that were
added in the 2.6.(18 or 19, can't remember off the top of my head right now)
timeframe which allow the LSM to better control/label the sockets during the
TCP handshake; this may allow you to do what you want.
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other ways to read a network socket than just
recvmsg().
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as a netfilter module?
Or maybe in userspace using the netfilter userspace queue feature?
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life easier if for some freak reason we have to
change them. For example, 0 == NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE.
This applies to a few other places in the code too.
I'm sure there will be more comments but these are the ones that jumped out at
me.
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On Monday, July 16 2007 10:59:41 pm Casey Schaufler wrote:
--- Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Saturday, July 14 2007 5:47:38 pm Casey Schaufler wrote:
+#include ../../net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.h
+#include net/cipso_ipv4.h
+
+ {snip}
+
+static void smk_cipso_doi(void
private email. A public list might also help attract
some warm bodies willing to write code ;)
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attempts.
Please take a look at the existing LSM stream connection request hooks as
well as how SELinux makes use of them.
* post_recv_datagram is added in skb_recv_datagram.
Can you explain to me why this is not possible using the existing
security_socket_sock_rcv_skb() LSM hook?
--
paul
On Tuesday, August 28 2007 6:39:13 am Tetsuo Handa wrote:
Hello.
Hello.
Paul Moore wrote:
* post_recv_datagram is added in skb_recv_datagram.
Can you explain to me why this is not possible using the existing
security_socket_sock_rcv_skb() LSM hook?
socket_sock_rcv_skb() is a hook
On Monday 03 September 2007 9:15:27 am Tetsuo Handa wrote:
Hello.
Hi.
Paul Moore wrote:
I apologize for not recognizing your approach from our earlier discussion
on the LSM mailing list in July. Unfortunately, I have the same
objections to these changes that I did back then and from
-accept() failed.
I think socket_post_accept() should be able to fail.
From my experience the community disapproves of approaches which go through
the entire TCP handshake and then terminate the connection, which is what
allowing security_socket_post_accept() to fail would do.
--
paul
be able to elsewhere and
I consider that a win.
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On Sunday 30 September 2007 4:16:18 am Andrew Morton wrote:
- hm, netlabels. Who might be a suitable person to review that code?
Seems that Paul Moore is the man. Maybe he'd be interested in taking a
look over it (please?)
Yep, I've been tracking Casey's work on this since the first
options/labels.
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unlbl list
# netlabelctl -p unlbl list
If you have any questions/problems/comments feel free to either drop me mail
privately or post something to the list.
Thanks.
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linux-security-module
This patch removes some unneeded RCU read locks as we can treat the reads as
safe even without RCU. It also converts the NetLabel configuration refcount
from a spinlock protected u32 into atomic_t to be more consistent with the rest
of the kernel.
---
net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c |5
The NetLabel/LSM domain hash table search function used a argument to specify
if the default entry should be returned if an exact match couldn't be found in
the hash table. This is a bit against the kernel's style so make two separate
functions to represent the separate behaviors.
---
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
---
security/selinux/Kconfig|2 -
security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 ++
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new peer object class.
---
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |3 +++
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h|3 +++
security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h |7 +++
security/selinux/include/flask.h |
This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK
are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each
subsystem. In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry
is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and
Most trusted OSs, with the exception of Linux, have the ability to specify
static security labels for unlabeled networks. This patch adds this ability to
the NetLabel packet labeling framework.
If the NetLabel subsystem is called to determine the security attributes of an
incoming packet it
This patch adds auditing support to the NetLabel static labeling mechanism.
---
include/linux/audit.h |2 +
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 127 +++--
2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h
In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.
---
Now that the SELinux NetLabel base SID is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.
---
Rename the existing selinux_skb_extlbl_sid() function to
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() and modify it's behavior such that it now reconciles
multiple peer/external labels and if reconciliation is not possible it returns
an error to the caller.
---
security/selinux/hooks.c| 94
On Friday 09 November 2007 5:19:02 pm Casey Schaufler wrote:
--- Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook.
I'll bite. Where does this get used?
Patch 12/13, functions netlbl_unlabel_staticadd
On Sunday 11 November 2007 5:31:44 pm James Morris wrote:
On Fri, 9 Nov 2007, Paul Moore wrote:
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new peer object class.
Should this be dependent on dynamic class/permission support?
I think it's okay to _define_ the Flask definitions regardless
On Sunday 11 November 2007 5:34:27 pm James Morris wrote:
On Fri, 9 Nov 2007, Paul Moore wrote:
+ /* Between selinux_compat_net and selinux_policycap_netpeer this is
+* starting to get a bit messy - we need to setup a timetable for
+* deprecating some of this old/obsolete
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes a SELinux implementation
for this hook.
---
include/linux/security.h | 13 +
security/dummy.c |6 ++
security/security.c |6 ++
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new peer object class.
---
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |3 +++
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h|3 +++
security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h |7 +++
security/selinux/include/flask.h |
Currently we use two separate spinlocks to protect both the hash/mapping table
and the default entry. This could be considered a bit foolish because it adds
complexity without offering any real performance advantage. This patch
removes the dedicated default spinlock and protects the default
are playing with this code I recommend
you update to r50 to get the latest bits.
As usual, if you have any comments/bug-reports/questions let me know.
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
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This patch removes some unneeded RCU read locks as we can treat the reads as
safe even without RCU. It also converts the NetLabel configuration refcount
from a spinlock protected u32 into atomic_t to be more consistent with the rest
of the kernel.
---
net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c |5
The NetLabel/LSM domain hash table search function used a argument to specify
if the default entry should be returned if an exact match couldn't be found in
the hash table. This is a bit against the kernel's style so make two separate
functions to represent the separate behaviors.
---
This patch adds support to the NetLabel LSM secattr struct for a secid token
and a type field, paving the way for full LSM/SELinux context support and
static or fallback labels. In addition, this patch adds a fair amount
of documentation to the core NetLabel structures used as part of the
This patch adds auditing support to the NetLabel static labeling mechanism.
---
include/linux/audit.h |2 +
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 127 +++--
2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h
Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together. This includes moving both subsystems to a
single peer object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
---
security/selinux/Kconfig|2 -
security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 ++
In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.
---
Most trusted OSs, with the exception of Linux, have the ability to specify
static security labels for unlabeled networks. This patch adds this ability to
the NetLabel packet labeling framework.
If the NetLabel subsystem is called to determine the security attributes of an
incoming packet it
On Friday 16 November 2007 10:45:32 pm Tetsuo Handa wrote:
Paul Moore wrote:
I might be missing something here, but why do you need to do a skb_peek()
again? You already have the skb and the sock, just do the unlink.
The skb might be already dequeued by other thread while I slept inside
On Saturday 17 November 2007 11:00:20 pm Tetsuo Handa wrote:
Hello.
Hello.
Paul Moore wrote:
Okay, well if that is the case I think you are going to have another
problem in that you could end up throwing away skbs that haven't been
through your security_post_recv_datagram() hook because
On Monday 19 November 2007 9:29:52 am Tetsuo Handa wrote:
Paul Moore wrote:
If that is the case then the second call to
skb_peek() will return a different skb then the one you passed to
security_post_recv_datagram().
Yes. The second call to skb_peek() might return a different skb than
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.
---
include/linux/security.h | 13 +
security/dummy.c |6 ++
security/security.c |6 ++
Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
---
security/selinux/avc.c |
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new peer object class.
---
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |3 +++
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h|3 +++
security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h |7 +++
security/selinux/include/flask.h |
The NetLabel/LSM domain hash table search function used an argument to specify
if the default entry should be returned if an exact match couldn't be found in
the hash table. This is a bit against the kernel's style so make two separate
functions to represent the separate behaviors.
---
Now that the SELinux NetLabel base SID is always the netmsg initial SID we
can do a big optimization - caching the SID and not just the MLS attributes.
This not only saves a lot of per-packet memory allocations and copies but it
has a nice side effect of removing a chunk of code.
---
This patch adds auditing support to the NetLabel static labeling mechanism.
---
include/linux/audit.h |2
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 207 ++---
2 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h
This patch adds support to the NetLabel LSM secattr struct for a secid token
and a type field, paving the way for full LSM/SELinux context support and
static or fallback labels. In addition, this patch adds a fair amount
of documentation to the core NetLabel structures used as part of the
This patch removes some unneeded RCU read locks as we can treat the reads as
safe even without RCU. It also converts the NetLabel configuration refcount
from a spinlock protected u32 into atomic_t to be more consistent with the rest
of the kernel.
---
net/netlabel/netlabel_cipso_v4.c |5
Currently we use two separate spinlocks to protect both the hash/mapping table
and the default entry. This could be considered a bit foolish because it adds
complexity without offering any real performance advantage. This patch
removes the dedicated default spinlock and protects the default
Most trusted OSs, with the exception of Linux, have the ability to specify
static security labels for unlabeled networks. This patch adds this ability to
the NetLabel packet labeling framework.
If the NetLabel subsystem is called to determine the security attributes of an
incoming packet it
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
---
security/selinux/Kconfig|2 -
security/selinux/include/security.h | 15 ++
) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris [EMAIL PROTECTED]
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *Paul Moore, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
Rework the handling of network peer labels so that the different peer labeling
subsystems work better together. This includes moving both subsystems to a
single peer object class which involves not only changes to the permission
checks but an improved method of consolidating multiple packet peer
patches out next week to help enable
the new functionality and if everything is still looking okay I'll ping Andew
Morton to see if I can get the latest version of these patches included in the
-mm tree (previous versions are already included).
Thanks.
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
Add an inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook to allow the LSM to provide packet level
access control for all outbound packets. Using the existing postroute_last
netfilter hook turns out to be problematic as it is can be invoked multiple
times for a single packet, e.g. individual IPsec transforms, adding
In order to do any sort of IP header inspection of incoming packets we need to
know which address family, AF_INET/AF_INET6/etc., it belongs to and since the
sk_buff structure does not store this information we need to pass along the
address family separate from the packet itself.
---
This patch introduces a mechanism for checking when labeled IPsec or SECMARK
are in use by keeping introducing a configuration reference counter for each
subsystem. In the case of labeled IPsec, whenever a labeled SA or SPD entry
is created the labeled IPsec/XFRM reference count is increased and
On Friday 14 December 2007 4:51:29 pm Paul Moore wrote:
This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which
allow SELinux security policy to control the flow of all IPv4 and IPv6
packets into and out of the system. Currently SELinux does not have proper
control over
On Monday 17 December 2007 2:45:50 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
Add an inet_sys_snd_skb() LSM hook to allow the LSM to provide packet
level access control for all outbound packets. Using the existing
postroute_last netfilter hook turns out
On Monday 17 December 2007 2:56:41 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
/* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
-{ memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)-type =
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t
On Monday 17 December 2007 3:35:28 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Fri, 2007-12-14 at 16:50 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
This patch adds a SELinux IP address/node SID caching mechanism similar
to the sel_netif_*() functions. The node SID queries in the SELinux
hooks files are also modified
On Monday 17 December 2007 3:05:37 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Sun, 2007-12-16 at 11:47 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
On Friday 14 December 2007 4:51:29 pm Paul Moore wrote:
This patch implements packet ingress/egress controls for SELinux which
allow SELinux security policy to control
On Tuesday 18 December 2007 3:25:54 am James Morris wrote:
On Fri, 14 Dec 2007, Paul Moore wrote:
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.
Please sign off your patches
On Monday 17 December 2007 3:05:37 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Sun, 2007-12-16 at 11:47 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
We should probably have different permissions for the interface and node
cases. Take the example of an admin who is only interested in enforcing
interface controls and not node
On Tuesday 18 December 2007 10:14:41 am Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Tue, 2007-12-18 at 08:59 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
Thoughts? Should I just forget all this and use the peer label as a
subject label?
I'm not certain what we gain by using the peer as the object and class
in these checks
thanks to Venkat Yekkirala [EMAIL PROTECTED] whose earlier
work on this topic eventually led to this patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 347 --
1 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)
diff
removes the default message SID from the network interface record, it is
not being used and therefore is dead code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/selinux/hooks.c|4 -
security/selinux/include/netif.h|4 -
security/selinux/include/objsec.h |5
of the
NetLabel kernel API.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/net/netlabel.h| 91 ++---
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 59 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c |1
security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 10
-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/net/netlabel.h |2 ++
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c|2 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c| 33 ++---
security/selinux/include/netlabel.h |8 +++-
security/selinux/netlabel.c
This patch removes some unneeded RCU read locks as we can treat the reads as
safe even without RCU. It also converts the NetLabel configuration refcount
from a spinlock protected u32 into atomic_t to be more consistent with the rest
of the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED
unwanted
overhead and complicating the security policy.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++
net/ipv4/ip_output.c |7 +++
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c|5 +
security/dummy.c |8 +++-
security/security.c
available here:
* git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/lblnet-2.6_testing
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
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Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/linux/security.h | 13
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new peer object class and
additional permissions to the netif and node object classes.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |5 +
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h|5
Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL
This patch adds auditing support to the NetLabel static labeling mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/linux/audit.h |2
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 207 ++---
2 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 14 deletions
On Friday 21 December 2007 12:36:15 pm Stephen Smalley wrote:
On Fri, 2007-12-21 at 12:09 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new peer object class
and additional permissions to the netif and node object classes.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL
to Valdis for reporting the problem over the
holidays. In order to help spot similar problems in the future I added some
warning messages to the SELinux network code to eliminate these silent drops.
If you are run into any problems or have any comments please let me know.
Thanks.
--
paul moore
-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c | 47 ++--
1 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
b/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
index b3675bd..1f8f7ac 100644
--- a/net
entry with the
hash/mapping table spinlock.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c | 30 +-
1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_domainhash.c
b/net/netlabel
of the
NetLabel kernel API.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/net/netlabel.h| 91 ++---
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 59 +++-
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c |1
security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 10
Add a secctx_to_secid() LSM hook to go along with the existing
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation for this hook.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/linux/security.h | 13
unwanted
overhead and complicating the security policy.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/linux/security.h | 11 +++
net/ipv4/ip_output.c |7 +++
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c|5 +
security/dummy.c |8 +++-
security/security.c
-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/net/netlabel.h |2 ++
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c|2 ++
security/selinux/hooks.c| 33 ++---
security/selinux/include/netlabel.h |8 +++-
security/selinux/netlabel.c
back
through the network stack. This patch corrects this problem by properly
copying the 'iif' field in __skb_clone() and removing the 'iif' field
assignment from skb_act_clone() since it is no longer needed.
Also, while we are here, get rid of that silly C() macro.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore
Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL
Add a new policy capabilities bitmap to SELinux policy version 22. This bitmap
will enable the security server to query the policy to determine which features
it supports.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/selinux/Kconfig|2 -
security/selinux/include
Add additional Flask definitions to support the new peer object class and
additional permissions to the netif and node object classes.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |5 +
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h|5
labels.
As part of this work the inbound packet permission check code has been heavily
modified to handle both the old and new behavior in as sane a fashion as
possible.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/selinux/hooks.c| 204
is not the case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/linux/selinux.h | 45 +++---
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 13 ++-
security/selinux/exports.c | 20 +++--
security/selinux/hooks.c| 46
the netlabel_tools package. The matching security label is
returned to the caller just as if the packet was explicitly labeled using a
labeling protocol.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/net/netlabel.h|6
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 16
net/netlabel
-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/selinux/hooks.c|6 --
security/selinux/include/netlabel.h |2 -
security/selinux/include/security.h |2 -
security/selinux/netlabel.c | 55 ++--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 124
On Wednesday 16 January 2008 5:13:53 pm James Morris wrote:
On Wed, 16 Jan 2008, Paul Moore wrote:
On Tuesday 15 January 2008 8:05:27 pm James Morris wrote:
On Tue, 15 Jan 2008, David Howells wrote:
secid_to_secctx() LSM hook. This patch also includes the SELinux
implementation
thanks to Venkat Yekkirala [EMAIL PROTECTED] whose earlier
work on this topic eventually led to this patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 402 --
1 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-)
diff
This patch adds auditing support to the NetLabel static labeling mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/linux/audit.h |2
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 207 ++---
2 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 14 deletions
the netlabel_tools package. The matching security label is
returned to the caller just as if the packet was explicitly labeled using a
labeling protocol.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
include/net/netlabel.h|6
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 16
net/netlabel
.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |9 +
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h|9 +
security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h |7 +++
security/selinux/include/flask.h |1 +
4 files
Instead of storing the packet's network interface name store the ifindex. This
allows us to defer the need to lookup the net_device structure until the audit
record is generated meaning that in the majority of cases we never need to
bother with this at all.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore [EMAIL
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