what is the best book to learn assembly and architecture .
Reading the architecture books with a nice cup of tea.
http://www.power.org/resources/downloads/PowerISA_V2.06B_V2_PUBLIC.pdf
Good luck!
Mikey
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Linuxppc-dev mailing list
Hi all,
My setup is as below I've two MPC8315E board from freescale connected as
below
PC1 mpc board1 --- mpc board 2 - PC2.
I've installed openswan 2.6.18 on the mpc boards for encrypting the data
sent over the link between mpc boards using IPSEC. I've l2tpv3 bridge
between the mpc
* David Laight david.lai...@aculab.com wrote:
[...] unfortunately it worked by looking at the user-space buffers on system
call entry - and a multithreaded program can easily arrange to update them
after the initial check! [...]
Such problems of reliability/persistency of security checks
* Arnd Bergmann a...@arndb.de wrote:
On Saturday 14 May 2011, Will Drewry wrote:
Depending on integration, it could even be limited to ioctl commands
that are appropriate to a known fd if the fd is opened prior to
entering seccomp mode 2. Alternatively, __NR__ioctl could be allowed
with
* Will Drewry w...@chromium.org wrote:
Note, i'm not actually asking for the moon, a pony and more.
I fully submit that we are yet far away from being able to do a full LSM
via this mechanism.
What i'm asking for is that because the syscall point steps taken by Will
look very
* Will Drewry w...@chromium.org wrote:
I agree with you on many of these points! However, I don't think that the
views around LSMs, perf/ftrace infrastructure, or the current seccomp
filtering implementation are necessarily in conflict. Here is my
understanding of how the different
On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 7:55 AM, Ingo Molnar mi...@elte.hu wrote:
* Will Drewry w...@chromium.org wrote:
I agree with you on many of these points! However, I don't think that the
views around LSMs, perf/ftrace infrastructure, or the current seccomp
filtering implementation are necessarily
* James Morris jmor...@namei.org wrote:
On Fri, 13 May 2011, Ingo Molnar wrote:
Say i'm a user-space sandbox developer who wants to enforce that sandboxed
code should only be allowed to open files in /home/sandbox/, /lib/ and
/usr/lib/.
It is a simple and sensible security
On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 10:26 AM, Steven Rostedt rost...@goodmis.org wrote:
Sorry to be absent from this thread so far, I just got back from my
travels and I'm now catching up on email.
On Wed, 2011-05-11 at 22:02 -0500, Will Drewry wrote:
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
On Mon, May 16, 2011 at 7:43 AM, Ingo Molnar mi...@elte.hu wrote:
* Will Drewry w...@chromium.org wrote:
Note, i'm not actually asking for the moon, a pony and more.
I fully submit that we are yet far away from being able to do a full LSM
via this mechanism.
What i'm asking for is
Sorry to be absent from this thread so far, I just got back from my
travels and I'm now catching up on email.
On Wed, 2011-05-11 at 22:02 -0500, Will Drewry wrote:
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 377a7a5..22e1668 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
Both, #address-cells and #size-cells properties are required
for spi bus node, so add them.
Signed-off-by: Anatolij Gustschin ag...@denx.de
---
arch/powerpc/boot/dts/mpc5200b.dtsi |2 ++
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/boot/dts/mpc5200b.dtsi
Add new nodes to describe more hardware the board is
equipped with:
- two can nodes for SJA1000 on localbus
- pci node to support Coral-PA graphics controller
- serial node for SC28L92 DUART on localbus
- spi node for MSP430 device
Also correct i2c eeprom node name.
Signed-off-by: Heiko
I would like to get some opinions on the following.
I'm working on extending our existing board definition files to support our
ePAPR reference hypervisor. Because our hypervisor provides a virtual PIC, we
need to have different functions for define_machine() structure that related to
the PIC,
* Steven Rostedt rost...@goodmis.org wrote:
I'm a bit nervous about the 'active' role of (trace_)events, because of the
way multiple callbacks can be registered. How would:
err = event_x();
if (err == -EACCESS) {
be handled? [...]
The default behavior would be something
On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 18:52 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
* Steven Rostedt rost...@goodmis.org wrote:
I'm a bit nervous about the 'active' role of (trace_)events, because of the
way multiple callbacks can be registered. How would:
err = event_x();
if (err == -EACCESS) {
be
It seems that Adrian is getting old. He removed almost everything of
GEMINI in commit c53653130 ([POWERPC] Remove the broken Gemini
support) except this piece.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior sebast...@breakpoint.cc
---
arch/powerpc/kernel/head_32.S | 13 -
1 files
On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 11:21 -0500, Timur Tabi wrote:
I would like to get some opinions on the following.
I'm working on extending our existing board definition files to support our
ePAPR reference hypervisor. Because our hypervisor provides a virtual PIC, we
need to have different functions
In message 1305589123.2781.15.camel@pasglop you wrote:
On Mon, 2011-05-16 at 16:37 +1000, Michael Neuling wrote:
what is the best book to learn assembly and architecture .
Reading the architecture books with a nice cup of tea.
On Mon, 16 May 2011, Ingo Molnar wrote:
Not really.
Firstly, what is the security goal of these restrictions? [...]
To do what i described above? Namely:
Sandboxed code should only be allowed to open files in /home/sandbox/,
/lib/
and /usr/lib/
These are access rules, they
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