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> Israel Crosses the Threshold II: The Nixon Administration Debates the > Emergence of the Israeli Nuclear Program > > DOD's Paul Warnke Warned in Early 1969 that Israeli Nuclear Program is > "the Single Most Dangerous Phenomenon in an Area Dangerous Enough Without > Nuclear Weapons" > > President Nixon Overrode Near Consensus of Senior U.S. Officials on Threat > Posed by Israeli Nuclear Program in 1969 > > NSSM 40 and Related Records Released in Full for First Time > > National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 485 > > Posted - September 12, 2014 > > Edited by William Burr and Avner Cohen > > For more information contact: > William Burr - 202/994-7000 or nsarc...@gwu.edu > > > Washington, DC, September 12, 2014 -- During the spring and summer of > 1969, officials at the Pentagon, the State Department, the Central > Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council staff debated and > discussed the problem of the emergence of a nuclear Israel. Believing that > Israel was moving very close to a nuclear weapons capability or even > possession of actual weapons, the Nixon administration debated whether to > apply pressure to restrain the Israelis or even delay delivery of advanced > Phantom jets whose sale had already been approved. > > Recently declassified documents produced in response to a mandatory > declassification review request by the National Security Archive, and > published today by the Archive in cooperation with the Nuclear > Proliferation International History Project, show that top officials at the > Pentagon were especially supportive of applying pressure on Israel. On 14 > July 1969, Deputy Secretary of Defense (and Hewlett-Packard co-founder) > David Packard signed a truly arresting memorandum to Secretary of Defense > Melvin Laird, arguing that failure to exert such pressure "would involve us > in a conspiracy with Israel which would leave matters dangerous to our > security in their hands." > > In the end, Laird and Packard and others favoring pressure lost the > debate. While National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger supported some of > their ideas, he also believed that, at the minimum, it would be sufficient > for U.S. interests if Israel kept their nuclear activities secret. As he > put on his draft memo to President Nixon on or around July 19, "public > knowledge is almost as dangerous as possession itself." Indeed, Nixon > opposed pressure and was willing to tolerate Israeli nuclear weapons as > long as they stayed secret. > > > Check out today's posting at the National Security Archive's Nuclear Vault > - http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/ > > Find us on Facebook - http://www.facebook.com/NSArchive > > > ________________________________________________ Send list submissions to: Marxism@lists.csbs.utah.edu Set your options at: http://lists.csbs.utah.edu/options/marxism/archive%40mail-archive.com
