Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSMhook

2007-05-29 Thread Tetsuo Handa
Hello. Crispin Cowan wrote: AppArmor actually does something similar to this, by mediating all of the ways that you can make an alias to a file. These are: * Symbolic links: these actually don't work for making aliases with respect to LSM-based security systems such as AppArmor,

Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSMhook

2007-05-29 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- Tetsuo Handa [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Conventional UNIX's access control can't restrict which path_to_file can link with which another_path_to_file because UNIX's access control is a label-based access control. UNIX access control is attribute based, not label based. The distinction may

Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSMhook

2007-05-29 Thread Andreas Gruenbacher
On Tuesday 29 May 2007 12:46, Tetsuo Handa wrote: But, from the pathname-based access control's point of view, bind mount interferes severely with pathname-based access control because it is impossible to determine which pathname was requested. Wrong. It is very well possible to determine the

Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSMhook

2007-05-29 Thread James Morris
On Tue, 29 May 2007, Casey Schaufler wrote: Conventional UNIX's access control can't restrict which path_to_file can link with which another_path_to_file because UNIX's access control is a label-based access control. UNIX access control is attribute based, not label based. The

Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSMhook

2007-05-29 Thread Tetsuo Handa
Hello. Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: But, from the pathname-based access control's point of view, bind mount interferes severely with pathname-based access control because it is impossible to determine which pathname was requested. Wrong. It is very well possible to determine the path of a