On Sun, Feb 05, 2017 at 05:18:11PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
[..]
> > shiftfs is going to miss out on overlayfs bug fixes related to user
> > credentials differ from mounter credentials, like fd3220d ("ovl:
> > update S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs"). I am not sure that this
> > specific
On Sun, Feb 05, 2017 at 05:18:11PM -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
[..]
> > shiftfs is going to miss out on overlayfs bug fixes related to user
> > credentials differ from mounter credentials, like fd3220d ("ovl:
> > update S_ISGID when setting posix ACLs"). I am not sure that this
> > specific
ng file system in
> mounter's context")
> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszer...@redhat.com>
> ---
> fs/overlayfs/super.c |9 +++--
> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/supe
uld be allowed to use reserved space on underlying filesystem
when doing overlay. It should not be overlay's job to prevent that?
May be it is just me
Vivek
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov
> Fixes: 1175b6b8d963 ("ovl: do operations on underlying file system in
> mounter'
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 11:06:47AM -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 02:26:48PM +0300, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
> > If overlay was mounted by root then quota set for upper layer does not work
> > because overlay now always use mounter's credentials
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 11:06:47AM -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 02:26:48PM +0300, Konstantin Khlebnikov wrote:
> > If overlay was mounted by root then quota set for upper layer does not work
> > because overlay now always use mounter's credentials
capability CAP_SYS_RESOURCE in root user namespace.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebni...@yandex-team.ru>
> Fixes: 1175b6b8d963 ("ovl: do operations on underlying file system in
> mounter's context")
> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
capability CAP_SYS_RESOURCE in root user namespace.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov
> Fixes: 1175b6b8d963 ("ovl: do operations on underlying file system in
> mounter's context")
> Cc: Vivek Goyal
> Cc: Miklos Szeredi
> ---
> fs/overl
ce.
This makes sense to me. I too would like quota to take effect for
containers on overlay.
I will test it.
Vivek
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebni...@yandex-team.ru>
> Fixes: 1175b6b8d963 ("ovl: do operations on underlying file system in
> mounter's co
ce.
This makes sense to me. I too would like quota to take effect for
containers on overlay.
I will test it.
Vivek
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov
> Fixes: 1175b6b8d963 ("ovl: do operations on underlying file system in
> mounter's context")
> Cc: Vive
On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 12:43:07PM +0100, Nicholas Mc Guire wrote:
> Add the missing declarations of basic purgatory functions and variables
> used with kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol() to allow a clean build.
>
> Fixes: commit 8fc5b4d4121c ("purgatory: core purgatory functionality")
>
On Fri, Dec 23, 2016 at 12:43:07PM +0100, Nicholas Mc Guire wrote:
> Add the missing declarations of basic purgatory functions and variables
> used with kexec_purgatory_get_set_symbol() to allow a clean build.
>
> Fixes: commit 8fc5b4d4121c ("purgatory: core purgatory functionality")
>
On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 11:53:41AM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:54 PM, Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 04:46:30PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> >
> > [..]
> >> > +static ssize_t ovl_read_i
On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 11:53:41AM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 11:54 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 04:46:30PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> >
> > [..]
> >> > +static ssize_t ovl_read_iter(st
On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 11:12:11AM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 04:54:08PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 04:46:30PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> >
> > [..]
> > > > +static ssize_t ovl_read_iter(st
On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 11:12:11AM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 04:54:08PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 04:46:30PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> >
> > [..]
> > > > +static ssize_t ovl_read_iter(st
On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 04:46:30PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
[..]
> > +static ssize_t ovl_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
> > +{
> > + struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
> > + bool isupper = OVL_TYPE_UPPER(ovl_path_type(file->f_path.dentry));
On Thu, Oct 20, 2016 at 04:46:30PM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
[..]
> > +static ssize_t ovl_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *to)
> > +{
> > + struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
> > + bool isupper = OVL_TYPE_UPPER(ovl_path_type(file->f_path.dentry));
On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 03:33:26PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> This is a proof of concept patch to fix the following.
>
> /ovl is in overlay mount and /ovl/foo exists on the lower layer only.
>
> rofd = open("/ovl/foo", O_RDONLY);
> rwfd = open("/ovl/foo", O_WRONLY); /* this causes copy up
On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 03:33:26PM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> This is a proof of concept patch to fix the following.
>
> /ovl is in overlay mount and /ovl/foo exists on the lower layer only.
>
> rofd = open("/ovl/foo", O_RDONLY);
> rwfd = open("/ovl/foo", O_WRONLY); /* this causes copy up
On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 08:01:42PM +0200, Paolo Valente wrote:
>
> > Il giorno 06 ott 2016, alle ore 19:49, Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com> ha
> > scritto:
> >
> > On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 03:15:50PM +0200, Paolo Valente wrote:
> >
> > [..]
&
On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 08:01:42PM +0200, Paolo Valente wrote:
>
> > Il giorno 06 ott 2016, alle ore 19:49, Vivek Goyal ha
> > scritto:
> >
> > On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 03:15:50PM +0200, Paolo Valente wrote:
> >
> > [..]
> >> Shaohua, I have
On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 03:15:50PM +0200, Paolo Valente wrote:
[..]
> Shaohua, I have just realized that I have unconsciously defended a
> wrong argument. Although all the facts that I have reported are
> evidently true, I have argued as if the question was: "do we need to
> throw away
On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 03:15:50PM +0200, Paolo Valente wrote:
[..]
> Shaohua, I have just realized that I have unconsciously defended a
> wrong argument. Although all the facts that I have reported are
> evidently true, I have argued as if the question was: "do we need to
> throw away
On Wed, Oct 05, 2016 at 02:37:00PM +0200, Paolo Valente wrote:
[..]
> Anyway, to avoid going on with trying speculations and arguments, let
> me retry with a practical proposal. BFQ is out there, free. Let's
> just test, measure and check whether we have already a solution to
> the problems
On Wed, Oct 05, 2016 at 02:37:00PM +0200, Paolo Valente wrote:
[..]
> Anyway, to avoid going on with trying speculations and arguments, let
> me retry with a practical proposal. BFQ is out there, free. Let's
> just test, measure and check whether we have already a solution to
> the problems
On Tue, Oct 04, 2016 at 11:56:16AM -0400, Tejun Heo wrote:
> Hello, Vivek.
>
> On Tue, Oct 04, 2016 at 09:28:05AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 03, 2016 at 02:20:19PM -0700, Shaohua Li wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > The background is we don't
On Tue, Oct 04, 2016 at 11:56:16AM -0400, Tejun Heo wrote:
> Hello, Vivek.
>
> On Tue, Oct 04, 2016 at 09:28:05AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 03, 2016 at 02:20:19PM -0700, Shaohua Li wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > The background is we don't
On Mon, Oct 03, 2016 at 02:20:19PM -0700, Shaohua Li wrote:
> Hi,
>
> The background is we don't have an ioscheduler for blk-mq yet, so we can't
> prioritize processes/cgroups.
So this is an interim solution till we have ioscheduler for blk-mq?
> This patch set tries to add basic arbitration
>
On Mon, Oct 03, 2016 at 02:20:19PM -0700, Shaohua Li wrote:
> Hi,
>
> The background is we don't have an ioscheduler for blk-mq yet, so we can't
> prioritize processes/cgroups.
So this is an interim solution till we have ioscheduler for blk-mq?
> This patch set tries to add basic arbitration
>
On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 08:57:22AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 03:11:10PM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> > On 09/19/2016 03:06 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > > On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 09:46:46AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > > >
> > > &g
On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 08:57:22AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 03:11:10PM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> > On 09/19/2016 03:06 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > > On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 09:46:46AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > > >
> > > &g
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 03:11:10PM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> On 09/19/2016 03:06 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 09:46:46AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Hou Tao,
> > >
> > > [ CC Tejun and Thomas ]
> > >
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 03:11:10PM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> On 09/19/2016 03:06 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 09:46:46AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Hou Tao,
> > >
> > > [ CC Tejun and Thomas ]
> > >
On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 09:46:46AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
>
> Hi Hou Tao,
>
> [ CC Tejun and Thomas ]
>
> Thanks for the patch. I can reproduce it. I am wondering that why are you
> doing so many checks. Can't we just check if throttle group is empty or
> not. If i
On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 09:46:46AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
>
> Hi Hou Tao,
>
> [ CC Tejun and Thomas ]
>
> Thanks for the patch. I can reproduce it. I am wondering that why are you
> doing so many checks. Can't we just check if throttle group is empty or
> not. If i
timer function to
wait. And when that timer expires, same process will repeat and we
will wait again and this can easily be an infinite loop.
Solve this issue by starting a new slice only if throttle gropup is
empty. If it is not empty, that means there should be an active slice
going on. Ideally
ait. And when that timer expires, same process will repeat and we
will wait again and this can easily be an infinite loop.
Solve this issue by starting a new slice only if throttle gropup is
empty. If it is not empty, that means there should be an active slice
going on. Ideally it should not be expire
5
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0 tclass=file
permissive=0
Notice that now dev information points to "dm-0" device instead of "overlay"
device. This makes it clear that check failed on underlying inode and not
5
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_overlay_client_t:s0:c10,c20
tcontext=unconfined_u:object_r:test_overlay_files_ro_t:s0 tclass=file
permissive=0
Notice that now dev information points to "dm-0" device instead of "overlay"
device. This makes it clear that check failed on underlying in
On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 09:35:30AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:45:42PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> > > IOW, if your kernel forced signature verification, you should not be
> > > able to do sig_enforce=0. If you kernel did not have
> > >
On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 09:35:30AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:45:42PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> > > IOW, if your kernel forced signature verification, you should not be
> > > able to do sig_enforce=0. If you kernel did not have
> > >
On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:45:42PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> >
> > Command line options are not signed. I thought idea behind secureboot
> > was to execute only trusted code and command line options don't enforce
> > you to execute unsigned code.
> >
> >>
> >> You can
On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 01:45:42PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> >
> > Command line options are not signed. I thought idea behind secureboot
> > was to execute only trusted code and command line options don't enforce
> > you to execute unsigned code.
> >
> >>
> >> You can
On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 01:47:28PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 08:24:06AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 11:52:00AM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > Regardless, this extended syscall changes some underlying assumptions
> > >
On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 01:47:28PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 08:24:06AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 11:52:00AM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > Regardless, this extended syscall changes some underlying assumptions
> > >
On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 11:52:00AM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 08:55:56AM +0800, Dave Young wrote:
> > On 07/18/16 at 11:07am, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 10:30:24AM +0800, Dave Young wrote:
> > > > I do not think it is worth to add another syscall
On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 11:52:00AM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 08:55:56AM +0800, Dave Young wrote:
> > On 07/18/16 at 11:07am, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 10:30:24AM +0800, Dave Young wrote:
> > > > I do not think it is worth to add another syscall
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 09:26:29AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 10:46:04PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> > On Wed, 2016-07-13 at 14:22 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 06:40:10PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> > >
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 09:26:29AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 10:46:04PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> > On Wed, 2016-07-13 at 14:22 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 06:40:10PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> > >
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 10:46:04PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-07-13 at 14:22 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 06:40:10PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:03:38AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
&
On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 10:46:04PM +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-07-13 at 14:22 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 06:40:10PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:03:38AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
&
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 09:31:02AM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Thursday, July 14, 2016 10:44:14 PM CEST Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> > Am Donnerstag, 14 Juli 2016, 10:29:11 schrieb Arnd Bergmann:
>
> > >
> > > Right, but the question remains whether this helps while you allow the
> > >
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 09:31:02AM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Thursday, July 14, 2016 10:44:14 PM CEST Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> > Am Donnerstag, 14 Juli 2016, 10:29:11 schrieb Arnd Bergmann:
>
> > >
> > > Right, but the question remains whether this helps while you allow the
> > >
On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 10:42:01AM +0900, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
[..]
> -SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE6(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
> unsigned long, cmdline_len, const char __user *, cmdline_ptr,
> -
On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 10:42:01AM +0900, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
[..]
> -SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE6(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
> unsigned long, cmdline_len, const char __user *, cmdline_ptr,
> -
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 09:49:25AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 03:13:42PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> > On Wednesday, July 13, 2016 10:41:28 AM CEST Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > The big question is whether this is a realistic case on a secure boot
> > > system.
On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 09:49:25AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 03:13:42PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> > On Wednesday, July 13, 2016 10:41:28 AM CEST Mark Rutland wrote:
> > > The big question is whether this is a realistic case on a secure boot
> > > system.
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 06:40:10PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:03:38AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:26:39AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> > > Indeed - maybe Eric knows better, but I can't see a
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 06:40:10PM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:03:38AM -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:26:39AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> > > Indeed - maybe Eric knows better, but I can't see a
creds to create file and then
revert back to old creds and release new creds.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
---
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c| 15 +++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 11 +++
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++
security/security.c
creds to create file and then
revert back to old creds and release new creds.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c| 15 +++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 11 +++
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++
security/security.c | 8
4 files changed
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 10:52:34AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 07/13/2016 10:44 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
> > up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount.
> >
> > This
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 10:52:34AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 07/13/2016 10:44 AM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
> > up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount.
> >
> > This
.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 16
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c82ee54..4fda548 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/h
.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 16
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c82ee54..4fda548 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3290,6 +3290,21
Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of
current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved
from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide
where to fetch security pointer from.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <
the label
of lower file and in case of context mount, overlay inode will have
the label from context= mount option.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 +
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/se
Right now selinux_determine_inode_label() works on security pointer of
current task. Soon I need this to work on a security pointer retrieved
from a set of creds. So start passing in a pointer and caller can decide
where to fetch security pointer from.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
security
the label
of lower file and in case of context mount, overlay inode will have
the label from context= mount option.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 21 +
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
med into upper/, and it might get
label based on work/ dir. So this hooks helps avoiding all these issues.
When a new file is created in upper/, it gets its label based on transition
rules. For the case of context mount, it gets the label from context=
option.
Any feedback is welcome.
Vi
med into upper/, and it might get
label based on work/ dir. So this hooks helps avoiding all these issues.
When a new file is created in upper/, it gets its label based on transition
rules. For the case of context mount, it gets the label from context=
option.
Any feedback is welcome.
Vi
module does not handle/manage the xattr, or a -errno
upon an error.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
---
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c| 7 +++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 ++
include/linux/secu
module does not handle/manage the xattr, or a -errno
upon an error.
Signed-off-by: David Howells
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c| 7 +++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 ++
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++
security/security.c | 8
4
-by: Dan Walsh <dwa...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
---
fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
index 66f42f5..6d9d86e 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overl
to old creds and release new creds.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
---
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c| 18 ++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 11 +++
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++
security/security.c | 8
4 files changed, 43 inse
-by: Dan Walsh
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
index 66f42f5..6d9d86e 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int
to old creds and release new creds.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c| 18 ++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 11 +++
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++
security/security.c | 8
4 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs
of creds appropriately. Caller makes use of these new
creds for file creation.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
---
fs/overlayfs/dir.c| 10 ++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++
include/linux/security.h | 12
security/security.c
of creds appropriately. Caller makes use of these new
creds for file creation.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
fs/overlayfs/dir.c| 10 ++
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 15 +++
include/linux/security.h | 12
security/security.c | 11 +++
4
Calculate what would be the label of newly created file and set that secid
in the passed creds.
Context of the task which is actually creating file is retrieved from
set of creds passed in. (old->security).
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com>
---
security/selinux/hoo
.
Dan Walsh noticed this when he did access(lowerfile, W_OK) and it returned
True (context mounts) but when he tried to actually write to file, it failed
as mounter did not have permission on lower file.
Reported-by: Dan Walsh <dwa...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@r
.
Dan Walsh noticed this when he did access(lowerfile, W_OK) and it returned
True (context mounts) but when he tried to actually write to file, it failed
as mounter did not have permission on lower file.
Reported-by: Dan Walsh
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 9 +++--
1
Calculate what would be the label of newly created file and set that secid
in the passed creds.
Context of the task which is actually creating file is retrieved from
set of creds passed in. (old->security).
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 ++
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:41:39AM +1000, Stewart Smith wrote:
> Petr Tesarik writes:
> > On Tue, 12 Jul 2016 13:25:11 -0300
> > Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >
> >> Hi Eric,
> >>
> >> I'm trying to understand your concerns leading to your nack. I
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:45:22AM +1000, Stewart Smith wrote:
> Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com> writes:
> > On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 10:58:09AM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >> Hello Eric,
> >>
> >> Am Dienstag, 12 Juli 2016, 08:25:48 schrieb
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:41:39AM +1000, Stewart Smith wrote:
> Petr Tesarik writes:
> > On Tue, 12 Jul 2016 13:25:11 -0300
> > Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >
> >> Hi Eric,
> >>
> >> I'm trying to understand your concerns leading to your nack. I hope you
> >> don't mind expanding your
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:45:22AM +1000, Stewart Smith wrote:
> Vivek Goyal writes:
> > On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 10:58:09AM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> >> Hello Eric,
> >>
> >> Am Dienstag, 12 Juli 2016, 08:25:48 schrieb Eric W. Biede
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:26:39AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 05:55:33PM +1000, Stewart Smith wrote:
> > Russell King - ARM Linux writes:
> > > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 02:59:51PM +1000, Stewart Smith wrote:
> > >> Russell King - ARM
On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 09:26:39AM +0100, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 05:55:33PM +1000, Stewart Smith wrote:
> > Russell King - ARM Linux writes:
> > > On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 02:59:51PM +1000, Stewart Smith wrote:
> > >> Russell King - ARM Linux writes:
> > >> > On
On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 04:02:46PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Tuesday, July 12, 2016 8:25:48 AM CEST Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> > AKASHI Takahiro writes:
> >
> > > Device tree blob must be passed to a second kernel on DTB-capable
> > > archs, like powerpc and
On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 04:02:46PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Tuesday, July 12, 2016 8:25:48 AM CEST Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> > AKASHI Takahiro writes:
> >
> > > Device tree blob must be passed to a second kernel on DTB-capable
> > > archs, like powerpc and arm64, but the current kernel
On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 10:58:09AM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> Hello Eric,
>
> Am Dienstag, 12 Juli 2016, 08:25:48 schrieb Eric W. Biederman:
> > AKASHI Takahiro writes:
> > > Device tree blob must be passed to a second kernel on DTB-capable
> > > archs,
On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 10:58:09AM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> Hello Eric,
>
> Am Dienstag, 12 Juli 2016, 08:25:48 schrieb Eric W. Biederman:
> > AKASHI Takahiro writes:
> > > Device tree blob must be passed to a second kernel on DTB-capable
> > > archs, like powerpc and arm64, but the
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 11:31:47AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
[..]
> > +static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
> > +{
> > + -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> return?
Yes, this one I fixed it in my patches now. kbuild also flagged this.
Vivek
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 11:31:47AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
[..]
> > +static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
> > +{
> > + -EOPNOTSUPP;
>
> return?
Yes, this one I fixed it in my patches now. kbuild also flagged this.
Vivek
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 11:31:47AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 07/08/2016 12:19 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being
> > copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and LSM can return 0
> > to access t
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 11:31:47AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 07/08/2016 12:19 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Provide a security hook which is called when xattrs of a file are being
> > copied up. This hook is called once for each xattr and LSM can return 0
> > to access t
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 11:24:26AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 07/08/2016 12:19 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
> > up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount.
> >
> > This
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 11:24:26AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 07/08/2016 12:19 PM, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> > Provide a security hook to label new file correctly when a file is copied
> > up from lower layer to upper layer of a overlay/union mount.
> >
> > This
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