Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs

On Sat, 10 Jun 2017, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack. > > Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld > Cc: David Safford > Cc: Mimi Zohar > Cc: David Howells > Cc:

Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] security/keys: use constant time memory comparison for macs

On Sat, 10 Jun 2017, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote: > Otherwise, we enable a MAC forgery via timing attack. > > Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld > Cc: David Safford > Cc: Mimi Zohar > Cc: David Howells > Cc: keyri...@vger.kernel.org > Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: James Morris --