----- Original Message ----- From: "Fred Feldman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "standard" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "gleft" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "107" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "snews" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "change" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "rad" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu>; <PEN-L@SUS.CSUCHICO.EDU>; "620" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "ceoi" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "ufpj-news" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "kom" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "'gpcafe'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "'gpcafe'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "'nsan'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "solidarity" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "atlantic" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Tuesday, March 15, 2005 4:53 PM Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Re: Imperialism's "war for democracy" in theMiddle East
> The growing striving for popular democracy in the Middle East Fred > Feldman > Mar 15, 2005 05:01 PST > > This is a useful summary article in my opinion. The range and variety > of aspirations for democracy in the Middle East are part of the > breakdown of the old status quo, which the US rulers are trying to take > hold of, contain, control, and direct. ----------------------Forwarded message------------------------ >From Rudyard Kipling To: Marxmail <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2005 11:37:41 -0500 Subject: [Marxism] Re: Imperialism's "war for democracy" in theMiddle East Now it is not good For the Christian's health To hustle the Aryan brown, For the Christian riles And the Aryan smiles And he wearth the Christian down; And the end of the fight Is tombstone white With the name of the late deceased, And the epitaph drear, "A fool lies here Who tried to hustle the East." - Rudyard Kipling [vfr] > This partly predates, but is being heightened by, the imperialist > challenge to the region. It would be a mistake to see the hundreds of > thousands who demonstrated in opposition to the Syrian troops in > Lebanon, and the hundreds of thousands who have twice mobilized to > support Hezbollah against Syria against US-French-UN Security Council > intervention as simply opposite sides of the class struggle. This is an > example of the growing social tensions, and the growing tendency of the > masses mobilize, that Washington is seeking to contain, control, and > direct -- including by force of arms. > > For instance, the term "Cedar revolution," now universally adopted by > the US media for the largely Christian-Druse Muslim-middle class > mobilizations against the presence of Syrian troops and the Syrian > predominance over the Lebanon government, did not originate with the > protesters but with President Bush. It has specifically Christian > sectarian implications, indicating Washington's desire to strengthen the > position of the Christian bourgeoisie, traditionally allied with US and > French imperialism -- and at times with Israel. Some of the latter have > picked up the US-approved designation. > > But the popular term for the first anti-Syrian mobilizations was > "intifada" or "shaking off" and anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian > sentiment is common even among the Christian masses. > The successive governments backed by Syria have certainly not solved any > of the problems of the Lebanese masses, and the wearing out of the mass > toleration for these regimes can certainly have progressive as well as > reactionary consequences, depending on the evolution of the class > struggle. > > It is a fact that the Hezbollah forces tend to have more support and to > mobilize more of the poor, especially from among the Shia who tend to > make up, along with the Palestinians, the poorest and least represented > section of the population. But it is wrong to see these demonstrations > as simply representing counterposed pro- vs. anti-imperialist forces. > > The striving for a democratic opening against the mostly burned-out a > unpopular bourgeois nationalist regimes in the region is also an opening > for the oppressed and exploited to put their stamp on the process, and > not simply participate as followers. Elements of these aspirations for > real mass democracy AGAINST what > imperialism is bringing to the region appear in both the > anti-occupations struggle of the Sunni population in Iraq, and just as > much in the mobilization of the Shia around the elections. > > The people of the region are feeling the need for a new order. US > imperialism is trying to take hold of the region to impose its > "democracy" which is counterposed to both national independence and the > interests of the most oppressed and exploited. They want regimes that > will be reliable guarantors of growing imperialist superprofits, > reliable allies against challenges to intensifying imperial ist > domination, and reliable barriers to mass organization, protests, and > challenges for power. > > Perhaps the example of Venezuela will begin to be more widely known and > discussed in the Middle East in the next period. The struggles and > successes in Venezuela are more immediately relevant to the practical > situation in Lebanon and Iraq than I > tended to assume. The demand for democracy has to be recaptured in the > Middle East as a anti-imperialist, popular demand for for the interests > of the masses as > opposed to the worn-out dictatorships (which so far are showing little > power of resistance to the mounting imperialist attack) and to the > controlled, exclusive, and really anti-democratic "consensus demcracy" > being proposed from Washington. The slogan of democracy must not be > handed to the imperialists in defense of the shabby and increasingly > inadequate status quo. > > As should be clear, this does not change our stance of > unconditional opposition to all imperialist intervention, political and > military, in the region, or our call for immediate, unconditional > withdrawal of troops from Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. > > The demand for democracy is not a softening or limitation to the fight > against imperialism. The fight for self-determination and recognition > of imperialism as the main enemy of all the peoples of the region is > central to a victorious fight to win democracy for the oppressed > masses. > Fred Feldman > > > News & Views for Anarchists & Activists: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo > > [The web version of this excellent, informative article > includes many links.--DC] > > Reason > http://www.reason.com/links/links030805.shtml > March 8, 2005 > Behind the Cedars > Nonviolent protest in the Middle East > by Jesse Walker > mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > > First the invasion, then the agitation. A month ago, it was > a scenario embraced by only a handful of neoconservatives > and liberal hawks. In the wake of the Lebanese rebellion, > it's becoming the new conventional wisdom: The U.S. sweeps > into Iraq, topples Saddam, hangs on tenaciously when the > occupation gets ugly; the payoff will be ten of thousands of > Arabs in the streets demanding democracy. > > In fact, several countries have seen nonviolent Arab > movements for liberty and self-government recently, but > there's only one where there's no doubt the protests are a > consequence of the American invasion of Iraq. That revolt > happened under circumstances that should give pause to hawks > and doves alike: It's the movement in Iraq, led by the Grand > Ayatollah Ali Sistani, that culminated in January's elections. > > In 2003, after the American occupiers cancelled local votes > and announced that there'd be no national balloting until a > constitution was drafted, Sistani demanded elections in a > fatwa. He stepped up his protests after the U.S. proposed an > indirect vote that would be easier for the Americans to > control. As many as 100,000 of his Shi'ite followers marched > in the streets of Baghdad in early 2004, and 30,000 held a > similar demonstration in Basra. Among their chants: "Yes, > yes to elections! No, no to occupation!" The U.S. eventually > gave in to most of Sistani's demands, and the cleric then > urged his followers to go to the polls. > > Since that vote, American pundits have debated how > democratic the process was, how liberal Sistani's long-term > intentions are, how stable the new government will be in the > face of the insurgency. But most have passed over the extent > to which the vote itself was a product of ferment from the > bottom up rather than orders from the top down. When they > have raised the issue, it's usually been in the context of > debating how much "credit" Bush deserves for the elections, > an issue of interest to no one but partisan obsessives. Few > have paused to ponder the paradox that the most successful > recent grassroots campaign in the Middle East was both a > product of the American occupation and aimed at the American > occupiers. > > The region's other people power movements are a heady mix, > and a judgment about one won't always apply to the others. > Here's an incomplete rundown: > > * Most famous, of course, are the festive protests that > followed the assassination of Lebanon's former prime > minister Rafik Hariri, which soon became a strikingly > successful drive to end Syria's two-decade occupation. > (Syria's responsibility for Hariri's death has not been > proven, but it was widely blamed for the murder.) The > movement had a substantial victory when Lebanon's pro-Syrian > prime minister resigned, and another when Syrian President > Bashar Assad agreed to a gradual pullout-though the > protesters are calling for something much faster. > > Supporters of the Iraq war are calling this uprising a > consequence of the U.S. invasion, frequently citing the > Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's comment to The > Washington Post: "I was cynical about Iraq. But when I saw > the Iraqi people voting three weeks ago, 8 million of them, > it was the start of a new Arab world. . . . The Berlin Wall > has fallen." I have no window into Jumblatt's soul, and I > have no idea how sincere the notoriously opportunistic > politician is being. But in practice, America's current > face-off with Assad is more important to Jumblatt than its > earlier face-off with Hussein, and it gives him a strong > incentive to do an about-face on the Iraq war. > > On the streets, there's anecdotal evidence that the > elections in Iraq have been on the marchers' minds. But > there are two bigger influences, represented by the two > labels the Lebanese revolt has attracted. Sometimes it calls > itself the Independence Intifada, indicating an eye trained > on Israel's partial withdrawal from its occupied > territories. And sometimes it's called the Cedar Revolution, > suggesting that the other eye is pointed at two recent > recent events in Central Asia: the Orange Revolution in > Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. > > The Lebanese protesters have borrowed many tactics directly > from the Ukrainians and Georgians, from tent cities to > street theater. "Interestingly, one of the Lebanese and > Egyptian slogans is 'enough,' which was also used by the > Ukrainians, and was the name of the Georgian student > resistance movement," notes Shaazka Beyerle, the > Greece-based vice president of the International Center on > Nonviolent Conflict, who has closely followed events in > Lebanon. "Protesters handed out roses to soldiers-another > echo of Georgia's tactics which earned its Rose Revolution > name." > [As to the slogan "enough", one might also recall the > Zapatista's "Ya basta!" and Zimbabwe's Zvakwana/Sokwanele.--DC] > > * Just south of Lebanon, another nonviolent campaign has > been underway since 2002. Mustafa Barghouti's Palestinian > National Initiative has been in the forefront of protesting > the wall Israel is erecting in the West Bank. The barrier is > supposed to keep suicide bombers out of Israel, but it's had > dire effects for many ordinary Palestinians who now find > their property confiscated and their movements curtailed. As > Amnesty International put it in 2003, "more and more > Palestinians find themselves trapped into enclaves and > cantons, unable to have any semblance of a normal life." > > The movement against the fence is notable not just for its > aims, but for its methods: Barghouti, who comes from a > secular leftist background, is making a conscious attempt to > move Palestinian dissent away from terrorism and toward > nonviolent resistance. He's also a longstanding critic of > the corruption within the Palestinian National Authority, > and he finished second in the recent election to succeed > Yasser Arafat, gathering 19.8% of the vote. > > * Syria now faces both nonviolent and violent upheaval from > its Kurdish minority. (This received some western attention > a year ago, after a soccer riot in Qamishli set off protests > and crackdowns in several Syrian cities.) The country has > also seen occasional displays of displeasure from its Arab > citizens, and there are hopes that the crisis in Lebanon > will fell the regime in Damascus as well. For the moment, > though, few expect a full-fledged people-power revolt. "The > City's air is rife with all sorts of untoward rumors," the > Damascus-based blogger Ammar Abdulhamid wrote last week; > "everything is now possible: there is talk of arrests, > purges, coup d'états, assassinations, sanctions, invasions, > anything and everything, except, of course, freedom. > Everything is possible except freedom." > > * Saudi Arabia's municipal elections, which began in > February and went through their second phase last week, are > hardly models of modern democracy-among other problems, only > men could vote-but there's some hope that they'll be a first > step towards more serious change. Though some have rushed to > attribute the Saudi shift to Iraq's example, there are some > closer models, including Bahrain's parliamentary elections > in 2002 and Jordan's vote in 2003. > > Even closer to home is the small but brave domestic movement > for democracy, which received a little press attention last > year when three of its leaders went on trial for their > anti-authoritarian activism, attracting a crowd of 200 > spectators. It's hard to say how big a role it played in the > kingdom's cautious reforms, but The Washington Post's Steve > Coll has some bad news: "In the same week that the Saudi > government posted and celebrated the results of the Riyadh > area's municipal voting," he writes, "it barred lawyers and > supporters from the accused activists' courtroom and > threatened to convict them without a formal trial because > the men refused to present a defense." > > * And then there's Egypt. President Hosni Mubarak announced > what he called a "new era of reform" late last month with > the news that his country would hold its first multiparty > elections in over 50 years. Hardly anyone thinks he has a > genuinely competitive contest in mind, let alone the sort of > liberalization that would entail releasing all his political > prisoners and embracing open political debate. But opponents > of his rule are now agitating for more substantial changes. > A week after Mubarak's announcement, demonstrators in Cairo > were declaring the elections a "masquerade" and demanding > more substantial reforms. > > * Just as this story was going to press, Reuters reported > that about 500 Kuwaitis, most of them women, marched on > Parliament to demand women's suffrage. My colleague Charles > Paul Freund notes that Kuwait has seen bills to enfranchise > women in the past, but that this was the first time such a > measure has been boosted by street protests. > > Simon Jenkins wrote yesterday that "tossing a miasma of > events into a journalistic cocktail seldom yields clarity," > and I realize I'm in danger of mixing a hallucinatory potion > myself. The above list mixes strong movements and weak ones, > movements aligned with the U.S. and distant from it, > movements for free elections and movements for deeper > liberal reforms. It's useless to argue about whether the war > "caused" these revolts. Syria's Kurds wouldn't be so > rambunctious without the Iraqi Kurds to inspire them, but > otherwise it's hard to claim that any particular uprising > couldn't have occurred without Iraq looming in the > background. Iraq does loom in the background, though, and if > nothing else it's created a general quickening effect. > Within Iraq, it sparked Sistani's peaceful protests-and it > also sparked a violent insurgency. Outside Iraq, preexisting > patterns of all kinds are intensified. There's a wave of > nonviolent movements against injustice; there's also a wave > of terrorism. (The State Department's most recent report on > global terror shows the number of attacks increasing from > 198 in 2002 to 208 in 2003.) The circuits of communication, > from Bahraini bloggers to Al Jazeera, pulsate with > unexpected ideas and insurrections. Most of this is > invisible to Americans until suddenly it flares into view. > All of a sudden, mutually suspicious Lebanese factions unite > to throw out their Syrian overlords. All of a sudden, a car > bomb kills 125 in Baghdad. > > And then the event is ripped from its context and reduced to > fit one of the competing narratives of America's domestic > disputes. I can't stop that, and I'm not sure I'd want to, > but let me make a plea. If you're a hawk, try to read the > voices of caution without reflexively declaring that the > pessimists just don't want to give Bush credit for anything. > And if you're a dove, try to read the voices of elation > without worrying that a happy event in the Middle East might > somehow justify the war. (Last I checked, the > national-security case for the invasion was still in > tatters, and that's the only one that mattered to me. > Besides, if nonviolent conflict can be a consequence of war, > it can also be an alternative to it.) > > Breathe deeply. For a moment, forget our stateside > struggles, and try to take the Middle East on its own terms. > > Managing Editor Jesse Walker is author of Rebels on the Air: > An Alternative History of Radio in America (NYU Press). > > -- > Dan Clore > > Now available: _The Unspeakable and Others_ > http://www.wildsidepress.com/index2.htm > http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1587154838/thedanclorenecro > Lord We˙rdgliffe & Necronomicon Page: > http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/9879/ > News & Views for Anarchists & Activists: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/smygo > > As the Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, > founded on the Christian religion; as it has in itself no character of > enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquillity, of Mussulmen; and, > as the said States never entered into any war, or act of hostility > against any Mahometan nation, it is declared by the parties, that no > pretext arising from religious opinions, shall ever produce an > interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries. > -- The Treaty of Tripoli, entered into by the USA under > George Washington > > > _______________________________________________ > Marxism-Thaxis mailing list > Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu > To change your options or unsubscribe go to: > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Anti-Virus. > Version: 7.0.308 / Virus Database: 266.7.2 - Release Date: 11/03/05 > -- No virus found in this outgoing message. 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