----- Original Message ----- From: "Ralph Dumain" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu> Sent: Thursday, March 17, 2005 6:47 PM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] More Godel
> First of all, the theories of knowledge of Engels and Lenin lack the specificity to grapple with axiomatic systems as we've come to understand them. Secondly, the philosophical extrapolations and analogies presented here are not very good interpretations of Godel. Putting these two components together, much of the reasoning we see here is nebulous and vague verbiage about "dialectics", communicating very little. [vfr] Nor should they. Engels and Lenin follow Marx who in turn follows Hegel in discarding formal logic as useless for the development of empirical theories for designing social practice. > I can't claim to be an expert in Popper, but I had a specific argument as to why philosophical reasoning is inadequate as a model for the gaining of knowledge through practical engagement with the world. This is becasue reasoning about empirical matters is inherntly fallible, hence no definitive proof is possible. This led Hume to skepticism, Kant to his Cpernican revolution, and Popper to deducing certain consequences from the problem of induction. However, this is a very different problem from formal mathematical deductive inference. [vfr] FORMAL reasoning about empirical matters is inherently fallible regarding empirical matters. Kant makes this a central feature of his science of knowledge. It is also the main reason why Hegel discarded the Law of the Excluded Middle (among other things) to produce a theory on reasoning that could successfully deal with empirical matters. > For a whole different approach to these issues, see: > > "On the Dialectics of Metamathematics" (Excerpts) by Peter Vardy > http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/vardy2.html > > Some Italian mathematicians also have something interesting to say on the subject. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Charles Brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Mar 17, 2005 11:33 AM > To: 'Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marx and > the thinkers he inspired' <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu> > Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] More Godel > > My opinion is that this sort of analogical reasoning doesn't work well here, > i.e. when we are talking about formal mathematical systems. > > ^^^^ > CB: Why , would you say, formal mathematical systems don't "fit" this ? > > What's "special" about mathematical systems that makes them an exception to > the Marx-Engels-Lenin theory of knowledge, from your analysis and experience > with these ? > > ^^^^ > > > > Now, if the topic were a priori philosophical reasoning in general, I might > be inclined to agree. In fact, I used a similar argument last year when > arguing with critical rationalists (Popperians) about falsifiability and > objective knowledge, or the notion that objective knowledge is what survives > tests (negative criteria). I don't recall the details, but my argument had > something to do with the limitations of the aprioristic mode of reasoning of > philosophy. > > > _______________________________________________ > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. > Version: 7.0.308 / Virus Database: 266.7.3 - Release Date: 15/03/05 > > -- No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. Version: 7.0.308 / Virus Database: 266.7.3 - Release Date: 15/03/05 _______________________________________________ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
