesale efi struct initialization from efi_xen, is not
> > good. Usually if new member is defined then it is properly initialized in
> > drive
used by
Xen to avoid such issues in the future.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
---
arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 45 -
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
index 3
used by
Xen to avoid such issues in the future.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
arch/x86/xen/efi.c | 45 -
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
index 30bb2e8..01b9faf 100644
--- a/arch
Otherwise e.g. Xen dom0 on x86_64 EFI platforms crashes.
In theory we can check EFI_PARAVIRT too, however,
EFI_MEMMAP looks more generic and covers more cases.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com>
---
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c |3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions
Otherwise e.g. Xen dom0 on x86_64 EFI platforms crashes.
In theory we can check EFI_PARAVIRT too, however,
EFI_MEMMAP looks more generic and covers more cases.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper
---
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c |3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git
insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
Daniel Kiper (2):
efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
Daniel Kiper (2):
efi: Process MEMATTR table only if EFI_MEMMAP
x86/xen/efi: Init only efi struct members used by Xen
On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 08:37:38PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Wed, 19 Apr, at 09:29:06PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:46:50PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> > > On Thu, 06 Apr, at 04:55:11PM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > >
> > >
On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 08:37:38PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Wed, 19 Apr, at 09:29:06PM, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:46:50PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> > > On Thu, 06 Apr, at 04:55:11PM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > >
> > >
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:46:50PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Thu, 06 Apr, at 04:55:11PM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> >
> > Please, let's keep the Xen knowledge constrained to the Xen EFI wrapper,
> > rather than spreading it further.
> >
> > IMO, given reset_system is a *mandatory* function, the
On Tue, Apr 18, 2017 at 02:46:50PM +0100, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Thu, 06 Apr, at 04:55:11PM, Mark Rutland wrote:
> >
> > Please, let's keep the Xen knowledge constrained to the Xen EFI wrapper,
> > rather than spreading it further.
> >
> > IMO, given reset_system is a *mandatory* function, the
On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 06:53:36PM +0200, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> On Tue, 11 Apr 2017 19:20:08 +0200
> Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com> wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 11, 2017 at 04:59:16PM +0200, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> >[...]
> > > Tested-by: Petr Tesarik <pte
On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 06:53:36PM +0200, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> On Tue, 11 Apr 2017 19:20:08 +0200
> Daniel Kiper wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 11, 2017 at 04:59:16PM +0200, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> >[...]
> > > Tested-by: Petr Tesarik
> > >
> > > I copied the
On Tue, Apr 11, 2017 at 04:59:16PM +0200, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> On Tue, 11 Apr 2017 15:00:58 +0200
> Daniel Kiper <daniel.ki...@oracle.com> wrote:
>
> > On Tue, Apr 11, 2017 at 02:45:43PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
> > > On 03/04/17 14:42, Daniel Kiper wrote:
> &g
1 - 100 of 607 matches
Mail list logo
