Re: [RFC][PATCH] Simplified mandatory access control kernel implementation

2007-07-18 Thread Joshua Brindle
Casey Schaufler wrote: --- Joshua Brindle [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Casey Schaufler wrote: snip Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-7

Re: [RFC][PATCH] Version3 - Simplified mandatory access control kernel implementation

2007-07-18 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Tue, 2007-07-17 at 19:59 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: - Speaking of which, are you ok with your MAC model being overridden by all uid 0 processes? Or do you plan to change securebits and use file caps? I've been tracking the file caps closely. I like file capabilities, but I have

Re: [PATCH try #3] security: Convert LSM into a static interface

2007-07-18 Thread Arjan van de Ven
On Sat, 2007-07-14 at 12:37 -0400, James Morris wrote: Convert LSM into a static interface, as the ability to unload a security module is not required by in-tree users and potentially complicates the overall security architecture. Needlessly exported LSM symbols have been unexported, to help

Re: [RFC][PATCH] Simplified mandatory access control kernel implementation

2007-07-18 Thread Joshua Brindle
Casey Schaufler wrote: Today's implementation of sshd is a hack, just enough to get things going. Longer term I expect users to have a list of labels they can use. sshd currently uses /etc/smack/user, which contains lines like: method manic casey loony with future support for:

Re: [RFC] [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: change fE to a bool

2007-07-18 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Serge, I spent the evening getting my local build of libcap (building the libcap/progs/old/setcap and getcap tools) working with the new kernel support. It seems there is a basic insecurity bug in

Re: [RFC] [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: change fE to a bool

2007-07-18 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Wed, 2007-07-18 at 12:53 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Serge, I spent the evening getting my local build of libcap (building the libcap/progs/old/setcap and getcap tools) working with the

Re: [RFC] [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: change fE to a bool

2007-07-18 Thread Stephen Smalley
On Wed, 2007-07-18 at 14:03 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote: On Wed, 2007-07-18 at 12:53 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Serge, I spent the evening getting my local build of libcap (building

Re: [RFC] [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: change fE to a bool

2007-07-18 Thread Serge E. Hallyn
Quoting Stephen Smalley ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): On Wed, 2007-07-18 at 12:53 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: Quoting Andrew Morgan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Serge, I spent the evening getting my local build of libcap (building the

Re: [RFC][PATCH] Simplified mandatory access control kernel implementation

2007-07-18 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Sat, 2007-07-14 at 14:47 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. ... A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it. Smack defines and uses these labels: * -

Re: [RFC] [PATCH 2/2] file capabilities: change fE to a bool

2007-07-18 Thread Andrew Morgan
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Serge E. Hallyn wrote: For suid, this is handled by remove_suid - notify_change with ATTR_KILL_SUID/SGID. No equivalent for security xattrs presently. I assume we're all agreed that we do in fact want to treat security.capability xattrs like

Re: [RFC][PATCH] Simplified mandatory access control kernel implementation

2007-07-18 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- Joshua Brindle [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Casey Schaufler wrote: ... I do have a hackish newsmack command, which I should probably include. All it does is write the new label to /proc/self/attr/current and exec the desired program. That's not good enough for a production

Re: [PATCH try #3] security: Convert LSM into a static interface

2007-07-18 Thread James Morris
On Wed, 18 Jul 2007, Andrew Morton wrote: The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. I'd like to understand who is (or claims to be) adversely affected by this change, and what their complaints (if any) will be. Because I prefer my flamewars pre- rather than post-merge.

Re: [PATCH try #3] security: Convert LSM into a static interface

2007-07-18 Thread david
On Wed, 18 Jul 2007, James Morris wrote: On Wed, 18 Jul 2007, Andrew Morton wrote: The SECURITY_FRAMEWORK_VERSION macro has also been removed. I'd like to understand who is (or claims to be) adversely affected by this change, and what their complaints (if any) will be. Because I prefer my

Re: [RFC][PATCH] Version3 - Simplified mandatory access control kernel implementation

2007-07-18 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Tue, 2007-07-17 at 19:59 -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote: - Speaking of which, are you ok with your MAC model being overridden by all uid 0 processes? Or do you plan to change securebits and use file caps? I've been tracking the