Steve, Well, now I know what comes after the <snip>. First paragraph: Oudeyis is saying nothing about what nature is, but rather is writing that whatever understandings man has of nature are a function primarily of his active interaction (his labour) with the natural conditions of his existence. The difference between knowing what nature is (i.e. its essential being or "nature" if you will) and having a working knowledge of world conditions is all the difference between the treatment of nature in Marxist and classical materialist theory. Now then, the only part of nature humanity can know is that part of it with which he has some sort of contact, and at least for Marxism, the only part of nature about which man can develop theories of practice is that which he can or has changed in some fashion. When it comes to explaining the practical foundation scientific cosmology we argue that the theories regarding the behaviour of huge masses of material over barely conceivable periods of time and spatial dimensions are projections based more often as not on experimentation with some of the very smallest of the universe's components; atoms, quarks, and so on). Anyway, its hard to imagine how men would know things about which they have absolutely no experience and how they would know how things work without a working experience with them or with things like them. Divine revelation perhaps? Finally, there is no doubt that nature must also include that which is beyond the observed and acted upon and that its existence is important for the creation of a materialist ideology. There are three ways the "unknown" makes itself felt in material human experience:
1.The fact that human practice and the science that represents it in thought is open ended or, better yet, appears to have no outward limits is a clear indication of the existence of more to nature than that which is treated by our current state of knowledge and practice. 2. The classic observations by Marx in the first chapter of German Ideology (1845) and the Critique of Hegelian Philosophy (1844) that the physical and sensual interface between man a nature in human labour is far more concrete than can ever be represented by even the most developed dialectics. The rational representation of men's activity in the world is then an inherently uncompletable task. 3. Hegel in his discussion of being makes the point that the logical formula A = A has no demonstrable correspondence with actual experience; diversity is an inherent property of identity (Andy B. presents a pretty thorough discussion on this in his The Meaning of Hegel, Chapter iv section, " Diversity(essential Identity )" ). The whole basis of all rational activity, all dialectics, conscious and unconscious, deliberated and automatic, is the unity between the essential transitoriness of experienced moments and the determination of identities; qualities, quantities, measure and all the other things we have to "know" to develop a working model of the world. It's the unity of logical categorization and the essential temporality of immediate experience that fuels the dialectic and makes it so important a tool for exploration of the unknown. Second paragraph: The clarification of what exactly is the significance of the *objective* nature of nature is probably Ilyenkov's most important contributions to Scientific Marxism. Indeed for orthodox Marxists, including Lenin in his earlier writings (prior at very least to his readings in Hegel in 1914 and possibly as early as his article on Emprio-positivism), did indeed inherit the classical materialist concept of the objectivity of nature in the metaphysical sense of the essential being of nature; known, unknown, whatever. Ilyenkov in the last paragraphs of chapter 8 of Dialectical Logic summarizes the reasoning that is the basis of the concept of nature as prior to and independently of humankind. Here he distinguishes between Marx and Engel's theories of human activity and Hegel's idealism by recapitulating their description of man as a product and force of nature that transforms nature into the instruments of his activity in appropriating nature's goods and producing from them the means for the perpetuation of his body organic and inorganic. Nothing could more clearly describe the independence of abstract nature from the emergence of human activity in the world. After all, if man has his origins in the development of the natural world, then nature as a whole precedes and is a prerequisite for human activity. Nature regarded abstractly cannot be described as a product of human activity Then too, the laws and principles of nature whereby men transform nature into the instruments and products of labour are hardly a product of pure logic, of men's unfettered imagination. The laws of nature as men know and accommodate their actions to them are firmly connected to the physical and sensual properties of man the organism and to the natural conditions he confronts in the course of his prosecution of labour activity. Men do not produce in a vacuum which they then fill with ideas and concepts. Nature is a partner with man in his determination and production of his needs, and its presence is identifiable in all human activity in the world. All these descriptions of nature relate directly to the interaction of man with nature as a force of nature, and not one of these statements asserts some sort of universal state of being for nature itself. The activist interpretation of men's relation to the world first proposed by Kant, further developed by Hegel and given a material natural interpretation by Marx and Engels obviates all necessity to make broad ontological statements about the world in order to realize the objects of theory. with Regards, Oudeyis ----- Original Message ----- From: "Steve Gabosch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu> Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2005 9:35 AM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! > If I am reading Oudeyis correctly, he is saying that nature is determined > by human interaction with it; that nature is strictly a product of the > unity of human purposive activity and natural conditions; and that nature > is a function of human labour. If by "nature" we are only referring to > that portion of reality that humanity consciously observes and/or acts > upon, then Oudeyis successfully makes that point. But this conception of > reality restricts nature to human experience, which can only be a subset of > nature. Nature must also include that which is beyond the observed and > acted upon. The "unknown" - the not yet experienced - must also be taken > into account in the creation of a materialist ontology. > > It is certainly true that humans only consciously experience that portion > of nature they observe and/or act on through the lens of culture and the > plethora of human activity, a key idea in Ilyenkov's concept of the > ideal. But how humanity, through its social relations, activities, > languages, etc. *subjectively* experiences nature (individually or > collectively) is a different question than the *objective* nature of nature > itself. I can see little room for doubt that all these Marxists insisted > upon making this fundamental distinction. They maintained that nature > exists prior to and independently of humankind, holding the ontological > view that nature also includes that which humankind has not yet - and may > never - experience. I am aware of no evidence to support Oudeyis's claim > that the conception of nature held by these classical Marxists was > restricted to only that which humans have interacted with and/or laboured on. > > - Steve > > > At 07:09 AM 5/26/2005 +0200, Oudeyis wrote: > >Marx and Engels adopted Hegel's activist determination of nature as > >a product of the interaction of man with > >nature (human purposive intervention in nature) , but revised it to include > >that human intervention as a force of nature rather than just an exercise of > >intellect. For Marx, Engels, and Lenin the objective, materialist > >determination of the nature of nature must be regarded as strictly a > >dialectical product of the unity of human practical activity with the > >natural conditions that are the subject of that activity, i.e. as a function > >of human labour. > > > > _______________________________________________ > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. > Version: 7.0.322 / Virus Database: 267.2.0 - Release Date: 27/05/05 > > -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. 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